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1
Introduction
Sandra E. Gleason
Pennsylvania State University

As early as the mid-1970s, observers of private sector employment
practices in the United States commented on an emerging new phenomenon: the increasing use of nonstandard workers—that is, employees
who are hired under a variety of nonstandard arrangements without a
permanent connection to an employer. These include part-time employment; hiring through temporary help employment agencies, such as
“Kelly Girl” clerical services; self-employed consultants; employees
leased, contracted, or subcontracted from business service firms such as
advertising or janitorial firms; multiple-job holders; and day laborers.1
Although companies historically have used nonstandard workers,
the relatively rapid growth rate of these workers in a wide range of industries and occupations has become pervasive (see Nye [1998] for examples). At the time the change was identified, the available data made
it difficult to measure exactly what was occurring, although the trend
appeared to be similar in both the private and public sectors (see Light
[1999] for examples in the federal government). Today we have better
data but they provide disparate estimates of the extent of nonstandard
employment.
Nonstandard employment arrangements have received increased attention due to several factors. First, ongoing changes suggest that the
trend toward greater use of nonstandard employment is likely to continue. The restructuring of the economy in the post–World War II era in
an increasingly global economy has continued. The pace of this change
has been heavily driven by technological advances and the “information age,” and encouraged by the increase in the share of total compensation (i.e., wages and fringe benefits) represented by legally required
benefits such as Social Security and nonwage benefits such as health
care. These economic forces have encouraged employers to seek more
options to control or reduce labor costs. Illustrative examples include
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the use of temporary workers during a short period of peak demand and
long-term strategies to improve productivity by subcontracting the peripheral activities of the firm to companies specializing in services such
as accounting. Several terms are used interchangeably to identify these
employment arrangements, including nonstandard work or nonstandard employment, atypical employment, contingent work, alternative
staffing strategies, flexible work arrangements, as well as the phantom
workforce and the shadow workforce (Belous 1989; Carré et al. 2000;
Delson 1995; Light 1999; Nollen and Exel 1996; Nye 1988; Polivka,
Cohany, and Hipple 2000; Reilly 2001).2
Second, while nonstandard employment provides for many employers a buffer for market changes, it often provides relatively unstable
employment for workers due to their dependence on the varying needs
of the employer. Also, wages can be lower, and many workers do not
receive benefits such as health care and pensions. Consequently, the
perceived movement away from the twentieth-century model of “good
jobs,” defined as full-time employment with a continuous attachment
to one employer, has raised questions about how “good jobs” will be
defined in the future.3
Finally, it has become apparent as we have learned more about the
nonstandard workforce that it is disproportionately staffed by women,
younger workers, and minorities (see Fagan and O’Reilly [1998] and
Zeytinoğlu and Muteshi [1999] for further discussion). Indeed, early
research in the United States particularly stressed the negative impact
on women.4 Furthermore, not all of these workers are voluntarily in
contingent employment. Some would prefer full-time employment in a
standard work arrangement.
Our understanding of the growth of nonstandard employment and
its impact on employers, employees, the labor force, and public policy
has evolved over the past two decades. In the 1980s much attention was
focused on the identification of the dimensions of the change and trying
to explain why it was occurring. During the 1990s, more sophisticated
explanatory models were developed and tested. These models explained
the advantages and disadvantages of nonstandard work from the perspectives of both the employer (the demand side of the labor market)
and employee (the supply side of the labor market). This was a departure from previous research, which tended to focus primarily on either
the demand or the supply side of the market, and treated this workforce
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as a relatively homogeneous group without appropriate attention to the
multiple forms of nonstandard employment arrangements. Not surprisingly, different authors with varying foci reached different conclusions
about the positive, negative, or neutral impact of these arrangements.
For example, those studying the implications for unions typically saw
the impact on the labor force as highly negative, while those analyzing
the benefits for employers generally concluded that there were many
positive benefits.
Researchers today present a more balanced outlook, which has
synthesized the divergent perspectives of employers and employees. It
recognizes the heterogeneity of this group of workers and both the advantages and disadvantages of nonstandard employment to the parties
involved. This in turn is encouraging more attention to the public policy
measures designed to provide more protections and improve working
conditions for nonstandard employees.
This book provides an overview of the facts and issues of nonstandard employment in the countries where this labor market phenomenon has been most studied: the United States, Japan, and the European Union.5 Although the authors have used nontechnical language
for general readers who are not specialists in labor market analysis,
scholars and human resource professionals also will find these essays
of interest. The book presents a balanced perspective on the advantages
and disadvantages of nonstandard employment arrangements from the
viewpoint of employers and employees; it does not advocate a particular philosophical perspective. Chapters 2 through 6 focus on the United
States, while Chapters 7 through 9 focus on Japan and Europe. The final
chapter summarizes the future directions for research identified by the
authors.

Key Concepts
A number of concepts are used repeatedly throughout the book
that are key to understanding the discussions. These concepts include
the measurement of the shadow workforce, the heterogeneity of these
workers, labor market flexibility as seen from both the employer and
employee perspectives, the use of core and noncore workers in strategic
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hiring decisions, and the tension between regulation and deregulation in
the public policy debates.
Measuring the Nonstandard Workforce
Those interested in studying the nonstandard workforce initially
were hindered by the lack of labor market employment data designed
to focus in detail on this segment of the workforce. Also, the variety of
forms of nonstandard employment made it difficult to determine how
many people were in each employment category. In response to the
need for data, in 1995 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) added
more questions to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in a supplemental survey conducted every two years called the “Contingent and
Alternative Work Survey” (CWS). The CWS measures the size of the
labor force in nonstandard work arrangements by the type of employment arrangement and for workers employed for less than one year in
jobs that are contingent on the needs of the employers. We now have
time-series data indicating that, since 1995, the characteristics of contingent workers have changed little.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the data show that, by
2005, workers hired in nonstandard employment arrangements represented about 4.1 percent of the labor force based on the broadest
measure of contingent work developed by the BLS, but this is about a
1.1 percent decrease from 1995.6 These facts sharply contrast with the
popular perception that nonstandard work is rapidly replacing standard
work arrangements. However, the estimate is based on the responses
provided by workers, but not all workers were able to answer the question of whether their employment was contingent. If the respondents
who were uncertain about the contingency of their employment arrangements were included, contingent employment would be about 10
percent (Belman and Golden 2000).
The BLS definition of alternative employment arrangements indicates that about 10.7 percent of the workforce fell into this group in
2005, but there is some overlap between this measure and the contingent
work measure.7 Several studies have analyzed this overlap. Even when
using the broadest measure of contingency, one-third of the employees
of temporary help agencies were not contingent workers in 1995, and in
1997 about 19 percent of total employment was in regular self-employ-
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ment or regular part-time employment (Cohany 1996; Polivka 1996).
However, if the regular self-employed and regular part-time workers
also are included, 29.9 percent of the labor force in 1999 was in a nonstandard employment arrangement (Hipple 2001; Polivka, Cohany, and
Hipple 2000). Because this group of employees has been relatively invisible to employers, as well as within the total labor force, it has been
labeled as a “phantom” of the larger full-time labor force employed in
standard employment arrangements; its true size is unknown.8
The Heterogeneity of the Nonstandard Workforce
Analysis increasingly has taken into account the substantial differences between the various subgroups of nonstandard employees,
whether the choice to be in nonstandard employment is voluntary or
involuntary, and the resulting economic impact of the employment arrangement on the employee. For example, a male computer programmer who is a college graduate and voluntarily chooses to work as a
well-paid, full-time consultant to a software firm is in a very different
arrangement than a female with a high school education who works
part time in a retail store earning the minimum wage when she prefers a
full-time position. She usually has no fringe benefits such as health insurance or an employer-provided pension, and she experiences inferior
working conditions and has little or no job security.
Although both workers are in nonstandard employment arrangements, it is clear that the consultant is not harmed by this arrangement;
he may in fact be employed for several years on a project with the same
employer. In contrast, the female retail clerk is disadvantaged in the
labor market by her contingent status. Consequently, relatively few policy concerns have been articulated about workers such as the computer
consultant. Most of the public policy discussion has focused on workers
who, like the retail clerk, are relatively disadvantaged by involuntary
contingent employment, particularly those who are working-class, minority or immigrant, and less educated (Bernasek and Kinnear 1999;
Carré et al. 2000; Zeytinoğlu 1999). Without careful attention to this
heterogeneity, research may either over- or understate the labor market
problems faced by these workers. This, in turn, can result in inappropriate and ineffective policy recommendations (Lester 1998).
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Consequently, care must be taken to avoid generalizations about the
impact these highly varied employment arrangements have on workers.
Such generalizations do not provide useful insights and can be misleading. The impact of being in a contingent job varies greatly with the
type of employment arrangement, industry sector, occupation, education, and employee demographic characteristics such as age, gender,
and race (Belman and Golden 2000). As Ferber and Waldfogel (2000,
p. 214) note: “. . . the answer to the question of whether part-time jobs
are bad jobs is ‘it depends.’”
Core and Noncore Workers
Discussions about the use of nonstandard employment arrangements frequently draw a distinction between two groups of employees.
The first is the “core” workers who perform the work most closely tied
to the primary economic activities of the employer. Core employees
are in standard employment arrangements, which means they have fulltime jobs with a permanent connection to a single employer, usually
receive a range of social insurance benefits, and have some protection
from arbitrary dismissal (Vosko 1998). The second is the noncore, or
“peripheral,” workers whose work is not the core work of the organization (see Reilly [2001, pp. 47–49] for a typical discussion of core and
peripheral workers). An example for a manufacturing company would
be the use of a core employee trained to perform a specialized task on
an assembly line, while a peripheral employee would be hired to perform janitorial work through a subcontract with a firm that specializes
in janitorial services.
The use of noncore workers in various types of nonstandard employment arrangements offers the firm more flexible opportunities to do
its work while protecting the employment security and avoiding layoffs
of its trained and experienced core workers. The use of contingent employees can be an ad hoc tactical approach to address short-term needs,
such as covering the maternity leave of a core employee, or a strategic
response developed to deal over time with an increasingly global and
dynamic economic environment. Nonstandard employees allow an employer to use “just-in-time” management of labor to increase, decrease,
or reassign its workforce (Lewis and Molloy 1991). Nonstandard employment arrangements can be used, for example, to adjust to fluctua-
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tions in the demand for its products, reduce labor costs, reduce the inhouse time spent on a variety of human resource administrative and
monitoring functions for peripheral workers, subcontract for special
projects for which a set of skills is needed for only a limited time period, manage unexpected or temporary staffing needs such as an illness
or vacations, and to temporarily add a position as a way to determine
whether a new core position is needed. To achieve the flexibility desired
for both tactical and strategic adjustments one employer may use one or
more of these different employment arrangements simultaneously. For
a detailed discussion of how to determine whether to hire a core or noncore employee for a particular job, see Roberts and Gleason (2000).
Flexibility
As discussed earlier, flexibility gives employers more options for
rapid and nimble adjustments to changes in the economic environment
through internal adjustments to their strategic hiring and staffing plans.
Similarly, some employees want greater flexibility so they can more
easily combine work with their lifestyle preferences.
Much of the discussion of employer flexibility has focused primarily on numerical flexibility at the enterprise level, i.e., adjusting the
number of workers or hours of work in response to product demand.
However, two other types of flexibility also are important to employers. Functional flexibility, the design and organization of jobs so that
employees can be used in a wide range of tasks, permits rapid reassignment to different jobs. Financial flexibility includes hiring decisions designed to control or reduce short- and long-term labor costs
and the use of different systems of compensation such as subcontracting.9 However, when this results in contingent employment with lowerwage jobs and fewer benefits for workers, the welfare of workers is
reduced, and some workers are unable to exercise their preferences for
full-time employment.
Some employees voluntarily choose nonstandard employment because of lifestyle preferences or because it provides the flexibility to
combine employment with other daily demands. For example, women
with small children may be conceptualized as making a labor market
choice among three options: not working, working part time, or working full time. Some women will voluntarily choose part-time work so
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they have time to care for their children (Tam 1997). As a result, greater
workforce diversity had placed new demands on employers to develop
employment options that are more family-friendly and recognize the
different needs of employees.
The concept of the “flexibilisation of labor” was coined by Delson
(1995) to denote an inclusive framework of factors that result in greater labor market flexibility. This includes employer actions, employee
choices, and the legal and institutional framework that structures labor
market relationships. Reilly (2001) discusses the concept of “mutual
flexibility” which “. . . lies in balancing the understandable needs of
employers to be efficient and competitive with the equally understandable needs of employees to protect their incomes and lead the lifestyle
that suits them” (p. xi). These are both multidimensional views of flexibility, broadly defined.
Regulation or Deregulation
Fundamental transformations are under way in the global economy.
New forms of technology are developing, and the structure of the industrialized nations is continuing to shift away from traditional manufacturing toward services and information technology industries. In response
to these changes, nations are evaluating the laws and labor market institutions created in the past to identify the changes required for the
dynamic global economy of the twenty-first century. A frequent tension
encountered is whether, or to what degree, good public policy should
regulate or deregulate the institutions that structure labor market activities. This is a debate about the role of government policy in supporting
or limiting labor market flexibility. Tensions arise between regulation
advocates, who seek to develop new laws to address problems faced
by nonstandard employees, and deregulation advocates, who want to
remove the legal and institutional barriers to flexibility created by existing laws. Thus, what employers and workers can and cannot do is constrained by public policy as embodied in law and other regulations. This
public regulation is complemented by the private regulation negotiated
by employers and unions through collective bargaining.
Each type of nonstandard employment exists in its current form
because there is either a relative absence of a regulatory environment
or a regulatory environment that frames its use. For example, in the
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United States employers have been able to expand the use of part-time
employees with few legal obstacles and little effort to change the institutional framework. Also, the temporary help industry has worked since
the 1960s to establish the legal concept of a temporary help firm as the
employer, instead of the client firm that actually uses the workers being
defined as the employer.10 This makes the client firm the customer firm,
which may—but not always—relieve it of a number of costly legal responsibilities, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. This result has been
achieved through lobbying and seeking influence over state administrative agencies, and has succeeded in achieving “conditional legitimacy”
for the employer status of temporary help firms (Gonos 1997, p. 105).
The business community in this case played a dominant role in the development of the law and public policy applied to temporary help firms.
As a result the temporary help supply industry grew rapidly from 1972
to 1997 at an annual rate of more than 11 percent (Estevao and Lach
2000, p. 123).
The regulatory framework has, in turn, affected economic decision
making. For example, in the United States the use of workers provided
by temporary help firms is generally expected to reduce labor costs due
to the relatively weak regulatory structure. In contrast, the European
Union has created a regulatory environment designed to provide greater
protections to these workers, which limits the degree to which client
firms can expect to reduce labor costs (Vosko 1998, pp. 24–26).
Labor unions also are important labor market institutions that influence the legal and administrative framework. Many labor unions tend
to oppose legal changes that will expand opportunities for part-time
and temporary work at the expense of full-time employment. Recent
evidence in the United States suggests that this opposition is not based
on the lower hours of employment per se, but instead reflects the concern that part-time workers are paid a lower wage per hour than fulltime workers. Various strategies are used to address unions’ concerns.
Unions in the United States have used collective bargaining to limit or
control the growth of nonstandard employment. In Japan and Europe
unions have supported regulation by the government to control temporary employment agencies (Delson 1995, p. 108).
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Overview of the Book
This book is organized into three sections. The primary focus is
the nonstandard workforce in the United States. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of the nonstandard workforce in the United States, its demographic characteristics, and why it has grown. Chapters 3–6 build on
this foundation, with discussions about the employer’s decision to hire
contingent workers, labor union responses to the threats and challenges
created by contingent work for unionized employees, the legal framework in which the decision to hire nonstandard workers of various types
is made, and the impact of current public programs such as unemployment insurance on these workers. Chapters 7–9 focus on Japan and Europe and explore how these mature industrialized nations are coping
with, and adapting to, contingent work within different socioeconomic
and legal systems. Finally, Chapter 10 presents a summary and ideas
for future research.
Perspectives from the United States
In Chapter 2, von Hippel et al. provide an overview of the facts,
theories, and issues related to the nonstandard workforce in the United
States. As the authors note, even the seemingly simple question “How
large is this segment of the workforce?” does not have an easy answer
due to the variety of definitions used to measure this heterogeneous
group of workers and the associated methodological challenges encountered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS uses three
estimates ranging from narrow to broad to measure “contingent employment,” which is work that is expected to last less than one year,
and a fourth measure of “alternative employment arrangement,” which
groups workers into four categories: 1) independent contractors, 2) oncall workers, 3) temporary help agency workers, and 4) workers provided by contract. The characteristics of the nonstandard workforce are
identified by type of alternative employment arrangement, age, gender,
race, level of educational attainment, occupational category, and industrial sector.
The chapter then provides an overview of the demand and supply
sides of the labor markets employing contingent workers. Data are pro-
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vided on workers’ preferences for nonstandard work arrangements, as
well as the impact of these arrangements on their earnings and selected
fringe benefits. Workers’ preferences for contingent or permanent work
reflect their interests in flexibility for lifestyle or life cycle reasons. Employers use these workers to address the challenges they face, including
the need to control or reduce labor costs, to be more flexible in adjusting to dynamic market conditions, and to avoid legal and other restrictions.
The authors argue that the changing nature of the employment relationship within the current global economic context suggests that the
size of the nonstandard workforce is likely to increase in the future.
As employers and employees understand more clearly the changing
nature of employment relationships, both see the benefits from more
flexible employment arrangements. This in turn means that we need to
overcome some of the negative stereotypes previously associated with
part-time and other forms of nonstandard work; we also need to address
inequities in the operation of our social support systems, which were
designed to serve primarily full-time employees in standard employment arrangements.
Miller and Barney discuss in detail in Chapter 3 how employers
are responding to the rapidly changing competitive environment that
has encouraged their increased use of contingent workers. They recognize that the use of contingent workers is only one option for managing
the monetary expenses of wages and benefits and nonmonetary labor
costs. Nonmonetary costs include a variety of transactions costs such
as time spent interviewing job candidates, teaching firm-specific skills,
and handling the administrative costs associated with contingent employees. The empirical research on the impact on labor costs of various
transactions costs is summarized.
The authors argue, however, that the creation of a flexible workforce through appropriate investments in permanent employees, such
as training in a broad range of skills, is an alternative to the use of
contingent workers. The relative productivity of contingent and permanent workers depends on the employment situation. Consequently,
when monetary and nonmonetary costs are considered, hiring contingent workers is not always the most cost-effective strategy.
Miller and Barney’s analysis extends the basic benefit/cost analysis
used by employers to evaluate strategic hiring decisions by combin-
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ing two perspectives: the real-options approach and the resource-based
approach. The real-options approach borrows from financial analysis
the concept of “real options,” that is, investing in a real asset under
conditions of uncertainty about demand, technology, and the actual
productivity of employees. The owner of the option uses it for financial benefit when there are favorable conditions. For example, hiring
temporary employees can be considered a real option during periods of
high uncertainty, but companies may desire a larger and more flexible
permanent workforce under low uncertainty. Thus, the employer can
adjust the mix of contingent work arrangements and flexible permanent employees to address demand, technological, and measurement
uncertainties. Similarly, the resource-based approach focuses on how
organizations gain competitive advantages by managing resources that
are rare, valuable, hard to imitate, and uniquely used due to the culture, history, and structure of an organization. Consequently, the use
of a hard-to-imitate flexible permanent workforce can be a least-cost
strategy for a firm seeking flexibility. Depending on the circumstances,
a flexible permanent workforce and contingent workers are substitute
methods to create value under conditions of uncertainty. Bringing the
two frameworks together generates some additional insights into how
managers can gain competitive advantage through adjustments in their
labor forces.
Chapter 4, by Lundy, Roberts, and Becker, discusses U.S. labor
unions’ responses to the use of contingent work. In an era when union
membership has been declining, the potential loss of additional fulltime union members due to nonstandard employment arrangements
threatens the strength of unions and the job security and economic welfare of their members.11 Labor unions in the United States, like those
in Japan and Europe, generally oppose nonstandard employment. Most
unions continue to focus solely on their traditional membership of fulltime permanent employees. They have done little to organize contingent workers, or to seek to provide protections in wages, hours, and
conditions of work similar to those provided traditionally to organized
workers.
Lundy, Roberts, and Becker reviewed the collective bargaining
contracts from a variety of private and public sector employers to determine how unions are addressing contingent work as reflected in the
contract language. Their analysis indicates that the economic sector in
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which the union operates is an important although imperfect predictor
of union tactics. Unions in industrial or goods-producing sectors are
more likely to use strategies of exclusion to prohibit or limit contingent
employment arrangements, such as subcontracting or outsourcing. In
contrast, unions in the service sector are more likely to use strategies of
inclusion so that these workers are covered by their collective bargaining agreement, such as including part-time employees in the bargaining
unit and negotiating prorated benefits for them.
The authors discuss the guidelines provided by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), which governs the inclusion in a bargaining
unit of temporary, part-time, and leased employees, as well as some less
common employee categories, such as students. Also, employers’ use
of outsourcing, privatization, and independent contractors limits union
membership and is resisted by unions. However, when unions are able
to organize contingent workers, unions may face tensions over what
is negotiated for contingent workers relative to the full-time members
who want more family-friendly policies and greater scheduling flexibility, as well as improved economic welfare through better wages,
benefits, and conditions of work. In this context unions face challenges
when bargaining for seniority, wages, and prorated benefits for contingent workers.12
Chapters 5 and 6 review in more detail the public policies that affect
contingent workers in the United States. Chapter 5 reviews the legal
framework that structures the contingent work arrangements between
employers and employees. Chapter 6 reviews public policies affecting workers’ economic welfare and the conditions of work that affect
individual workers directly, such as unemployment insurance and job
safety. Although some of these topics are briefly discussed in earlier
chapters, the focus here is a more detailed analysis of the effects of
these policies on contingent workers.
In Chapter 5, Coens and Storrs note that much of the literature about
employers’ advantages in nonstandard employment arrangements creates the impression that these arrangements are options for escaping a
variety of legal obligations and liabilities related to employment. The
authors discuss in detail why this impression is incorrect and why there
is “no safe harbor” from these obligations; employers are responsible
for complying with the laws. However, understanding compliance is
complicated for employers because there is no single definition of em-

Gleason.indb 13

11/13/2006 9:06:41 AM

14 Gleason

ployee that is used consistently throughout U.S. labor law. In addition,
the terminology used to describe the various contingent employment arrangements, such as independent contractor, also varies. Consequently,
the same nonstandard employment arrangement can be treated differently under different laws.
The authors focus on the definitions and legal interpretations used
by federal agencies to differentiate “employees” from independent contractors, temporary employees, and leased employees. For example, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses the multifactor “common law test”
to determine whether a worker is considered an employee or an independent contractor for tax purposes. This test focuses on how much
direct control the employer has over the work done by the employee.
However, the Wage-Hour Division of the Department of Labor uses
the broader multifactor “economic realities” test to determine which
workers should be covered as employees by the federal minimum wage
law. This test incorporates the control issues of the narrower common
law test but focuses on the degree to which the individual depends on
the employer for his or her economic livelihood. As a result of the differences in these approaches, the same worker might be classified as
an employee for the purposes of minimum wage coverage and as an
independent contractor for tax purposes. The chapter discusses the need
to change the present fragmented approach to defining employees to
provide greater consistency and uniformity, as well as to provide more
guidance to help employers understand what they must do to comply
with the current complex and often confusing laws.
Wenger in Chapter 6 discusses the relative lack of public policy responses to date in both federal and state public policy to the growth of
nonstandard employment. This lack of responses reflects the history of
existing labor market policies which were developed to protect full-time
employees in standard employment arrangements. Furthermore, there
is no true national labor market policy in the United States, but rather
a fragmented system in which the states implement federal legislation
while the courts interpret it. When workers in nonstandard employment
arrangements are covered by public policies, it is unintended since the
definitions of eligibility for coverage were designed for full-time employees. Understanding the eligibility rules for coverage thus is critical,
since these rules determine who is covered and who is not. The broader
the definition of “employee,” the more workers are covered.
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The major programs and policies that directly affect contingent
workers are reviewed by Wenger: health care and pensions, unemployment insurance, Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), minimum
wage law, and occupational safety and health. The eligibility requirements for each policy are reviewed. Also, the impact on contingent
workers is evaluated based on four standard criteria used for public
policy evaluations: economic efficiency, equity, security, and liberty.
His analysis and these four criteria guide the identification of appropriate policy reforms. Wenger argues that the ongoing changes on both
the supply and demand sides of the labor force require public policy
responses to provide benefits, social insurance, and work site protections to nonstandard workers equivalent to those provided to full-time
workers. He provides six recommendations for reforms that will help
adapt U.S. social welfare protections to provide better protection for
nonstandard employees.
Perspectives from Japan and Europe
The same basic forces for change generated by the increasing impact of global economic competition on national economies have affected all of the mature industrialized nations, including those of Japan
and Europe. Not surprisingly, the phenomenon of the increase in the use
of nonstandard employment also has been experienced in these countries, and has given rise to concerns similar to those discussed for the
United States. Like the United States, other nations have struggled with
measurement issues and finding the most appropriate way to measure
the growth of these varied employment arrangements. However, due to
different institutions and cultures, the focus on nonstandard employment has taken some unique twists when compared with the experience
in the United States. For example, in Japan the adjustments to expanding nonstandard employment reflect a movement away from a national
labor market policy commitment to employment stability embodied in
the concept of “lifetime employment” that has dominated the Japanese
labor market since World War II.13 In Europe, the growth of temporary
employment agencies reflects a movement away from a historical public
policy commitment to institutions that support full employment rather
than labor market flexibility. Consequently, both Japan and Europe are
working to devise an appropriate infrastructure through deregulation
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to encourage a previously prohibited or limited labor market institution—private sector temporary employment agencies.
The discussion of the growth of nonstandard employment in Japan is set in the context of the “bursting of the bubble” of economic
prosperity in 1989.14 As a consequence of the economic changes that
resulted, Japanese employers have been moving away from “lifetime
employees” or “regular employees” to use alternative employment arrangements.
A by-product of the bursting of the bubble was the Japanese government’s recognition that its labor markets had to become more flexible as the economy was opened to both more domestic and global
competition (Porter and Sakakibara 2004). National policy initiatives
to support flexibility included the expansion of public employment offices and services as well as training. Temporary employment agencies
also were given greater freedom to operate. Prior to 1985 such employment arrangements were prohibited by law in Japan in part as a way
to encourage hiring for lifelong employment. However, as the need
for greater labor market flexibility was recognized, temporary employment agencies were legalized and the types of jobs they could fill were
expanded.
Ozeki and Wakisaka in Chapter 7 provide an overview of the different types of nonregular employment in Japan and the demographic
and industrial characteristics of these workers. As a group, nonregular
workers represented 33 percent of the labor force in 2005, an increase of
more than 5 percent since 1999, and tended to be more heavily concentrated in the service-oriented industries. Like U.S. employers, Japanese
firms attribute the use of contingent workers to factors such as labor
cost savings and more flexible adjustments to changes in demand. Furthermore, Japanese workers’ explanations for why they are nonregular
employees are similar to those of American workers.
The chapter pays particular attention to two groups of nonregular
workers: part-time workers, who are the largest group of nonregular
workers, and “dispatched workers” sent by temporary employment
agencies to client companies. Dispatched workers are the component of
the nonregular workforce that is expected to grow the most quickly in
the foreseeable future.
There are two categories of part-time workers in Japan: those who
work shorter hours (similar to the definition used in the United States)
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and those who are not on the lifetime employment career path but may
work 35–40 hours a week (fewer hours than “lifetime” employees). The
large number of women in part-time employment reflects not only the
cultural norms of employment for men and women, but also financial
inducements provided by the Japanese government and many companies to encourage women to work less than full time. The chapter also
discusses the effects of contingent employment on pay, unemployment
insurance, bonus programs, and retirement benefits. Although wages
and benefits generally are lower for nonregular employees in Japan, the
national health insurance system ensures that everyone has health care.
In Chapter 8 Honda builds on the discussion by Ozeki and Wakisaka by providing more detail about the Japanese government’s employment policies and the labor unions’ responses to the growth of parttime and dispatched workers. He discusses the three major employment
policies used for these two groups of workers: the Part-Time Work Law
(PWL) and job placement assistance focused on part-time workers, and
the Worker Dispatching Law (WDL) developed to protect workers dispatched by temporary employment agencies.15 The PWL was developed
to provide protections for part-time workers by improving job security,
providing better management practices where they are employed, and
improving the social security system. Unfortunately, since the PWL is
not legally binding, it appears to have had little impact; indeed, many
employers are only vaguely aware of its existence. As discussed earlier,
temporary employment agencies are relatively new in Japan. The WDL
was created to permit a legal private sector mechanism to match employers and employees that would supplement the public employment
services while regulating these temporary agencies to protect employee
welfare.
The chapter also discusses unions’ responses to the growth of nonregular employees. The Japanese union structure is dominated by enterprise unions in relatively large companies—the same companies that
have built their human resource management structures around lifetime
employment for regular employees. Japanese labor unions have been
heavily involved in the development of Japanese government labor policies for part-time and dispatched workers. However, like U.S. unions,
they have shown little interest in organizing these workers.
Chapter 9 by Michon provides an overview of nonstandard work in
Europe and discusses one institutional response—the growth of tem-
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porary help firms (also called temporary work agencies [TWAs]). As
the need for more flexible labor markets has become evident, temporary work agencies have emerged as institutions that facilitate flexibility. However, like Japan, a number of European countries previously
have prohibited or severely limited temporary employment agencies as
part of their national policies to support full employment; the notable
exception is France. Consequently, these relatively new labor market
institutions still are evolving within each country as well as in the context of the European Union (EU). The EU is working toward common
approaches to regulating employment policies and labor markets and
institutions such as temporary work agencies to facilitate greater labor
market integration.16
Michon provides an overview of temporary agency work (TAW) in
the member nations of the EU. He discusses the difficulties of comparative analysis across countries because there is no common definition of
TAW or common method of regulating TAW through laws and collective bargaining.17 The heterogeneity of national differences in the regulation of TAW has resulted in differing workforce characteristics. For
example, in Germany TAW is primarily used in the industrial sector and
employs male manual laborers, while in Denmark it is found primarily
in the service sector employing white-collar females.
The chapter provides an overview of the complexities of the various
national approaches to regulating TAW and the activities of the “social
partners” (employers and unions). While employers have created national TWA employer organizations, unions typically have not created
comparable associations due to their hostility to TAW. Michon discusses the ways in which the differences in perspectives on public policy
of the employer organizations and unions are being negotiated in some
countries, and he reviews the attention being given in varying degrees
to protections of TAW workers in the member nations. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the challenges of developing within
the EU a more standardized approach to regulating temporary agency
work.
Where Do We Go from Here?
Chapter 10 discusses the directions for future research. The research
challenges created by the available data and theoretical models are re-
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viewed, and attention is focused on options to develop public policies
that are more customized to address the needs of those workers who are
involuntarily contingent employees (Bendapudi, Mangum, and Tansky
2001). In addition, the chapter discusses recommendations for future
research provided by the contributors to this volume. These include
further analysis of employer decision-making processes, analysis of
factors affecting the extension of coverage of employment protections
and benefits, comparative research to provide insights into the impact
of different models of regulation, and evaluations of the impact of the
activities of unions and nonprofit organizations.

Conclusion
One of the most challenging labor market developments in the past
three decades has been the increased use in the United States, Japan,
and Europe of nonstandard employment arrangements. These employment arrangements are not new; however, their use has raised questions
about what workers in these countries can expect for their future career
paths. Also, there is increasing recognition that social systems have not
changed appropriately to support nonstandard workers who are disadvantaged in the labor market, whether by the provision of training to
support lifelong learning, the accommodation of variations in life cycle
preferences for work for men and women, or the provision of health
care and pensions.
The countries discussed in this volume are struggling to find answers
to many questions that will help define the future of work and what a
“good job” should provide for workers. Each country is trying to determine how to create a new approach to the social and psychological contracts previously provided by the standard employment relationship.18
As our understanding of the forces creating the nonstandard workforce
has improved, more discussion has focused on the implications of this
change as part of a larger conversation about the future of work.
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Notes
1. For a more detailed discussion of the definitions of these various employment
arrangements see Polivka, Cohany, and Hipple (2000).
2. Although in 1996 there were about 1.9 million civil servants, Light (1999) estimates that the “shadow of government” was 12.7 million full-time-equivalent
jobs due to job creation by federal contracts, and through grants and funds allocated to state and local governments. If the military and postal workers are
counted, a total of nearly 17 million people were employed through federal expenditures for this shadow workforce (p. 1).
3. However, it should be noted that this twentieth-century model differs from the
historical model of employment in which contingent employment was the norm
for most workers (Kelloway, Gallagher, and Barling 2004).
4. For example, 9to5, National Association of Working Women published a report
in 1986 noting that almost two-thirds of the part-time workforce in 1985 was female, and over 62 percent of the temporary help industry jobs in 1984 were filled
by women. Furthermore, the report documented the poor wages and conditions
of employment of these workers (DuRivage 1996).
5. Counting contingent workers is not an easy task, even in mature countries with
well-established procedures for collecting accurate labor market data, as discussed in Chapter 2. Unfortunately, the evolving data collection systems in rapidly developing countries such as China generate unreliable or incomplete labor
market measures. This makes it impossible to evaluate nonstandard employment
in a meaningful way. See Banister (2005) for a discussion of the problems.
6. To determine the employment status of workers, BLS survey respondents are
asked a series of questions to determine the absence of either an implicit or explicit commitment by an employer for long-term employment. The key factor
used to make this determination is whether the job is temporary or not expected
to continue (Hipple 2001).
7. Polivka (1996, p. 56) states “. . . not all workers in alternative work arrangements
are contingent, and conversely, not all contingent workers are in alternative arrangements. Therefore, by and large, contingent workers and workers in alternative arrangements are analyzed separately.”
8. Belous (1989) illustrates the challenge this creates for employers, as well as data
collection, by quoting senior executives in two companies. The “. . . senior human resource executive admitted, ‘I don’t call it a contingent workforce; I call it
a phantom workforce. In many cases, we just don’t know what we are doing. We
don’t know the size of this phantom workforce, but we think it is very large. We
don’t know our liability in terms of benefits to this phantom workforce. We don’t
know how to control it or who in the company should control it’ ” (p. 58). A second executive states: “We call it the hidden workforce, and our hidden workforce
is out of control . . . We are trying to get a handle on it” (p. 60).
9. In addition, some authors discuss wage flexibility, that is, changing wages to reflect the external labor market supply and demand conditions as well as pay flex-
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ibility internally. For a more detailed discussion of flexibility see Reilly (2001)
and Ozaki (1999).
10. The standard two-party employment relationship provides a direct relationship
between the employer (the firm hiring and paying the employee) and the employee (the worker performing the services for the employer). This contrasts with the
temporary employment agency, which creates a triangular employment relationship: the agency with the client (customer) company, the agency with the worker,
and the client company with the worker. The temporary employment agency has
a contract with the client company to which temporary workers are sent. The
agency handles the activities that would otherwise be undertaken by the human
resource department of the client firm, such as recruiting workers, conducting
reference checks, evaluating qualifications, and perhaps providing training, and
places the workers with employers. In addition, the agency generally is held
responsible for paying various taxes such as payroll and Social Security taxes,
protecting the safety and health of their workers, and ensuring equal employment
opportunity laws are followed. Thus, the agency generally is considered the legal
employer (see Chapter 5 for legal uncertainties arising from these “coemployment” situations), and is paid an hourly fee by the client which covers the wage
of the employee plus the firm’s markup for its services. The temporary agency
also has an employment contract with the temporary employee and pays the employee. Some agencies provide benefits in addition to pay. Finally, the temporary
employee provides services to and receives direction from the client company
(Gonos 1997).
			 Temporary employment agencies are distinguished from leasing companies
which take over from a client company the payroll of an existing workforce
and handle hiring and firing. Leasing companies also are more likely to provide
benefits. Typically work assignments are for longer term than those of temporary workers. The leasing company is the legal employer in these situations. The
number of leasing companies also has grown rapidly (Carey and Hazelbaker
1986; Lewis and Molloy 1991; Segal and Sullivan 1997).
11. However, some full-time workers also would be willing to accept a lower wage
under certain conditions. A survey by Friedman and Casner-Lotto (2003) found
that about one-quarter of unionized workers would reduce their scheduled work
time if they could cut back without experiencing severe reductions in income,
benefits, and job security. For example, they would find it acceptable to work
90 percent of a full-time work schedule and get paid 90 percent of their current
wages and benefits.
12. In 2003, 14.2 percent of employed full-time workers in the United States were
members of unions, while 6.8 percent of employed part-time workers were members (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004).
13. Gao (2001) states that Japan privatized social protections by basing its strategy
for total employment on
. . . three pillars. First, big corporations institutionalized a permanent employment system, providing job security to their employees; second, medium-size and small companies, with support from
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the state, organized numerous cartels to avoid bankruptcy and keep
everyone in business; and third, family-owned mini shops were
protected by heavy government regulations. All these measures
served to reduce pressure on public spending for unemployment
assistance. (p. 114)
This system created stability and protected inefficient companies. When unemployment grew, the Japanese government used public works projects to create a
safety net.			
			 For those employees hired by the big corporations that could provide lifetime
employment, the benefits were significant. Employees knew that although their
salaries started low they would rise steeply with the accumulation of training
and experience, and they would be rewarded with seniority-based promotions
within the company. These expectations typically tied employees to one employer for their entire careers. However, lifetime employment has been primarily
enjoyed by male workers. The buffer in the Japanese employment system has
been female employment heavily concentrated in part-time work. The female
labor force participation remains low in Japan relative to the United States and
most industrialized nations, but is expected to increase as more women achieve
higher levels of education and delay marriage. For further discussion of this employment system see Durand and Durand-Sebag (1996) and Hart and Kawasaki
(1999).
14. From 1985 to 1990 Japan recorded rapid economic growth averaging an increase
in the real gross domestic product of 4.6 percent a year, as well as a tripling of
the value of the Nikkei Stock index and rapidly increasing land prices. By 1991
it had become apparent that this “bubble economy” had grown due to gains from
speculation on inflated stock and land prices. When this bubble burst, economic
growth flattened and asset values fell; Japan went into the worst recession it had
experienced since the 1940s. The Japanese government began in 1992 to develop
macroeconomics policies to support a recovery. At this time it also began to
address the major mismatches between Japanese institutions, which had been
designed for a different set of economic forces, and the current global economy
(Grimes 2001). Alexander (2002) argues that the relative stagnation and decline
of the Japanese economy since the early 1990s is the result of the inability of
both the Japanese government and businesses to replace the previously successful ways of doing things that generated the economic miracle of post World War
II, and to emphasize employment stability with new approaches appropriate for
the flexibility needed for the current economic environment.
15. Organizations that provide job placement assistance are referred to as “labor
market intermediaries” because they facilitate matching workers seeking jobs
(recruitment) with employers (placement). The national system of public employment services offices created in Japan provides free services, whereas private
organizations may charge fees. Firms that provide placement are different from
temporary employment agencies because their job is completed once a worker is
placed in a job; these firms do not act as the employer and do not assume related
responsibilities such as providing some fringe benefits.
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16. See Vosko (1998) for the historical background to these multiple national approaches from the founding of the International Labor Organization in 1919
through the present.
17. Andresen (1992) identifies five particularly salient additional factors that result in
differences between European nations that are substantially larger than regional
differences in the United States and further complicate cross-national comparisons. These include language, social bonds to a local region which reduce labor
mobility, educational systems, different experiences with migration, and distinct
social security systems with different standards for benefits.
18. For an example of this type of discussion see Jouen and Caremier (2000). For
a discussion of the “new” psychological contract for employment, see Stone
(2004).
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Most individuals regard full-time, long-term employment as the
preferred employment relationship. As such, those in alternative forms
of employment may be cast as working in the “shadow” of the mainstream. The term shadow workforce thus refers to individuals engaged
in forms of employment that differ from full-time, long-term employment. That is, they are engaged in nonstandard work (Carré and Joshi
2001). The shadow workforce garners public attention in headlines, titles, and statements proclaiming “The End of the Job,” The Downsizing
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of America, and “Jobs in an Age of Insecurity,” and in judicial decisions
developing case law concerning this group (Bridges 1994; Cahill 1996;
Church 1993).
Opinions on the shadow workforce are polarized. Some point to
anxiety among workers about the disappearance of job security, career
ladders, and benefits in the shadow workforce (Nollen 1996). Others
argue that such sentiments are exaggerations of the extent of shadow
work, its consequences, or both (Cohany 1998; Dennard 1996; Ettore
1994; Lenz 1996). The latter view suggests that nonstandard employment offers greater flexibility to employees and employers and benefits
society as a result of a more efficient and cost-effective use of labor.
Both extremes are stereotypical attitudes to nonstandard work. The reality is that the shadow workforce is not a homogeneous entity. Significant differences exist among shadow workers in demographics, skills,
income and education levels, and motivation. Researchers should not
view contingent workers as a monolith, for such amalgamation prompts
overly simplistic diagnoses. Differences between types of contingent
workers are so pronounced that, for some workers, the shadow workforce is preferred to the mainstream. For those strongly preferring the
mainstream, some parts of the shadow are clearly darker than others.
We begin with data on the extent and composition of the shadow
workforce to provide an overview of trends in contingent and nonstandard employment arrangements. We also examine differences in perspectives on the job consequences of such employment. We then adopt
a psychological approach to understand growth in the shadow workforce from both the demand or employer perspective and the supply or
labor perspective. We reflect upon attempts to incorporate contingent
employment into standard models of the employment system, concluding with some questions still seeking answers, living true to the motto
that good research should recommend further research.

Defining and estimating the shadow workforce
Computing the size of the shadow workforce is complicated by its
heterogeneity. What unites its inhabitants is that they are not currently
party to full-time, long-term employment and instead are engaged in
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nonstandard work (Carré and Joshi 2001). Early attempts to quantify
the shadow workforce referred to “contingent employees” and operationally involved aggregating some or all of the following groups:
part-time workers, individuals employed in the temporary help–supply industry, and contract workers with a single client (Callaghan and
Hartmann 1991). This helped to narrow the group, but its imprecision led to unreliable estimates. Fortunately, significant progress has
occurred over time in the sophistication of available estimates of the
shadow workforce. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), beginning in 1995, has collected data on the phenomena through a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), administered monthly to
approximately 50,000 American households. The supplement employs
two conceptualizations: “contingent employment” and “alternative employment arrangement.”
The BLS defines contingent employment as work that does not
involve explicit or implicit contracts for long-term employment. Contingent work was initially conceptualized as “conditional and transitory employment arrangements as initiated by a need for labor,” or in
other words, individuals in employment relationships where the conditions are likely to be immediately and directly contingent on changes
in production processes and fluctuations in product and service demand
(Freedman 1985). Such direct contingency might be illustrated by software programmers in the dotcom bust, when decreases in demand for
software skills produced decreased demand and greater idle time for
software programmers employed on a per-project basis. Thus, in the
BLS data set, contingent work is employment expected to last less than
a year; contingent workers are individuals who do not perceive themselves as having an explicit or implicit contract for ongoing employment (Hipple 1998).
Three alternative measures of contingent work are used by the BLS
(Polivka and Nardone 1989). Estimate 1, the narrowest, measures contingent workers as wage and salary workers who both expect to work in
their current jobs and have worked for their current employers for one
year or less. Self-employed workers and independent contractors, as
well as individuals working for temporary help employment agencies
or contract companies who expect to be employed under these arrangements for more than one year, are excluded under this estimate.
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Estimate 2 includes the self-employed and independent contractors
who expect to be and have been in employment relationships for one
year or less. This category also includes temporary help and contract
company workers who expect to be working for the customers to whom
they have been assigned for one year or less. For example, based on the
above definitions, a temporary worker who has worked for the same
temporary employment agency for five years but who moves from one
client to another on a regular basis (e.g., weekly or monthly) would be
considered contingent under Estimate 1 but not under Estimate 2.
Contingent employment is expanded in Estimate 3 to include all
wage and salary workers who do not expect their employment to last
for a year, except for those who, for personal reasons, expect to leave
jobs that they would otherwise keep. For example, under Estimate 3, a
worker who has been employed by a company for 15 years but expects
to retire in four months would be contingent.
Using Estimate 3, there were 5.7 million contingent workers in
2005, representing 4.1 percent of the total U.S. workforce (Table 2.1).
This is only a very slight increase from 2001 levels of 5.4 million contingent workers, representing 4.0 percent of total employment. Also of
note is that 1995, the first year of the series, yielded the largest estimates
of contingent workers in both raw number and percentage terms. As a
percentage of total employment, contingent employment in these survey data decreased in the 1997, 1999, and 2001 surveys, leveling with
very similar percentages of employment figures in 2001 and 2005. To
the best of our knowledge these facts cannot be attributed to changes in
definition or survey methodology. Whether this 10-year swath of data
portrays a longer-term trend, a portion of a cyclical trend, or perhaps is
linked to other phenomena, such as trends in international outsourcing,
is grounds for healthy speculation.
A second conceptualization used in the supplement to the Current
Population Survey (CPS) concerns “alternative employment arrangements.” Specific alternative employment arrangements included are independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency workers, and workers provided by contract firms (Cohany 1998).
Independent contractors work for themselves and thus are not employees in a traditional sense. They may work with several clients on
different projects at the same time (e.g., a computer consultant). On-call
workers are people who do not have a regular schedule for reporting to
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Table 2.1 Contingent Worker Employment in the United States

Estimate 1
Estimate 2
Estimate 3

Number of contingent workers (in millions)
1995
1997
1999
2001
2005
2,739
2,385
2,444
2,295
2,504
3,422
3,096
3,038
2,963
3,177
6,034
5,574
5,641
5,369
5,705

1995
2.3
2.9
5.2

% of U.S. employment
1997
1999
2001
2.0
1.9
1.7
2.6
2.3
2.2
4.6
4.3
4.0

2005
1.8
2.3
4.1

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements,
Employed Contingent and Noncontingent Workers by Selected Characteristics, February 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005.
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work. They fill in for regular, full-time positions due to staffing shortages or temporary absences (e.g., substitute teachers). Temporary help
agency workers and workers provided by contract firms are employees
of one company who carry out work assignments for another organization. Temporary help services specialize in placing otherwise unconnected individuals temporarily with clients for specific projects, while
contract firms typically lease out their employees for significantly longer periods of time to client company sites (e.g., janitors, security staff,
engineers, and information technology workers).
The 2005 survey identified 10.3 million independent contractors
(7.4 percent of the U.S. workforce), 2.5 million on-call workers (1.8
percent), 1.2 million temporary help workers (0.9 percent), and 813,000
contract workers (0.6 percent). The proportion of people employed
in alternative arrangements increased from 9.3 percent (12.5 million
people) in 2001 to 10.7 percent (14.8 million) in 2005. As shown in
Table 2.2, the largest alternative employment arrangement category in
all five surveys (1995–2005) was independent contractors, four times
Table 2.2 U.S. Employment by Type of Work Arrangement

Number of
workers (000)
1995
1997
1999
2001
2005
% of U.S.
employment
1995
1997
1999
2001
2005

Independent
contractors

On-call
workers

Temporary
help agency

Contract
workers

Traditional
workers

8,309
8,456
8,247
8,585
10,342

2,078
1,996
2,032
2,089
2,454

1,181
1,300
1,188
1,169
1,217

652
809
769
633
813

111,052
114,199
119,109
121,917
123,843

6.7
6.7
6.3
6.4
7.4

1.7
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.8

1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9

0.5
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6

90.1
90.1
90.7
90.6
89.1

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements by Selected Characteristics, February 1995,
1997, 1999, 2001, 2005.
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as large as “on-call workers,” the next largest category. Interestingly,
2005 marked the highest absolute number and employment percentage
for three of the four alternative employment arrangements: independent
contractors, on-call workers, and contract workers. The only segment
that was not at a historical high in absolute numbers was temporary help
agency work, which was below the record 1997 levels in absolute numbers and in percentage representation. Viewing the shadow workforce
through the lens of alternative work arrangements portrays a sense of
greater stability in the phenomena than when viewed through the lens of
contingent work. “Traditional” work arrangements characterized 90.1
to 90.7 percent of employment in the period 1995–2001, dropping to
89.1 percent only in the latest survey year of 2005.
In sum, whether viewed through the lens of alternative employment
arrangements or that of contingent workers, the shadow workforce is a
nontrivial proportion of the U.S. workforce, as measured from 1995 to
2005.

Who Is In the Shadow Workforce?
The heterogeneity of the shadow workforce is evident in its demographic composition, briefly described here using CPS data on contingent workers and alternative employment arrangements.
Age
The age distribution of workers in contingent and alternative work
arrangements in 2005, contrasted with noncontingent and traditional
employment, is shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The largest group of contingent workers was between 16 and 24 years of age (27.2 percent).
This is in contrast to noncontingent workers, where the largest group
was the category of 35–44-year-olds (25.1 percent). Contingent workers are twice as likely as noncontingent workers to be under 25 years of
age. Table 2.4 provides an age breakdown across alternative work arrangements. Workers in temporary and on-call work arrangements were
more heavily clustered in the younger age groups than was the case for
other work arrangements: nearly 20 percent of both on-call and tem-
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Table 2.3 Age Distribution of Contingent and Noncontingent Workers,
2005 (%)
Age
Over 55
45–55
35–44
25–34
16–24

Contingent workers
13.8
15.3
18.3
25.4
27.2

Noncontingent workers
16.5
24.1
25.1
21.5
12.8

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Noncontingent Workers by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.

Table 2.4 Age Distribution of Employment within Alternative Work
Arrangements, 2005 (%)
Independent
Age
contractors
On-call
Temporary Contract Traditional
Over 55
27.3
18.0
13.8
16.3
15.5
45–54
27.1
17.0
16.4
22.8
23.7
35–44
26.6
23.3
20.8
24.1
24.7
25–34
14.7
21.8
29.8
25.2
22.2
16–24
4.3
19.9
19.3
11.6
13.9
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.

porary workers were between 16 and 24. The distribution of independent contractors was more skewed to the older-age categories compared
with any other work arrangement, including traditional arrangements.
For example, workers ages 55 and older represented 27.3 percent of
independent contractors, as opposed to 13.8 percent of temporary workers. The age distribution of contract workers was most consistent with
that of traditional work arrangements.
Gender and Ethnicity
The distribution of workers across contingent and alternative employment by gender and ethnicity is shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. In
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Table 2.5 Selected Demographics of Contingent and Noncontingent
Workers, 2005 (%)
Demographic group

Contingent workers

Noncontingent workers

48.9
11.6
20.8

46.7
10.5
12.7

Women
Black
Hispanic

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Noncontingent Workers by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.

Table 2.6 Selected Demographics of Workers in Alternative Work
Arrangements, 2005 (%)
Demographic
group
Women
Black
Hispanic

Independent
contractors

On-call

Temporary

Contract

Traditional

35.3
5.6
9.2

49.4
8.6
15.7

52.8
22.7
21.0

31.0
14.9
16.4

47.8
10.9
13.1

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements by Selected Characteristics, February 2005.

2005, women and minorities comprised a greater percentage of contingent workers than noncontingent workers. Among alternative work arrangements, the percentage of employment in temporary help agencies
for women, African Americans, and Hispanics was higher than their
employment percentages in traditional work arrangements. The percentage of independent contractors who were female, African American, or Hispanic was lower than the percentage of employees with these
characteristics who were employed in traditional employment.
Education
The educational level of workers is shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. A
larger percentage of contingent workers than noncontingent workers
reported having less than a high school diploma. Interestingly, this was
also true in 2005 for college education. Within alternative employment
arrangements, the percentage of temporary help agency workers pos-
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Table 2.7 Distribution of Contingent and Noncontingent Workers, by
Educational Attainment, 2005 (%)
Less than high
school diploma

High school
graduate,
no college

Some college,
less than a
bachelor’s degree

College
graduate

15.5

24.5

23.5

36.6

8.6

29.7

28.5

33.1

Contingent
workers
Noncontingent
workers

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Noncontingent Workers by School Enrollment and Educational Attainment, February 2005.

Table 2.8 Distribution of Workers in Alternative Work Arrangements,
by Educational Attainment, 2005 (%)
Less than high
school diploma
Independent
contractors
On-call workers
Temporary help
agency workers
Contract firm
workers
Traditional
arrangements

High school
Some college,
graduate,
less than a
no college bachelor’s degree

College
graduate

7.7

27.6

29.1

35.6

13.7
16.9

27.8
29.5

28.8
32.4

29.7
21.2

13.0

19.9

30.5

36.6

8.7

29.8

28.3

33.2

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements by School Enrollment and Educational
Attainment, February 2005.
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sessing less than a high school diploma was larger than that of any other
employment arrangement. Both contract firm and independent contract
employment arrangements had a larger percentage of college-educated
workers than did traditional employment. The employment arrangement
with the largest percentage of workers in the “some college” category
was temporary help agencies, suggestive perhaps of employment in this
category being most consistent with continued progression toward degree completion.
Occupation and Industry
Table 2.9 shows that, compared to the distribution of workers in
regular (noncontingent) employment, a larger percentage of contingent
workers in 2005 was in the occupational categories of administrative
support or operators, fabricators, and laborers, and a lower percentage
was in professional specialties. Compared to the occupational distribution of workers within traditional employment arrangements, the distribution of independent contractors was more concentrated in a professional specialty (57 percent) and substantially less among administrative
support occupations (3.4 percent) (Table 2.10). The occupational distribution of temporary help agency employment was more concentrated in
administrative support (24.8 percent) and operators, fabricators, and laborers (37.2 percent) and less in professional specialties (22.4 percent)
than was the case in traditional employment. The occupational distribution in contract firms and on-call employment were similar, both with a
substantially higher percentage in service occupations and in the operaTable 2.9 Distribution of Workers in Contingent and Noncontingent
Arrangements, by Occupational Category, 2005 (%)
Professional Administrative
specialty
support
Contingent
41.6
14.8
Noncontingent
47.3
13.9

Services
15.7
15.6

Operators,
fabricators,
laborers
27.8
23.3

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey Supplements: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and Noncontingent Workers by Occupation and Industry, February 2005.
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Table 2.10 Workers in Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements,
by Occupational Category, 2005 (%)
Work
arrangements
Independent
contractors
On-call
Temporary help
agency
Contract firm
Traditional

Professional Administrative
specialty
support
57.0
3.4

Services
13.7

Operators
25.8

40.0
22.4

8.2
24.8

22.1
15.6

29.6
37.2

42.1
46.7

4.7
14.9

26.2
15.5

27.0
22.9

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements by Occupation and Industry, February
2005.

tor et al. grouping and less in administrative support occupations than
was the case for traditional employment.
There were also differences among industries. Under all three definitional estimates of the contingent workforce, there was a higher percentage of workers in the services industrial classification than in the
case of noncontingent employment (Table 2.11). Work in the service
sector represented the majority of employment for on-call workers
(55.7 percent) (Table 2.12). While the percentage employed in services
among independent contractors and temporary help agency workers
(44.4 percent and 47.7 percent, respectively) was similar to that of traditional employment (43.4 percent), a substantially lower percentage of
contract firm employment (30.9 percent) was in services. ManufacturTable 2.11 Workers in Contingent and Noncontingent Arrangements, by
Selected Industry Grouping, 2005 (%)
Contingent
Noncontingent

Services
57.6
43.3

Wholesale/retail
8.6
15.6

Manufacturing
6.4
11.9

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and
Noncontingent Workers by Occupation and Industry, February 2005.
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Table 2.12 Distribution of Workers in Alternative and Traditional Work
Arrangements, by Selected Industry, 2005 (%)
Work arrangements
Independent
contractors
On-call
Temporary help
agency
Contract firm
Traditional

Services
44.4

Wholesale/retail
11.0

Manufacturing
3.2

55.7
47.7

7.7
7.5

4.8
28.4

30.9
43.4

6.5
16.1

14.1
12.6

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and
Noncontingent Workers by Occupation and Industry, February 2005.

ing employment represented less than 5 percent of total employment for
independent contractors and on-call workers, in contrast to 12.6 percent
of traditional employment, and was a higher percentage of employment
among temporary help workers (28.4 percent) than any other form of
employment arrangement.

Volition in the shadow workforce
An important issue in the study of contingent and alternative employment relationships is the extent to which the arrangement reflects
employee choice. The CPS supplement lends itself to some exploration of this question in that it asks individuals to report their preference
for the current work arrangement, the response options for contingent
workers being “prefer noncontingent,” “prefer contingent,” and “it depends.” Across all three contingent employment definitions/estimates,
the most frequently stated preference of workers currently employed
in contingent employment was that of noncontingent employment arrangements and by a wide margin (55.3 percent preferring noncontingent employment to 35.5 percent preferring contingent employment in
2005 [Table 2.13]). Investigating preference across alternative work
arrangements reveals greater differences in attitudes. Independent con-
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Table 2.13 Distribution of Contingent Workers, by Preference for
Contingent Employment, 2005 (%)
Work preference
Prefers noncontingent
Prefers contingent
It depends
Not available

Contingent workers
55.3
35.5
5.7
3.5

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent Workers by their Preference for Contingent or Noncontingent Work Arrangements, February 2005.

Table 2.14 Distribution of Alternative Workers, by Arrangement,
2005 (%)
Independent
Temporary
Work preference
contractors
On-call
help agency
Prefers alternative
82.3
46.1
56.2
Prefers traditional
9.1
44.6
32.1
It depends
5.2
6.8
6.5
Not available
3.4
2.5
5.3
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Workers with Alternative Work Arrangements by their Preference for a Traditional Work Arrangement, February 2005.

tractors expressed little interest in traditional employment (only 9.1
percent), contrasted with significantly larger percentages of temporary
help workers (32.1 percent) and on-call employees (44.6 percent) (Table 2.14).

Earnings and Access to Benefits in Alternative
Employment Relationships
Median weekly earnings for contingent workers ($405 to $488, depending on operational definition of contingent employment used) were
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lower than median weekly earnings of noncontingent workers (Table
2.15). The median weekly earnings of independent contractors and contract firm workers were higher than individuals who are on-call or temporary help agency workers (Table 2.16). Perhaps somewhat surprising is that contract firm workers, not independent contractors, show the
highest median weekly earnings level in the 2005 survey. The lowest
median earnings level was that of temporary help agency workers, with
on-call workers earning a higher median weekly income.
In terms of benefits, only 18.1 percent of contingent workers reported access to employer-provided health insurance. 52.1 percent of
noncontingent workers and 12.4 percent of contingent workers were
eligible for employer-provided pension plans, in contrast to 44.7 percent of workers in noncontingent employment (Table 2.17). We would
not expect independent contractors to have access to these benefits, as
they are self-employed and responsible for providing their own. Nearly
Table 2.15 Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Contingent Workers, 2005
Contingent worker estimates
Estimate 1
Estimate 2
Estimate 3

Usual weekly earnings ($)
405
411
488

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Full- and Part-time Contingent Wage and Salary Workers and those with Alternative Work Arrangements by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, February 2005.

Table 2.16 Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Workers with Alternative
Work Arrangements, 2005
Alternative worker arrangement
Independent contractors
On-call
Temporary help agency
Contract firm

Usual weekly earnings ($)
716
519
414
756

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Full- and Part-time Contingent Wage and Salary Workers and those with Alternative Work Arrangements by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, February 2005.
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50 percent of employees in contract firms reported employer-provided health insurance, compared to only 8.3 percent of temporary help
agency workers (Table 2.18). Similarly, 33.5 percent of contract firm
workers were eligible for employer-provided pension plans in contrast to 3.8 percent of temporary help agency workers. In summary,
contingent workers had less access to both health insurance and pension benefits than their noncontingent counterparts, and, with the exception of our expectation on independent contractors, the lowest
level of health insurance and pension coverage was among temporary
help agency workers. Combined, these data paint a complex portrait
of the shadow workforce. It is a tapestry of diverse employment arrangements with distinct demographic profiles, differing levels of employee volition, and very different outcomes as measured in earnings
and benefits.
To increase understanding of the forces that provide the impetus for
the formation and the maintenance of the shadow workforce, we adopt
the economist’s propensity for demand and supply. We first discuss the
demand side, highlighting factors that may motivate organizations to
increase their use of contingent workers. We then focus on the supply
side, examining why employees choose to work in a contingent capacity. In this examination we concentrate on temporary employees, where
research exists to shed light on the question. Logic and evidence suggest that the factors are likely a function of both supply and demand.
The chapter ends with an examination of the consequences of contingent worker usage for the organization.
Table 2.17 Access to Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Pension
Plans, 2005 (%)
Contingent
Noncontingent
Health insurance
18.1
52.1
provided by employer
Eligible for employer12.4
44.7
provided pension plan
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and
Noncontingent Workers and those with Alternative and Traditional Arrangements
by Health Insurance Coverage and Eligibility for Employer-provided Pension Plans,
February 2005.
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Table 2.18 Workers with Alternative and Traditional Work Arrangements,
by Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Eligibility for
Employer-Provided Pension Plans, 2005 (%)
Work arrangements
Independent contractors
On-call
Temporary help agency
Contract firm
Traditional

Employer-provided
health insurance
0.0
25.7
8.3
48.9
56.0

Eligible for employerprovided pension plan
1.9
27.8
3.8
33.5
47.7

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements:
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, Employed Contingent and
Noncontingent Workers and those with Alternative and Traditional Arrangements
by Health Insurance Coverage and Eligibility for Employer-provided Pension Plans,
February 2005.

Organizational reasons to hire
contingent workers
Numerous reasons have been cited in the literature for organizational usage of contingent employees, from filling in for absent permanent
employees to avoiding the perception of wage inequity. These reasons
can be divided into three general categories: cost reduction, increasing
flexibility, and avoiding restrictions/consequences (von Hippel et al.
1997). Although these reasons are presented separately, organizations
may rely on the contingent workforce for all of these reasons (Liden,
Wayne, and Kraimer 2003).
Cost Reductions
Reducing wage and benefit costs is a major motivation for companies to turn to a contingent workforce. As a rule, most contingent
employees do not receive the same wages as permanent employees doing the same work (Coates 1997). Average benefits costs can increase
compensation levels anywhere from 25 to 40 percent above the base
levels. Consistent with this reasoning, a positive relationship has been
documented in a large number of organizations between the average
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fringe benefit level and the ratio of temporary to total employee use
(Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson 1985). In addition, even when pay rates
for contingent workers are not necessarily lower, resources can be saved
by hiring employees only for a finite period of time. For example, a
company may hire temporary executives, such as chief financial officers (CFOs), when unable to afford a permanent hire (Messemer 1994).
The temporary CFO can bring key financial stewardship and insight to
an organization for a limited time, within a manageable budget (World
Future Society 1997).
Use of contingent workers can affect costs other than wages. Organizations may save on training-related costs by hiring contingent workers who were trained elsewhere for the tasks they will be performing
(Caudron 1994). Temporary employees in particular also may reduce
organizational costs of recruiting and testing. For example, hiring from
temporary worker ranks can serve as a screening tool for the organization, and thus lower selection costs (Pfeffer and Baron 1988). This kind
of strategy has been employed by organizations such as Hancock Information Group, where 39 percent of its permanent employees began
as temporary employees. Similarly, Universal Tax Systems typically
brings in 40 temporary employees prior to its busy season, of whom 10
to 20 are hired permanently afterward (Fenn 1995). Indeed, 70 percent
of employers in a Robert Half International Survey said that they had
hired a temporary employee for a permanent position after having seen
the temporary employee “in action” (Financial Management Association 1997). Finally, organizations may save on administrative overhead
when the temporary agency is responsible for processing the employee
paychecks and attending to paperwork associated with employment
(Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993).
Flexibility
Flexibility is another frequently cited reason for organizations’ use
of contingent employees. Given our global economy, it is now a truism
that output demand fluctuates tremendously over time. These fluctuations may be more effectively managed through the use of a contingent
workforce (Kochan et al. 1994). In a survey by the Society for Human
Resource Management (1999), respondents indicated that the main reason companies use flexible staffing arrangements is to meet workload
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or business fluctuations. Such flexibility would be particularly attractive where the corporate culture favors employment security for permanent employees. Rather than laying off permanent workers, the company may rely upon judicious use of contingent workers to respond to
transitory fluctuations in output demand (Cappelli and Neumark 2004).
Indeed, in a twist on this strategy, Lancaster Laboratories avoids layoffs
during the slow season by having their employees work as temporary
employees outside the company during their off months (Greco 1997).
The use of contingent workers may also enhance flexibility by enabling the organization to focus permanent employees’ efforts on core
competencies while having contingent workers perform more peripheral work. This approach has the potential to reduce structural differentiation within the permanent workforce and thereby make integration
easier among employees. That is, they develop a shared set of values,
orientations, and activities as a result of focusing on the organization’s
core competencies (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). This is consistent with
the trend to outsource and the focus toward relying upon a small group
of higher-paid employees who have firm-specific knowledge. Contingent workers can also facilitate organizational access to skill flexibility
by providing highly specialized functions that, while necessary, are infrequently recurring, or for which need is periodic or unpredictable.
Avoiding Restrictions and Consequences
Organizations also may be motivated to use contingent workers to
avoid some of the potentially negative consequences of permanence in
employment relationships. Organizations can avoid building commitment to a large number of permanent workers and subsequently having to fire unneeded employees by using contingent workers. That is,
“contingent workers offer flexibility without long-term commitments”
(Grossman 1998), as discussed in Chapter 3. Restrictions that may be
avoided include those created by unions, the legal framework, the organizational budget, and internal wage levels.
It has been speculated by union officials that companies may use
contingent workers, in particular temporary employees, as an attempt to
avoid unionization (Kochan et al. 1994). But in an even broader sense,
with the increase in use of temporary workers, unions are concerned
that employers are using temporary workers to redefine the employee
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relationships. To counteract this, unions have moved to reduce the restrictions on organizing temporary workers, thus reducing this organizational rationale for their use (Dreazen 2000). For more information
on union responses, refer to Chapter 4.
Companies also avoid various legal restrictions by using contingent
workers. Typically, the client organization pays a flat fee to a temporary
employment service agency or a leasing company to cover the worker’s
wages and benefits, as well as overhead to the agency. The client organization is not liable for benefits such as health care insurance, vacation
pay, and holiday pay. At the same time, the organization also is relieved
of paying unemployment taxes, workers’ compensation, and other payroll taxes. This also may provide a strategy for avoiding the requirements of Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA)
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); see Chapters 5 and 6 for
more details. Thus, although the company may pay a higher hourly rate
for the temporary worker, it eliminates many of the extra costs and risks
associated with a permanent employee.
One issue of concern, especially with temporary workers, is that of
coemployment, the term used to describe the relationship between the
client employer and the worker (Tansky and Veglahn 1995). That is,
the temporary worker is employed by the temporary agency but works
on-site at the client employer. Under this employment arrangement it
is unclear who is legally responsible for the temporary worker. For example, if the temporary worker is sexually harassed while placed at
the client employer, does the temporary agency or client employer take
legal responsibility? The laws are not entirely precise on these matters.
These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
In addition, companies may hire contingent workers as a means of
avoiding internal budget constraints in place for permanent hires. For
example, in many state and federal agencies authorization is necessary to hire a new employee. Moreover, companies often impose hiring
“freezes” for budgetary or even public relations reasons. Often, however, these companies or units within the company have discretionary
budgets that are not subject to the same kinds of authorizations and
constraints. Thus, if a department cannot hire a permanent employee, it
may still be able to contract out the work by hiring a contingent worker
(Grossman 1998). Additionally, companies may be under pressure to
keep their personnel allocations down. By hiring contingent workers
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they are able to achieve this goal since the costs are not permanently
incorporated into the base budget.
Finally, organizations may access the shadow workforce to avoid
perceptions of wage inequity among their permanent employees. For
example, companies that pay above market wages may contract out
those activities that can be staffed at lower relative salaries. Through
the use of contingent workers, this may be done without damaging the
organization’s reputation as a high wage provider. Alternatively, organizations may decide to contract out high-paying activities (e.g., consulting) to avoid pressure to upgrade the current internal wage scale. It
has been argued that by cutting overall employment costs, contingent
workers can enable organizations to provide permanent employees with
greater job security and better compensation (Davis-Blake, Broschak,
and George 2003).

Individual Motivation to Work as a
Contingent Worker
Although companies have strong incentives to hire contingent
workers, the individuals’ motivation to work as a contingent worker
may bear little correspondence to these incentives. The desirability of
permanent employment has been well ingrained in our culture, and permanent employment provides workers with better salaries, benefits, and
a greater level of job security than contingent work (Connelly and Gallagher 2004; Golden and Applebaum 1992). Why, then, would anyone
choose to work in a contingent capacity?
Although there are a large number of idiosyncratic reasons why individuals are motivated to work as contingent employees, the research
on temporary employees in particular points to a few critical factors.
Specifically, temporary employees work in such a capacity because they
cannot obtain the kind of permanent position they desire, they want the
flexibility that temporary employment offers, they value the variety that
temporary employment offers, and/or they seek the skills and training
provided in temporary positions (Golden and Applebaum 1992; Mendenhall 1993; Tetrault 1994; von Hippel et al. 1997). At a broader level,
one could classify this list of reasons to propose that some people work
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as temporary employees because they prefer various aspects of the job
such as flexibility, variety, and skill enhancement, whereas others work
as temporary employees because they have only limited opportunities
to do otherwise (Feldman 1995; Nardone 1986). For example, a college student might find temporary employment attractive because of the
flexibility it provides. A student can work during the summer months
and school holidays, while turning down positions when exams and assignments are pending. In contrast, an employee who has been recently
laid off from a downsizing company might be working in a temporary
capacity until a permanent position becomes available.
In previous work, the implication of classifying temporary employees in this manner was explored (von Hippel et al. 2000). Specifically,
temporary employees were categorized based upon their beliefs about
the degree of choice they have to work as a temporary employee. Those
employees who perceive themselves as having no choice but to work
as a temporary employee were classified as “involuntary” temporaries, whereas those who believed they were with a temporary agency by
choice were classified as “voluntary” temporaries (Ellingson, Gruys,
and Sackett 1998; Feldman 1995; Feldman, Doerpinghaus, and Turnley
1995; Marler, Barringer, and Milkovich 2002). This classification appears to be meaningful in that voluntary temporary employees were
found to have different sources of satisfaction with their work, commitment to their employers, and perceptions of personal control over
how they accomplish their work than involuntary temporary employees
(von Hippel et al. 2000). Specifically, involuntary temporaries showed
increased personal control, satisfaction, and commitment to the degree
that they were gaining new skills from their temporary assignments.
In contrast, voluntary temporaries showed increased personal control
and satisfaction to the extent that they experienced variety in their task
assignments. Thus, it seems that voluntary temporary employees are
looking for variety in temporary placements, whereas involuntary temporary employees are looking to gain new skills from their temporary
placements. To the extent that voluntary and involuntary temporary
employees experience these differential characteristics, work-related
attitudes are more positive.
Feldman, Doerpinghaus, and Turnley (1994, 1995) propose a similar distinction. They find that temporary employees who work in a temporary capacity by choice have more positive job attitudes than those
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who believe they have no other option. Temporary employees who work
in positions consistent with their expertise, and who are not trying to
convert a temporary position into a permanent one, also manifest more
positive job attitudes. Ellingson, Gruys, and Sackett (1998) also explore
whether temporary employees who work in this capacity voluntarily
are more satisfied than their involuntary counterparts. They find that
both univariate and multivariate indices of “voluntariness” were comparable in predicting satisfaction among temporary employees. Voluntary temporary employees were more satisfied than involuntary temporaries with temporary work, whereas no differences emerged between
voluntary and involuntary temporary employees with regard to growth
satisfaction, co-worker satisfaction, or supervisor satisfaction. Finally,
Marler, Barringer, and Milkovich (2002), using a similar classification
(termed “traditional” and “boundaryless” contingent workers), demonstrate that voluntary temporary employees’ performance was more
sensitive to job-related attitudes such as satisfaction and commitment
compared to involuntary temporary employees.
This research does not speak to contingent workers more generally,
however. Interestingly, although statistics indicate that an overwhelming percentage of the workforce is desirous of permanent employment,
anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing number are viewing
contingent work positively. For example, in the high-tech area, many
individuals move from one company to the next, hiring themselves out
for limited projects, or allow themselves to be hired permanently with
the knowledge that their stay will be relatively short. This flexibility
enables them to continuously offer themselves up to the highest bidder, thus keeping their compensation at or above the market. It also
permits them to maintain a skill set that is not company-specific; in so
doing, that makes them far more valuable both to the company in which
they work and the market in general. Finally, in some sectors of the
economy, the growth of individual wealth over the past decade is such
that some people, having satisfied many of their extrinsic interests, are
free to focus on lifestyle and work and nonwork uses of time. People
want to spend time with their families, to work at home, and to have
extended periods of not working. Contingent work is enabling insofar
as they can select positions aligned with their values and needs, leave
positions that impose unacceptable demands on their time, and negotiate for preferential arrangements.
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Interface of Supply and Demand Factors
We have approached the utility of contingent workers as main effects from both the demand and supply side, but in the economy of the
twenty-first century, it appears as if the interaction of needs is more
compelling. The convergence of thinking regarding the utility of contingent workers has been a significant trend that may portend their increasing use. The meeting of the minds regarding contingent workers
can best be seen in two areas: the changing nature of the employment
relationship and the changing nature of benefits. We will discuss each
briefly.
Abundant research suggests that the nature of the employment relationship is changing (Littleton, Arthur, and Rousseau 2000). Specifically, both employers and employees are seeing the benefit of keeping
options open; flexibility allows a company to release people it no longer
needs, and allows workers to easily leave when a better position becomes available. These examples best illustrate the changing mind-set:
the diminishing stereotypes of the laid-off employee and the employee
who job hops, the movement to more of a project orientation, and the
outsourcing of noncore competencies. First, we all know that there has
been a stigma associated with someone who was released from a job
or who moves around “too frequently.” This stereotype has begun to
change from a very negative one—reflected in a general desire to avoid
the person—to a neutral or even positive one—an openness to see what
the person has to offer, and in the case of someone who has moved
around, an attribution that the individual might be highly sought after.
Second, as companies become more project-oriented, they necessarily use permanent employees in a more incidental nature and often
need to “backfill” with contingent workers. This project orientation has
necessitated frequent reorganizations in existing firms, but more importantly has served to make salient to employees the temporary nature of
the work. That is, rather than being job focused and thus having permanence because of the position, work is now seen as transitory, with a
finite beginning and end.
Third, the widespread use of outsourcing has led to the deterioration
of the traditional companies. Even in the most conventional companies,
it is common to see consultants come into the company to assist in ar-
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eas that fall outside the company’s basic expertise. Moreover, when a
firm chooses to outsource, efforts are made to treat the individuals who
assist as partners, thus blurring the separation between permanent and
contingent workers. Finally, when individuals who had previously performed the now outsourced function are replaced, the firm becomes dependent upon the outsourced partners. As a consequence, the contingent
workers from the outsourced partner develop a sense of permanence
with the organization.
Another area that has seen a convergence of the needs of both companies and employees is benefits. Historically, benefits have rested
within the company, so if an employee moved to a different organization, she risked not being covered or having to wait for eligibility. This
forced many employees—particularly those who might need to use the
benefits—to stay with an organization regardless of their satisfaction.
Recently, at least two significant changes have occurred in the nature
of benefits that not only facilitate the movement between organizations,
but also reinforce the normative nature of movement. First, retirement
plans have moved from traditional plans to more portable plans, such as
401(k)s and “cash balance” or “pension equity” plans. These plans—ignoring the problems of the new plans for older workers—are notable for
their portability and thus are appealing to young employees who may
want to change jobs frequently. With these new plans, employees can
move to a different organization at will and can retire at any point of
their careers. These plans facilitate flexibility and the kind of restructuring in which dynamic organizations need to engage (Burlingame and
Gulotta 1998).
Second, with the spiraling costs of health care, insurance is a requirement and is often the factor that motivates people to work. Stories
of “dumping” noninsured patients to other hospitals abound. Although
issues of insurability continue to be important, statutes (e.g., authorizing COBRA) now assist people in keeping their insurance when they
change jobs.
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Directions for Future Research
Although the previous discussion provides evidence for the use of
contingent workers, a variety of issues remain unexamined. The scope
of this chapter does not allow for an exhaustive list of these issues, but
we address a few of them here. Specifically, we discuss the implications
of a blended workforce, that is, a blend of permanent and contingent
workers. Next we examine the changes that occur in company culture
when there are large numbers of contingent workers in the workplace.
Finally, we address the question of what motivates the contingent worker, focusing primarily on the temporary employee. Other important
questions, such as whether public policy changes are required with the
increased use of contingent workers, are covered in Chapter 6.
Almost all workforces are blended in some important ways. For example, there often are regional and divisional differences within a company, as well as differences in job description, training level, pay, and
demographics. These sorts of blended workforces are unlikely to create
the same sorts of problems and opportunities created by a blend of contingent and permanent workers, however, because all of these workers
accept and endorse the common in-group identity provided by the company that employs them. In contrast, the blend of contingent and permanent workers brings people together who may share no common in-group
identity at all. This lack of a bond between workers has the potential to
create prejudice and conflict between groups (as discussed below), which
in turn can be exacerbated by the inherent differences in status that exist
between permanent and contingent workers (Pettigrew 1998).
The existing research focuses on temporary employees and suggests
that they have largely negative effects on permanent employees. Permanent employees often resent the presence of temporary employees,
feeling that their work is not up to par, which then forces the permanent
employee to compensate for the temporary workers’ poor performance
(Smith 1994). Permanent employees who work alongside temporary
employees also showed decreased trust in and commitment to the organization (George 2003). Not surprisingly then, blended workforces
also reduced permanent employees’ intentions to remain at their jobs
(Davis-Blake, Broschak, and George 2003).
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More recent research has started to examine some of the psychological mechanisms underlying these negative consequences of blended
workforces (Kraimer et al. 2005; von Hippel 1999). The results of this
work suggest that a blended workforce produces negative outcomes
when the perceived motives for using temporary employees are deemed
inappropriate (e.g., hiring temporary employees as a way to cut costs
rather than to increase flexibility or deal with fluctuations in demand),
the layoff policy is unfavorable, and/or the relative rank of the temporary worker is equal to or greater than that of the permanent employee.
These results further suggest that these conditions lead to negative outcomes because the permanent workers feel threatened by their temporary colleagues. Specifically, perceptions of threat arise, which in turn
lead to intergroup biases on the part of permanent employees, causing
them to think and act negatively toward their temporary co-workers.
The negative consequences of a blended workforce appear to translate to permanent employees’ performance as well. In one study, permanent employees who felt threatened by the presence of temporary
co-workers showed lower performance than employees who did not
(Kraimer et al. 2005). Further research is necessary to fully understand
the effects of a blended workforce, as well as to determine how to prevent these negative consequences and thereby allow companies to reap
the full benefits of a blended workforce. Indeed, recent research suggests that temporary workers can also feel threatened by negative stereotypes held by managers and their permanent co-workers (Gallagher
and Parks 2001; von Hippel et al. 2005).
Another issue that has not been addressed deals with company culture when a workforce contains a blend of contingent and permanent
workers. Most organizations pride themselves on their unique culture,
and staffing decisions—hiring, retention, and promotions—often rest
on the fit of the individual with the organization (which is to say the culture). With increasing use of temporary, contract, and outsourced partners, two problems may result. First, as organizations are increasingly
outsourcing their HR functions, the company’s culture becomes increasingly similar to the culture of the company to which it has outsourced
the human resource function. Companies try to hire employees who
“match” the company culture and image, just as prospective employees
try to determine if their values match those of the company. As a consequence, the culture of the organization must take on components of
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the culture of the partnering groups. The second problem results when
a sizeable percentage of the company is composed of contingent workers who come and go frequently. Contingent workers may not stay long
enough to detect and assimilate to the client employer’s culture. These
situations can result in either cultural blending or cultural blandness,
depending on how well the employees are managed. These situations
may have implications for the company’s long-term vitality. If human
resources are outsourced or there are too many transient workers, there
may be no “unique culture,” and thus, the organization’s competitive
advantage will suffer.
Because contingent workers, by definition, do not share the same
sense of “permanence” with employees of the organization, managing
their attitudes and performance may be an entirely different process
than for permanent employees. Indeed, different antecedents and interrelationships among temporary employees’ attitudes and behaviors have
been described in recent years (Moorman and Harland 2002; Parker et
al. 2002; Slattery and Selvarajan 2005). Some new methods of managing contingent versus permanent employees have also been proposed.
Through two case studies, Koene and van Riemsdijk (2005) have demonstrated the benefits organizations reap through careful management
of temporary employees in distribution centers. When temporary employees are “carelessly managed” they are treated as expendable, socialization is nonexistent, and training is minimal. In this particular
distribution center there was a standing joke whereby permanent workers would not tell a temporary employee their names until the temporary employee had been working for six weeks. It was believed that
providing your name before this time was pointless since temporary
employees typically did not last six weeks—no wonder! Contrast this
approach with the second distribution center, where temporary workers were given extensive training, socialization, and support. Although
temporary employees in this firm were treated differently from the permanent employees, this treatment was no worse (nor better, just different). As a consequence, this careful management resulted in lower rates
of sickness, minimal “no shows,” and increased tenure compared to the
“careless” approach.
As this chapter has demonstrated, however, contingent employees
are not a homogeneous group, and thus not all management strategies
are likely to be equally effective with this diverse population. For ex-
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ample, von Hippel et al. (1997) show how human resource practices for
temporary versus permanent employees vary according to the business
philosophy regarding temporary employees (e.g., as strategic partners
or a necessary evil) and by human resource functional area (e.g., staffing, development, compensation). Additionally, as discussed previously, the management of contingent workers is likely to differ depending on whether the contingent workers are working as such voluntarily
or involuntarily. For example, when managing voluntary temporaries,
managers can try to provide a number of different tasks for workers to
enhance feelings of variety. In contrast, a skills focus should be adopted
when managing involuntary temporary employees, given the role that
learning new skills plays in their levels of satisfaction, commitment,
and personal control.

Conclusion
The shadow workforce is a sizeable, heterogeneous group. If it was
ever the case, researchers certainly cannot now lump such workers into
a single grouping category. There is also significant heterogeneity in
motivation on the employing side of the labor exchange. Researchers
and policymakers must distinguish among types of contingent work and
contingent workers or risk simplistic analyses with simplistic solutions.
Articulation of the construct of contingent worker is required, as sweeping generalizations ignore critical differences inherent in this group of
workers. This chapter demonstrates the diversity in demographic profiles, levels of employee volition, different job outcomes, and occupational and industry representations among categories of contingent
workers. The old stereotypes of the contingent employee must be reconceptualized and replaced with new understandings.
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More than 4 percent of workers in the United States are in some
form of alternative employment arrangement. Most large businesses
now have a permanent budget category for temporary workers (CPA
Journal 1998).
Evidence suggests that employer demand—not labor supply—is
driving contingent work. Firms apparently want the cost savings and
flexibility of hiring workers with no expectation of permanent employment (Golden 1996; Golden and Applebaum 1992). Companies hired
more temporary workers as the last two decades progressed, although
there was not a corresponding increase in workers willing to take contingent jobs (e.g., young people, married women, and older workers).
In this chapter we explain how forces external to a company operate to increase the demand for a flexible workforce and summarize
evidence on how employers use contingent workers to manage labor
and related costs. We then argue that, in many situations, creating a
flexible workforce through investment in permanent employees may
be a feasible alternative to the use of contingent workers and can be
expected to lead more readily to a sustainable competitive advantage.
This argument employs the concept of “real options” to link labor and
related costs with decision making under uncertain conditions. It then
combines the real options approach with the resource-based view of the
firm to provide additional insights into the use of flexible permanent
employees as a competitive strategy for organizations. This resource-
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based view contends that competitive advantage results from appropriately managing resources that are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate,
and combined uniquely within an organization. We also provide suggestions for future research.

Why do employers use contingent workers?
An employer wishing to determine the economic value of any employee’s contribution compares the costs associated with hiring and employing a worker relative to the additional production expected (labor
productivity).1 Firms also need to consider how to plan to achieve the
flexibility desired to manage variable and uncertain future economic
conditions. Distinguishing between ongoing costs and transaction costs
is important when explaining why employers use contingent workers.
Ongoing Costs: Wages and Benefits
Firms may wish to use contingent workers to lower wages or benefits. According to the 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) by the
U.S. Census Bureau, the median weekly earnings for a full-time, adult
male contingent worker were only 80 percent of earnings for a comparable noncontingent worker. Women in contingent work earned less
than 72 percent of comparable noncontingent workers. The discrepancy
holds across all levels of education, age, and race (von Hippel et al.
1997). Contingent workers are eligible for employer-sponsored health
insurance or pension coverage less than half as often as noncontingent
workers (pp. 20–23). Efforts by temporary employees to demand better pay and benefits—such as lawsuits filed by oil field workers against
ARCO and by independent contractors against Microsoft—highlight
the differential compensation offered to contingent workers (Eisenberg
1999; Training 1999).
On average, contingent workers receive lower wages than equivalent, noncontingent employees. Workers employed through temporary
service agencies (TSAs) make approximately 7.7 percent lower wages
than long-term employees in similar jobs (Segal and Sullivan 1997).
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However, according to the 1999 CPS supplemental survey, full-time
contingent workers in some occupations, such as “precision production,
craft, and repair” and “construction,” earn nearly the same or higher
median weekly earnings than noncontingent workers. However, wage
comparisons may be deceiving because employers pay other costs, such
as a markup to the TSA or the expenses of a self-employed consultant.
On the other hand, a TSA could substitute for the employer’s internal
human resources personnel, so not all of the markup should be attributed to wages.
Several published studies support the claim that firms use temporary workers to save on fringe benefits.2 The growth of the temporary
help supply industry is positively related to the ratio of quasi-fixed labor
costs to variable costs (Golden 1996). Quasi-fixed labor costs, such as
health insurance and pension contributions, are associated with a particular worker rather than with hours worked. At the firm level, a higher
level of benefits as a percentage of total payroll is correlated with increased use of temporary agency or call-in employees (Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson 1985). Firms may contract out for services to skirt the
need to pay all workers the same high rate because of union pay scales
or because workers believe equal pay is fair.3
Transaction Costs
Unlike wages and benefits, many costs associated with employees are not ongoing. Costs that are incurred each time an agreement
is formed between two parties are called transaction costs, such as
time spent interviewing job candidates and processing paperwork, the
expense of training new employees in firm-specific skills, the loss of
goodwill during negotiations, and strategies to protect core workers.
Using temporary employees generally would be expected to increase transaction costs since temporary employees come and go more
often than permanent workers. Some costs are borne by the human resources budget, such as advertising, conducting interviews, or paying
for travel. Time spent interviewing applicants can be a substantial investment for firms with high turnover. Another important transaction
cost is the time and money spent on training new workers, especially
when a job requires idiosyncratic skills or knowledge. Consequently,
hiring new workers frequently entails high transaction costs.
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Also, a less obvious transaction cost is that of continuing to employ
the same workers under short-term contracts. Most employees develop
some experience and information that is of more value to the current
employer than to anyone else. This stock of knowledge, skills, and abilities (called firm-specific human capital) develops over time.
Because there is usually some uncertainty surrounding the particular tasks the worker should do, human capital often develops in ways
that are not specified in the original employment contract. Thus, at the
end of a short-term contract, the employee may wish to renegotiate the
terms of employment to reflect his or her new perceived value to the
firm. Likewise, the employer may argue that the worker cannot transfer that firm-specific human capital to another company and should be
satisfied with remuneration that only reflects what the market will pay
for generic skills, regardless of the fact that the employee truly can add
value to the current firm. Even if the employer and worker agree to split
the value created, reflected in some small raise at the time of renegotiation, the time spent in the negotiation process and the potential for
hard feelings and loss of goodwill impose real costs on both parties.
Consequently, rather than renegotiate every time the situation changes,
an employer often will prefer to sign the worker to a long-term employment contract. The long-term contract gives the employer the right to
alter the worker’s use of the knowledge or skill as necessary to respond
to unanticipated changes; it also protects the worker from an employer
using bargaining power to renegotiate rewards downward. Particularly
when a job requires substantial firm-specific training, the employer will
prefer to hire permanent workers, even if it has to keep them on during
slack periods when productivity is low (Williamson 1985).
The amount of firm-specific training may be decreasing as standard
tools such as computer software make firms’ processes more similar
(Szabo and Negyesi 2005). If so, temporary and contract agencies may
have an economy of scale in training workers. For example, Manpower
Inc. introduced a Web-based learning center (www.manpowernet.com),
which allows its employees and applicants access to technical training
material. The free information technology training is particularly attractive to people trying to enter computer fields, precisely the level of
workers Manpower typically places, but it also benefits Manpower’s
own full-time employees. Manpower’s knowledge of clients and work-
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ers allows it to track which skills are most in demand. Delivery of training over the Internet is ideal for technology workers (Cole-Gomolski
1999). Even in professions with more stable skill requirements, temporary employment agencies may have the opportunity to train more
workers in a given profession than most businesses. Client firms may
be willing to give up some of their firm-specific training preferences to
hire temps with strong generic skills. (See Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter
[1996]. The authors cite examples of how flexible business strategies
match well with outside development of employee competencies.)
On the other hand, if workers receive minimal training, the key
transaction cost surrounding employment may be the bureaucratic system of the employer. For a firm using generic labor in a seasonal business, the administrative and legal costs of hiring and firing temporary
workers can be prohibitive. Furthermore, the legal doctrine of “employment-at-will,” which allows an employer to dismiss an employee for
almost any reason, has been weakened by federal regulation, thereby
increasing the cost of firing a permanent worker (Lee 1996).4 In this
case, the transaction costs associated with contingent workers are less
than those associated with permanent workers. Moreover, a temporary
agency has an economy of scale in processing workers. John Bowmer,
CEO of TSA Adecco, cites the firm’s move to acquire Olsten’s staffing
unit as a response to the importance of information technology, which
makes size important (Studer and Stern 1999). Larger TSAs can spread
the costs of central computers and software over more placements. Adecco pioneered interactive “Job Shop” kiosks in public areas, linked
to the Internet via Monster.com (Sunoo 1999). Such efforts reduce the
transaction costs related to contingent workers.
Another kind of transaction cost relates to the firm’s reputation with
its core workers. The more frequent the layoffs, the more workers that
the firm hopes to keep will look elsewhere for employment. By clearly
identifying some jobs as temporary, firms can buffer their core workers
from layoffs. The resulting loyalty of key employees can offset minor
productivity losses that come from using day laborers or other contingent workers.5 Respondents to a minisurvey from Compensation and
Benefits Review noted that temporary workers allow the respondents’
companies to cover the work performed by full-time workers when they
take time off or to complete special projects (Jefferson and Bohl 1998).
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The alternatives—requiring other employees to work overtime when
someone goes on sick leave, or hiring extra programmers with no promise to recognize seniority after the project is over—would be more detrimental to the firm’s core workers. For example, Bell Atlantic used an
interim marketing staff for its move into the long-distance marketplace.
If the venture failed, no long-term Bell Atlantic Corp. employees would
be affected. If the market opened up, the company could transfer or hire
permanent employees to handle the increased work (Keenan 1999).

Empirical Research on Transaction Costs
Empirical research supports the importance of transaction costs in
the management of hiring decisions. Research has investigated how
firms respond to temporary increases in workload, the role of firm-specific training, and the impact of bureaucracy and firm size.
A nationwide survey of employers in the early 1980s, as well as
archival and interview data, showed how different kinds of employers respond to temporary increases in workload (Mangum, Mayall, and
Nelson 1985). In general, the researchers conclude that the use of temporary agencies lowered transaction costs related to temporary workers by eliminating various employer costs for a fixed fee paid to the
agency, fulfilling an economic role similar to the union hiring hall. The
study finds that the use of temporary employees from an agency, “callins” (occasional workers on a list maintained by the company itself), or
“limited duration hires” (day workers or others whose employment is
for a brief, specific time) is more likely when
• a firm has a high level of benefits (not true for call-ins),
• the firm’s employment level is changing,
• the firm is large, or
• the skills involved are less specialized.
Another study using employer survey responses defines transaction
costs primarily in terms of firm-specific training (Davis-Blake and Uzzi
1993). In general, the findings support the hypotheses that, in addition
to employment costs and external economic forces, skill requirements,
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organizational size, and bureaucratization affect the use of temporary
workers, leased workers, and independent contractors. When a job requires training, the position is less likely, albeit slightly, to be “externalized” (filled by someone not on the permanent payroll). The effect is
statistically significant but extremely modest. A job that involved over
seven months of training was only one-half of 1 percent less likely to
be externalized than a job that required no firm-specific training. This
result argues against transaction costs being the driving factor in the
decision. On the other hand, this measure actually includes all hours of
formal training, informal training by managers, and informal training
by co-workers for the typical incumbent in that job. It reflects at least
some industry-specific training and possibly occupational training as
well. Only some of this training is truly firm-specific, so this measure
may underestimate the true impact of this type of training. Also, since
the survey asked managers to consider the last position they filled, there
is a selection bias toward hard-to-fill jobs. In order to fill a difficult
position, firms may be more likely to hire a worker who lacks prior
training.
In the same study, the authors measure the amount of paperwork
necessary to fire an employee at each firm. The assumption is that some
firms are more bureaucratic than others. Based on the argument in the
previous section, one might predict that the administrative costs in a
bureaucratic organization would create more demand for temporary
workers. However, the hypothesis here is that workers undergo a particular kind of firm-specific training in a highly bureaucratic firm: the
orientation to the bureaucratic system. Since temporary workers may be
less able to follow rules without direct management, bureaucratic firms
should use fewer temporary workers.
Firms with more employees tend to have more bureaucracy and
can avoid layoffs in any business unit more easily by spreading jobs
around. Therefore, the hypothesis is that firm size should vary inversely
with the use of temporary workers. In contrast, contract workers generally manage themselves apart from the rules of the host firm. Since
the diversified firm may need access to specialized skills occasionally,
it should be more likely to use contract workers. As predicted, larger
firms and those with higher levels of bureaucracy are less likely to hire
temporary workers and more likely to use contract workers. Apparently,
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the transaction costs of actually hiring and firing are outweighed by the
transaction costs of orienting an employee to a bureaucratic organization.
The disadvantage of having temporary employees on site who have
difficulty following rules is a cost of integration, even though the integration is only temporary. The same dynamic can work with contract
workers in certain settings. For example, contract employees in the petrochemical industry have less safety training than permanent workers
(Kochan et al. 1994). Since the contract company supervises their employees, the host firm reduces its transaction costs. However, the host
firm and its employees may be harmed if the safety problems caused by
contract workers go beyond accidents that injure contract employees.
Thus, it may be in the best interest of the host company to offer further
safety training and oversight to contract employees to avoid accidents.
This effectively increases the transaction costs associated with contract
employees, which may still be outweighed by the transaction costs associated with hiring and firing permanent employees.

Productivity
From the employer’s perspective, the decision to define a task as
contingent work or noncontingent work employs a standard cost-benefit analysis. The value of the expected contribution from either type of
employee is productivity minus costs. Thus, if contingent workers are
just as productive at a certain task as permanent employees, firms will
hire contingent workers if the total cost is less. The total cost includes
both ongoing and transaction costs. That is,
Value created = Productivity – Total cost
Total cost = Ongoing costs + Transaction costs.
In the same job over the same duration, contingent workers may
be slightly more or less productive than noncontingent workers. Most
academic research on direct productivity comparisons has studied en-
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try-level employees because their tasks are generally the same across
firms and settings. For instance, two case studies of data entry operators
found that the productivity of part-time contingent workers was at least
7 percent below that of core workers. Considering the relative wages,
benefits, and training costs, the use of contingent employees did not
seem to be cost effective, but the use of agency-provided temporaries
did provide savings. The biggest difference between the two categories
of contingent workers was that the agency temps required much less
training (Nollen and Axel 1996). Contingent workers in professional
and technical fields, such as independent contractors of engineering
services, may be at least as productive as a firm’s own workers (see
Jarmon, Paulson, and Rebne [1998]. A survey of managers in six hightechnology settings found that the perceived performance of contractors was similar to employees).
Thus, the relative productivity of contingent and permanent employees depends on the circumstances. If an organization implements a
new data entry system using off-the-shelf software, agency temps who
have used the package at other establishments may be more efficient
and accurate than the company’s own workers who are just learning the
system. Regarding professional workers, hiring an attorney who specializes in the particular legal issues currently facing the firm may be
preferable to keeping one attorney on retainer who is a generalist. It
may be impossible to hire permanent workers who are able to handle
every contingency or to pay them full time when the work is seasonal.
Returning to the Bell Atlantic example, another reason the company decided to outsource may have been to access marketing people with
skills related to the specific market or project. Many self-employed,
independent contractors offer specialized expertise that employers need
only on occasion. An extreme example is the U.S. Census Bureau,
which hires thousands of workers for each decennial census (Potok and
Holdrege 1999). The contingent work arrangement can provide an employer with flexibility to maintain high productivity, even when circumstances change.
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Using “Real Options” to Explain
Flexibility Planning
A flexible workforce is one that can create value under various conditions of production. There are two ways to achieve a workforce that
can adapt over time to perform different tasks. One way is to hire different workers over time through contingent arrangements, including
hiring into the firm with no long-term commitment. The other way is
to hire and develop flexible permanent employees with either a broad
range of skills or the ability and willingness to learn and adapt with the
organization over time. In terms of the value equation above, a simple
approach is:
Productivity = (Productivity under one condition × Probability of
that condition)
+ (Productivity under another condition × Probability
of that other condition).
If there are only a few possible conditions, and if an employer can
anticipate their probabilities accurately, then it is possible to write those
expectations into an employment contract. However, as the variety of
potential tasks increases or the business environment becomes more unpredictable, it becomes impossible to work out every possible scenario
ahead of time. Then, flexibility is helpful not only because productivity
is increased under various conditions, but also because negotiations are
simplified. Uncertainty, not just variability, makes flexibility valuable.
But how does one estimate the value of flexibility?
Mathematically, the employer can estimate probabilities and conduct a more complete cost-benefit analysis than discussed above. Theoretically, one could even generate expected cash flows resulting from
the worker’s contribution. Standard financial analysis would use those
cash flows discounted appropriately over time to produce a measure
of net present value (NPV). Of course, realized cash flows may differ
substantially from the expectation. Thus, a financial analyst will usually
check to be sure conclusions do not change substantially if assumptions
(e.g., the interest rate) change slightly. This “sensitivity analysis” considers not only the mean of the distribution of potential returns, but also
the variation around the mean. For example, one can use a mathemati-
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cal formula to estimate the value of mineral rights based not only on the
expected price of the mineral and the costs of extraction, but also the
possible drift in price in the future (Copeland, Koller, and Murrin 1995,
Chapter 15). The right to drill for oil can be worth much more than
might be revealed through a simple NPV analysis, because the owner
only has to invest in extraction if the price of oil is high.
Similar logic underlies the large market for financial options. A call
option, for instance, gives the investor the right to buy a stock at a specified price at a future date. If the stock price drops, the investor loses
only the initial purchase price of the option, which is usually a few dollars for each share of stock. But if the stock price rises, the investor’s
gain is potentially huge. The investor can buy the stock at a preset, low
price and sell at a high price. If the stock price is certain, options do not
matter much; but if a stock price varies widely, an option is highly valuable.6 The value of the option comes from the fact that the investor will
only exercise the right to buy the stock if circumstances are favorable.7
The prevalence of financial options has led financial analysts to apply the term “option” to other kinds of investment under uncertainty.
For example, the right to drill for oil is considered a “real option.” The
term “real” comes from the fact that this option involves investment in
a real asset such as real estate rather than a financial asset such as stock.
Also, the additional value not captured in the simple NPV calculation is
sometimes called the “option value.”
A real option usually will be reflected in a series of small, staged
investments rather than a single, large investment, which is aimed at the
same goal but is less flexible.8 For example, firms entering highly uncertain new markets appear to invest in joint ventures rather than wholly owned subsidiaries because a joint venture embodies an option (Chi
and McGuire 1996; Kogut 1991). For a relatively small investment,
the firm can 1) learn more about the market and its potential partners,
2) wait to see if the market develops in some unpredictable manner,
and 3) get out of the deal if necessary without damaging its reputation.
The essential characteristic of a real option is that it allows the owner
to make a claim when conditions are favorable, with limited downside
risk. When change is likely but its direction is unpredictable, the firm
may have different requirements than if the current environment is expected to continue.
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Hiring temporary workers is a type of real option because the employer can switch labor inputs as conditions fluctuate (Foote and Folta
2002). While this arrangement does not have a written purchase price
or exercise period, there are parallels to financial options. The purchase
price of the real option may be lower productivity, higher transaction
costs, or even higher wages. The option may only be good for a certain
period, either because temporary workers can be expected to move on
to other employers more likely to offer permanent positions, or because
government regulation prevents keeping workers contingent forever.
Transaction costs incurred in switching from one set of contingent
workers to another, such as the cost of firm-specific training, represent
a price paid when the option is exercised. Using real options logic in
the employment context does not negate the importance of costs, but
it allows consideration of flexibility as well. Therefore, under high uncertainty, the option value may flip the decision from hiring inflexible
permanent workers to hiring contingent workers.
On the other hand, investing in full-time employees can create a
different real option in which the firm secures the right to ask the employee to vary activities. The purchase price is the cost of inducing the
employee to develop firm-specific human capital, perhaps through a
company-sponsored training program. The exercise period depends on
the outside job market as well as the person’s age and ability to learn.
There may be some further cost to exercise the right. For example, the
manager may have to give some attention to restructuring work relationships, and the employee may not be at optimal productivity in the
new setting right away. Both of these real options hedge against the
same kinds of risks, and the value of both increases with higher uncertainty. Of course, just as there are different kinds of transaction costs,
there also are many kinds of uncertainty to consider.
Factors Creating Uncertainty
There are three important categories of uncertainty: demand, technological, and measurement. Any change in demand can increase or reduce the number of labor hours (and therefore workers) a firm requires.
These changes can result from shifts in buying power, consumer preferences, competition, or other factors. Moreover, cyclicality of consumer
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demand can lead to increased demand for temporary workers, even if
that cyclicality is perfectly predictable, as in the case of the decennial
census of the United States. Given uncertainty about demand, a firm
would prefer to collect more information and wait before hiring permanent employees. The greater the degree of the uncertainty, the more tenuous the desired commitments to employees become. If it were costless
to hire and fire permanent employees, dishonest managers might offer
“permanent” jobs when needed, and simply lay off people to match
fluctuating demand. However, the costs of such actions include the loss
of company reputation and the breakdown of the internal labor market
(e.g., people performing their best to get a promotion).
In fact, the specific type of job influences the response to demand
uncertainty, according to a study of contract services (Abraham and
Taylor 1996, pp. 411–412). Organizations in industries with seasonal or
cyclical workloads contract out significantly less of their janitorial and
machine maintenance work. Cyclical firms also seem to contract out
fewer engineering and drafting services, but more of their accounting
work. The researchers offer a caveat that they had to construct seasonality and cyclicality measures from employment data at the industry
level since they did not have access to that information for each establishment. A different study used establishment-level data to construct
a measure of employment variability over a two-year span prior to the
survey. This measure, which blends seasonality, cyclicality, and trend
effects, is positively related to the use of temporary workers, as expected, confirming the value of flexibility under variability in demand
(Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993, p. 207).9
Similarly, if a firm is uncertain about what technology will be the
most efficient, it will be difficult to specify what tasks employees will
do in the future. The greater the degree of technological uncertainty,
the more problematic it is to commit to a group of employees with set
skills. Any change that affects the labor supply—equipment purchases, worker education, job process reengineering, or other factors that
change the productivity of labor or the specific skills required to best
implement production—can impact not only what tasks a worker performs, but also what that worker must be able to learn. A computer software designer can probably learn another programming tool. However,
a company that moves from a business plan based on lean production to
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one based on customer service may desire employee competencies that
were not required previously.
Measurement uncertainty arises because an employee’s productivity in any specific task is never fully verifiable. The resulting possibility of shirking work or other opportunistic behavior creates agency
costs. Either the employer has to pay for someone to monitor the employee, the employee has to pay (perhaps in the form of self-financed
education) to give assurance he can do the job, or the employer has
to be willing to live with the potential losses. These agency costs are
primarily characteristic of the task, not the employee. Some jobs are
more difficult to monitor. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the impact
of measurement uncertainty on the use of contingent workers. A permanent, internal employee may be more trusted, and can be rewarded
based on long-term performance. On the other hand, using a contract
worker or leased worker may allow a firm to share some of the agency
risk with the contracting firm. A temporary employment agency might
have an economy of scale or develop a particular skill in monitoring its
employees or training them to a minimal degree of productivity. Also,
externalized workers may have less opportunity to shirk duties if their
assignments are more specific. To the extent that employers believe
workers differ in their propensity to be opportunistic (and vice versa),
temporary employment can be an effective screening device prior to a
permanent hire.
To summarize, real option theory generally would propose that,
under high uncertainty, companies should desire a more flexible workforce than required under low uncertainty. Flexibility can be achieved
in two ways. One way is to employ more flexible permanent employees.
In the face of demand uncertainty, companies will want to hire workers
who will accept overtime hours and pay. If technological uncertainty
makes it impossible to fully define the skills required in an employee,
companies should aim to recruit employees with multiple competencies. The increased value of the flexible permanent workers would then
require higher overall compensation. Moreover, the transaction costs
and agency costs associated with flexible employees would likely be
higher than for focused employees, but the value of their productivity
under various scenarios will outweigh the increased costs as uncertainty
increases. The firm will only invest in such human capital if it can re-
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tain the right to exercise the option at its discretion. Thus, these flexible
employees should be bound with contractual agreements that protect
the firm’s options, such as long-term contracts and “do not compete”
clauses.
Alternatively, firms could achieve flexibility through the structure
of the workforce: outsourcing work, or using leased or temporary employees (Foote and Folta 2002). In the case of demand uncertainty, the
firm can hire temporary employees as needed. When technological uncertainty is high, the firm can hire contingent workers with different skill
sets, and hire permanently only those it needs. Or, the firm can hire the
workers it needs today and replace them in the future with workers with
other skills. As technological uncertainty increases to very high levels,
it would be impossible to hire permanent workers with the ability or desire to learn every possible skill required. The flexibility inherent in any
one person is limited. When measurement uncertainty is present, firms
may use temporary employment as a screening device. Firms can learn
about specific employees and reduce the uncertainty involved in offers
of permanent employment.10 For example, the company could put temporary workers through a brief training program to see which are best
suited to the company. Furthermore, certain firms may be able to hire
these workers permanently at wages lower than for employees who did
not temp first, because the temporary relationship convinced the worker
that the company is a good place to work. The permanent hiring of
temporary workers depends on the uncertainty being resolvable. In the
extreme, hypercompetitive environment, a firm will desire to maintain
the contingent relationship so it can swap skill sets as needed.

Evidence from the Current Population Survey
Existing research has tested for the importance of various determinants of demand for contingent labor. Unfortunately, studies to date
have typically focused on one type of contingent work, or have measured only whether a form of contingent work is used at all, not the
extent to which it is used. Gathering data on wages, benefits, transaction
costs, and productivity for the same set of workers has been difficult.
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However, to distinguish the economic importance of the various factors, they must all be included in the same statistical model.11 The biennial supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) on contingent
work offer an initial approach to these issues using a large sample of
workers. We offer the following analysis of these data to confirm general facts and to point to issues deserving more rigorous research.
The February 1995 supplement to the CPS was the first to focus
on contingent workers, whom Polivka and Nardone (1989) define as
“workers who have no implicit or explicit contract for ongoing employment.” The survey pertained to the worker’s length of expected service
as well as work arrangement. Respondents are categorized as contingent according to three definitions and their associated employment estimates. Estimate 1 includes wage and salary workers who have been in
their jobs for up to one year and expect their jobs to last no more than an
additional year. Estimate 2 includes those workers plus self-employed
or independent contractors whose length of service matches definition
1. Estimate 3 includes wage and salary workers who believe their jobs
to be temporary, without a specific time frame, plus all self-employed
and independent contractors.12 Thus, a worker is not defined as contingent simply because he or she works for a temporary agency, for
example. Temporary agencies have permanent employees, and some
firms that hire from temporary agencies also maintain their own pools
of on-call workers. Using definition 3, 66.5 percent of workers paid
by temporary help agencies in 1995 were contingent workers, and 3.6
percent of workers in traditional arrangements were contingent workers
(Cohany 1996).
Each estimate reflects worker responses rather than a formal description by a human resources person at the company. It captures all
employment arrangements in which contingency is understood even
if not recorded in a written contract. Moreover, it reflects all different kinds of contingent relationships, which is important since these
relationships can be substitutes for each other. The percentages of each
estimate have remained similar in subsequent surveys.13 Thus, 400,000
workers employed by temporary agencies see their positions lasting as
long as they wish, while nearly 4 million workers employed directly by
a firm consider their jobs more or less temporary.
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Our analysis of data on 2,568 workers answering the 1995 CPS
supplement reveals several important determinants in the choice of the
relative importance of contingent and noncontingent jobs in the employment structure.14 The model presented here assumes managers go
to the labor market and identify prospective employees who are willing to accept a given level of compensation for their skills, experience,
and education. Managers then choose whether to offer a contingent or
noncontingent position based on the costs and benefits associated with
those workers available to fill each kind of position.15 This is a model
of labor demand, not supply, so no conclusions should be drawn regarding workers’ choices of positions. Furthermore, this model contains no information on worker productivity. The implicit assumption is
that contingent workers and noncontingent workers perform the same.
These simplifying assumptions are clearly unrealistic to some extent,
and make the results given in this section exploratory. However, clarifying the assumptions also can help identify what kind of data would
better untangle the interrelationships between factors.
All data in the discussion that follows are based on Estimate 1.
Results are similar for the other definitions of contingency, except the
impact of fringe benefits decreases when self-employed workers are
included in the contingent ranks. The evidence shows the importance of
ongoing costs, transaction costs, and flexibility in the decision to make
a position contingent.
The current legal and cultural environment allows firms to offer, on
average, lower wages and fewer benefits to contingent workers than to
permanent workers. Our evidence confirms previous findings that employers hire contingent workers to reduce ongoing costs. The higher the
level of weekly pay, the less likely a worker is contingent. Furthermore,
if the employer provides health insurance or a pension in conjunction
with the job, the worker is less likely to be contingent.
The CPS supplement did not ask about hours of training or other indicators of transaction costs. No information is given on the employer,
other than the industry. However, if temporary agencies and contracting
firms reduce transaction costs through economies of scale in processing
and training workers, then firms should hire more contingent workers
when these agencies are available and can achieve economies of scale.
Thus, jobs in metropolitan areas should be more likely to be filled by
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contingent workers. The CPS identifies the worker by census tract into
three categories: central city, nonmetropolitan, and other (e.g., suburban). Indeed, we find that workers in nonmetropolitan areas are 2.59
percent less likely to be contingent than workers in other areas.
Firms can achieve workforce flexibility either through more flexible permanent employees or through the use of specialized, contingent workers. More flexible workers will therefore be less likely to be
contingent employees. Age, education, and willingness to work nontraditional hours may all relate to worker flexibility. First, older workers have had more time to acquire a range of knowledge, skills, and
abilities, including human capital specific to the firm. From the supply
side, older workers also should be less willing to enter some contingent
arrangements (such as temporary work) because their expected return
on additional investments in human capital, such as learning new skills
or acquiring new firm-specific knowledge, is limited by the time period
available to benefit from the return. On the other hand, older workers may be more willing to be self-employed to take full advantage of
their experience or take part-time jobs to enjoy more leisure. Second,
a worker with more schooling should be more capable of learning new
tasks, so we control for education level. Third, workers who work more
than 40 hours a week provide a buffer against demand variation and
uncertainty. However, part-time workers may be a substitute for contingent workers as defined in the CPS supplement. Firms may use workers
for fewer hours each week on a permanent basis, rather than hiring fulltime workers for short durations.
Including age in the model lessens the effect of pay, which makes
sense since a worker’s earnings usually increase throughout his or her
career. A change in age from 30 to 40 reduces the probability that a
worker is contingent by 5.7 percent. However, education does not seem
to make a difference. Considering raw correlation statistics, having a
bachelor’s or graduate degree appears to be negatively related to contingent status. However, in a full model including the other factors, education has no effect.16 The more overtime hours a person works, the more
likely he or she is to be a permanent employee of the firm. Part-time
status has no effect after controlling for wage and other variables.
Finally, firms facing higher uncertainty or variability should be
more likely to hire contingent employees than firms facing lower uncer-
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tainty. Since firm-level data are not available due to privacy concerns,
an industry-level measure is used. This measure is the mean variation
in stock returns over a two-year period for each three-digit SIC code,
matched to the industry codes used in the CPS. Only industries with at
least five actively traded firms were included. Aggregating over the industry creates a proxy for changes that affect total demand and the technology shared by the members of that industry.17 We find that industrylevel variability has no bearing on the use of contingent workers. It may
be that the option value is more closely tied to firm-level uncertainty, or
that achieving flexibility through investment in permanent workers is a
close substitute for hiring temporary workers.
Overall, contingent positions pay less in wages, offer health insurance and pension coverage less often, and are more likely to be located
in a city and not in a rural area. Contingent positions are less likely to
be filled by older workers and those who worked overtime hours in the
previous week. These broad correlations reinforce the tabulated results
released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Competitive Advantage through a
Flexible Workforce
As explained above, employees add value to an organization, and
this value varies according to different conditions. We have argued that
firms desire a workforce that can adapt quickly and effectively, especially as the pace of change in technology, international competition,
and other dynamic environmental forces require increased flexibility.
Furthermore, the employer can adjust the mix of contingent work arrangements and flexible permanent employees to address demand, technological, and measurement uncertainties. These two means of achieving flexibility can often substitute for each other. The key to gaining a
competitive advantage is whether one firm can achieve flexibility that
competitors cannot. Employers pursue strategic human resource management (SHRM) to compete effectively in these uncertain conditions.
The primary theoretical perspective being used in studies of SHRM is
the resource-based view of the firm.18 In this approach, an organization
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gains competitive advantage from managing resources that are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, and organizationally implemented (Barney 1991; 1997, Chapter 5).
A resource or capability has value to the extent that it enables the
firm to cut costs, increase price, or otherwise allow the firm to pursue a
strategy in product markets. A resource or capability is rare when only
one or a few competitors employ it in their strategies. Standard microeconomic approaches usually assume that competitors all have access
to the same resources and will adjust prices or quantities until the earnings from the resource are just enough to cover the risk involved in its
purchase. However, this “perfect competition” rarely, if ever, occurs.
Some industries or geographic markets have only a few participating
companies and, in emerging markets, a first mover may be able to gain
high returns on its product while competitors try to catch up. Therefore,
ongoing rarity is a function of how difficult a resource or capability is
to imitate.
One reason a competitor may not be able to imitate a resource is
that it was acquired at a unique point in history that cannot be repeated.
For example, pharmaceutical companies that already valued basic science research in the 1970s were able to adopt new “science-driven”
drug discovery procedures that led to highly profitable blockbuster
drugs, whereas those companies that had relied on more random testing
of existing chemicals to solve medical problems were unable to hire
the scientists and create the culture needed to imitate them (Cockburn,
Henderson, and Stern 2000).
A second obstacle to imitation is that someone outside the organization may not be able to distinguish the resource that is making the
difference. Even if the competitor knows which capability to imitate,
it may be hard to achieve since value is often created by teams of people working together in ways that are difficult to manage. Of course,
those same management struggles affect the firm that already has the
resource, so creating and maintaining an organization to get the best out
of the resources is the final condition for competitive advantage. We
now apply these concepts to the case of a flexible permanent workforce,
with an emphasis on the issue of imitation.

Gleason.indb 84

11/13/2006 9:06:47 AM

Employer Perspectives 85

The Flexible Permanent Workforce
For several reasons, a flexible permanent workforce built from
training and rewarding permanent employees will be more difficult to
imitate than a flexible workforce using contingent workers. First, creating a flexible permanent workforce takes time, whereas creating a
flexible contingent workforce can be done more quickly, particularly
with the aid of large-scale temporary service agencies. A permanent
worker’s flexibility may increase naturally over time as the employee
changes jobs within the organization, encounters different customers,
or communicates with other workers about their jobs. Also, an employee’s long tenure often includes times when the employee sacrifices for
the benefit of the firm, and other times when the company rewards that
service by giving the employee extra consideration. The repeated reciprocity builds trust and encourages the worker to be flexible again in
the future. Since knowledge and trust are rooted in a particular history,
it would be difficult for a competitor to quickly reproduce that kind of
relationship. When a change in demand or technology occurs, the capabilities must be already in place to be effective. In contrast, adjusting the
workforce with contingent workers happens at the time of the change.
A competitor can implement the same plan from scratch, assuming the
purpose of the plan is apparent and does not rely on either reconfiguring
the physical assets the contingent workers will use or redesigning jobs.
The second argument for a flexible permanent workforce is that
employment policies focused within the firm are less transparent to observers than are relationships with external parties. Temporary service
agencies, contract agencies, or independent contractors may reveal the
parameters and proposed benefits of their relationship with one firm
to entice another firm to use their services. Competitors can even ask
contingent workers how their previous employers used them. The flow
of information makes the market for contingent workers fairly efficient:
any employer should have to pay about the same amount to contract
for similar services. However, matching cost is not the only aspect of
benchmarking. Even more important is the issue of whether the resource or policy under consideration is central to the firm’s success.
With a relatively minor investment, a competitor can investigate an employer’s contingent work practices and determine whether they are the
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source of the firm’s competitive advantage or merely a convenient way
to staff a firm that really gains its superiority from other factors besides
human resources (e.g., its well-known brand name). On the other hand,
an employer’s relationship with its permanent employees is harder to
benchmark. A large organization follows complicated selection procedures, conducts numerous training programs, transfers employees between departments, and offers various incentives.
Part of what makes human resource systems so hard to understand
is that they are very complex, involving informal communication and
relationships. This complexity also makes it difficult to duplicate such
systems, even when the key components are well understood. Competitors thus find it difficult to determine which policies and practices have
the desired effect. It is possible that an employer uses an outside consultant to determine salaries or off-the-shelf software to train personnel.
In that case, a competitor could use the same methods. However, if the
key aspect of firm-specific human capital is something less obvious,
such as the personal commitments of team members to one another,
implementing all the standard solutions will be ineffective in matching
the successful firm. For example, HR practices that target employee
development can speed organizational learning, increase quality, and
enhance the flexibility of manufacturing systems.19 So, does a firm’s
manufacturing quality come from its proprietary machinery, used by
merely competent line workers, or from highly involved workers who
make constant suggestions for ongoing improvement to the machinery?
The answer to this question could lead a competitor to invest in new
equipment, new HR policies, or both.
The third explanation for why it can be more difficult to imitate
a flexible permanent workforce than one created through contingent
workers is that the imitator firm’s own history and capabilities impede
transfer of best practices from elsewhere. A small misunderstanding can
have a large impact on employees’ loyalty and productivity. Firms must
select, train, compensate, and commit to employees to create learning
synergies—just one of those aspects probably is not enough. The difficult nature of implementing such systems may explain why many firms
do not adopt “high-performance” work systems, and why many of these
systems die off quickly (Pfeffer 1994). An important aspect of the complexity in workforce flexibility is the relationship between a plant or di-
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vision and company headquarters. Employees will only welcome some
practices (e.g., merit pay) if they are universally applied. Likewise, staff
may establish uniform policies in order to simplify record keeping and
avoid mistakes. Both pressures will work against the manager of a particular plant trying to benchmark to a competitor whose practices differ
from the policies of his parent corporation. However, the harder a strategy is to implement, the more likely the successful firms will have a
source of sustainable advantage. A workforce that creates value through
flexibility will remain rare only if there exist barriers to imitation. The
challenge for managers is to create an organizational structure and culture that is consistent with the strategy, but not so formal or simple as to
allow for easy benchmarking.
Combining the Resource-Based and Real Options Frameworks
We have presented two frameworks for understanding flexible employment. Real options help managers know under what conditions
flexibility is important for any organization. The real option approach
also explains why contingent workers and flexible permanent employees are substitute methods of creating value under uncertainty. The resource-based view clarifies that gaining flexibility through permanent
employees is more likely to sustain that value in the face of competition.
Bringing the two frameworks together can generate some additional
insights into how managers can use real options to gain competitive advantage. The resource-based descriptions of markets, uncertainty, and
competitive advantage fit well with the type of economic framework
represented by financial options and real options. Three keys to the use
of financial options are information, complementarity, and efficiency,
and the same aspects exist for the real option of a flexible workforce.
Financial investors trade stocks based on information about the
magnitude, timing, and direction of profits and price movements. Financial options can be a less expensive way to profit from stock price
movement. For the price of one share of stock, an investor could purchase dozens of options that will also appreciate if the stock goes up. It
is even possible to make money on financial options solely by having
superior information about the amount of variability a stock’s price will
exhibit over time. For example, a certain combination of call options
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and put options may gain value if the stock price begins to move more
erratically over time. An investor does not need to know whether the
stock is going up or down, just whether world events or other factors
will cause the company’s cash flows to be less predictable in the future.
Likewise, purchasing and exercising real options can lead to competitive advantage if a firm has superior information.
Certain kinds of superior information may enable a firm to hire employees at an advantage. Suppose a firm has superior information about
which knowledge and skills will be in greatest demand in the near future. Competitors may be recruiting workers with broad skills, perhaps
paying a premium for intelligence and industry experience. But the firm
with superior information is able to select relatively inflexible workers
with just the right skills. While other firms are paying higher transaction
costs for churning through contingent workers, this firm can hire once.
Also, the complementarity between financial options and the underlying assets determines the value for each investor. The value of
financial options depends on the other assets in the investor’s portfolio,
often because investors use financial options to hedge against exposure
to specific risks. For example, an American company doing business
in Europe will earn revenues in euros, and will want to hedge against
changes in the exchange rate of the euro versus the dollar. A purely domestic U.S.-based company would have no need to hedge against currency risk. Even though traders and companies have sometimes been
hurt by speculative investment in options, the market for them continues to be strong because they are a low-cost way to hedge against specific risks. On the individual level, an investor who already owns shares
of stock can sell call options on those shares to lock in a limited profit;
the call option thus serves as a form of insurance. Similarly, different
real options will be worth more to some companies than others because
of the uncertainty each faces and the resources under its control.
A firm with a particular resource may find investment in a flexible
permanent workforce to be more valuable to it than a similar investment would be to its competitor. For instance, a firm with a distinctive
culture, brand name, managerial know-how, or location may be able to
leverage that resource into greater profits by hiring more flexible permanent employees at lower cost or with greater productivity than their
competitors. Consider an organization with superior proprietary tech-
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nology that allows a single worker to coordinate production of multiple
items. For competitors, the same production requires multiple workers
supervising multiple machines. The firm with the advantage can afford
to bid more than its competitors for the workers with the best learning
ability, and still be able to make an abnormal profit from their efforts.
The reverse is also possible. A firm may use distributed manufacturing
to meet demand as it arises. Because machines and systems are simple
or standardized, the company can hire temporary workers for a relatively low cost. A competitor committed to one large production facility
may have expensive overhead even during downtimes.
Finally, the U.S. stock market is still highly efficient in the sense
that the mechanisms of trade are not costly (e.g., stocks trading in penny increments) and do not automatically bias prices one way or the
other. The efficiency occurs despite the fact that the information available to investors is sometimes clouded by corporate misinformation
(e.g., Enron’s off-balance-sheet accounting), and some risks cannot be
anticipated (e.g., a terrorist attack). On the other hand, the markets for
resources that create real options are not necessarily efficient. Firms do
not frequently trade or sell real options, and managers may discount the
value of flexibility if it means trying something new.
Any input for sale in an efficient market will not be a likely source
of competitive advantage. Competing firms should bid up the price of
the resource to its fair market value. The market for contingent workers, at least in large metropolitan areas, is fairly efficient. Temporary
service agencies, contract agencies, and independent contractors generally provide their services at the same price to each employer. Likewise,
if every potential employer knows that certain potential employees are
more flexible, the cost of engaging those workers on a permanent basis
should rise to a level that equals their value contribution. Many seemingly different job abilities are highly correlated, at least as commonly
measured (Campion 1989). Entering the market for flexible employees,
an organization may find that everyone is its competitor, not just the
other firms in its industry. Thus, although a flexible permanent workforce can be achieved through the structure of work and the selection
of workers, such processes are likely to cost a firm the full price of the
flexibility. Structure and selection can bring the average firm to competitive parity, but not competitive advantage.
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On the other hand, in order to gain or extend a competitive advantage through investment in permanent employees, a company must
only have superior information relative to its employees. Companies
typically have a better understanding of what a job requires than does
the prospective employee. The difference in information allows the firm
to hire the worker at a fair market price, but less than the full value the
individual will create within the firm over time. Then, continued investment in firm-specific human capital can create more value to be shared
between the employer and an employee. The employee is willing to
learn from the employer because of the employer’s superior information and resources. Even skilled workers who know more about their
tasks than any manager will find it easier to prove their value to the organization by listening to how their tasks fit within the overall strategy,
rather than trying on their own to unpack complex interactions among
other workers. The agreement between the employer and employee is
not an efficient market, but rather a negotiation, even if it takes place
within the structure of a union contract.
This is not to argue that all firms would do equally well to invest in
permanent employees. Managerial skill, teamwork, distinctive reward
systems, partnerships with universities, or other resources could create a superior environment for developing the right kind of employee
flexibility. An optimal strategy for any given firm may be to invest in
real options through some permanent employees and some contingent
workers. Periodically integrating outsiders can invigorate organizational learning and facilitate change, even in businesses relying primarily
on core workers.20 Similarly, firms with good reason to employ many
contingent workers may need to invest in a few key employees who can
coordinate the constant flow of workers. Nevertheless, the resourcebased view clarifies that a flexible permanent workforce may be a more
sustainable source of competitive advantage than a contingent workforce, and the real options logic highlights the importance of information about industry conditions, firm-specific risks, and how an employee
can become part of a complex system to create value.
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Conclusion and Directions for
Further Research
Current research suggests that increasing rates of change in the
economic environment and uncertainty have driven demand for contingent workers. Temporary supply agencies, independent contractors, and
other organizational forms have arisen to take advantage of economies
of scale and reduce transaction costs related to hiring workers with a
particular, identifiable skill. Contingent work situations are diverse and
they are designed to address different costs and benefits. A multivariate regression analysis using CPS data confirmed that employers are
likely to hire contingent workers to save on wages, health insurance,
and pension contributions, and to take advantage of the availability
of large-scale agencies located in metropolitan areas. However, more
flexible workers, such as those who have had more experience or are
willing to work overtime, are less likely to be in contingent positions,
which implies that employers also recognize the possibility of gaining
a flexible workforce through hiring and training permanent employees.
The resource-based view of the firm and the real options approach to
valuing flexibility clarify that a company relying on multiskilled permanent employees to adapt to change may be in a better position to gain
and sustain a competitive advantage than a company using contingent
workers to handle uncertain labor demand.
Future research should shed light on two main areas. First, what
are the most important factors driving demand for contingent workers?
Second, under what circumstances is it preferable to invest in flexible
permanent employees rather than using contingent workers? To answer
both questions, there is a need for research designs that will measure
all relevant costs and employee productivity. These studies would do
well to move beyond studies of low-skilled temporary workers to consideration of the kind of high-skilled and professional occupations that
are more central to value creation in a business. The measurement of
particular risks in each firm’s environment is necessary to test whether
firms create the right real options.
An appropriate case study to address both questions might compare
two firms that face ongoing technology changes, the timing of which
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is unpredictable. One firm might make a commitment to its existing
full-time workers, promising to train them in any new skill required.
The other firm might cut back to a core of full-time employees and fill
the other positions with temporary workers. When the change occurs
(e.g., when a new time-saving computer technology is released), the
first company pays to train its employees and may have to fire or offer early retirement to some who cannot make the adjustment, but it
retains people with years of firm-specific experience. The second firm
can move more quickly to hire temps with the newly required skills, assuming they are available in the labor market, or rely on the agency to
train workers. The company using temporary workers ramps up to full
productivity more quickly and inexpensively, but perhaps the eventual
peak productivity is less than at the firm using its own employees. After
the fact, one could assess which firm had higher overall productivity.
But such examples are hard to find. Managers facing the same uncertainty often follow similar strategies, and estimating costs of training,
turnover, and benefits is difficult.
Such research would require detailed personnel data, as well as integrated theories. The worker’s own assessment of knowledge, skills,
abilities, and motivation is relevant, as well as the employer’s evaluation of the environment, the firm’s strategy, and the worker’s productivity and costs. Transaction costs are important, but theories also accounting for firm-specific resources and the need for flexibility must be
tailored to specific industry and occupational contexts.
Finally, economy-wide evaluations of supply and demand for contingent work should be replicated at the level of the industry and firm.
The CPS supplements have helped to define contingent work and its impact for the overall economy. However, new data sets at a more detailed
level would allow tests of models considering worker and employer
motivations. An understanding of both labor supply and demand is necessary to untangle the multiple factors driving contingent work.
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Notes
1. This discussion builds on a review of workforce practices that concludes organizations use temporary employees to cut costs, avoid restrictions/consequences,
and increase flexibility. See von Hippel et al. (1997).
2.  	The exception is a major study of employment externalization finding no relation between likelihood of a job being temporary and the level of fringe benefits.
However, data on fringe benefits were only available at the industry level (2-digit
SIC code), whereas the dependent variable is at the job level. This acknowledged
mismatch might have diluted the statistical and economic impact of the benefits
factor (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993).
3. This argument relies on empirical research that questions whether the dual internal labor market exists. Full-time employees may not believe managers who
claim temporary workers are not competing for the same jobs (Abraham and
Taylor 1996).
4. The major exception is dismissal based on discrimination such as gender or race
discrimination.
5. While the distinction between core and periphery workers is intuitive, some empirical evidence questions whether employing contingent workers actually provides any buffer against involuntary turnover among permanent workers (Capelli
and Neumark 2004). Further research is needed on the effects of employing both
contingent and permanent workers under different conditions.
6. The Black-Scholes model is the most famous example of a mathematical formula to estimate the value of a financial option. The formula takes into account the
option’s purchase price, exercise date or period, and exercise price. The formula
also considers the amount of uncertainty about the price of the stock.
7. This is why many executives who received stock options as compensation during
the Internet stock boom of the late 1990s made so much money.
8. For a helpful categorization of real options, see Trigeorgis (1996).
9. Also, Abraham (1998) finds differences in mean use of staffing arrangements
between firms with and without seasonality and cyclicality.
10. The first published paper to apply real options logic to employment decisions
was Malos and Campion (1995). The authors explain the up-or-out promotional
systems in professional service firms as creating a real option that mitigates uncertainty about employee productivity.
11.  	We use logistic regression analysis, which allows us to investigate the impact of
independent variables on the probability that a position is contingent. Logistic
regression is an extension of standard ordinary least squares analysis that is appropriate when the dependent variable is of a yes/no nature. Technical details and
tables of results can be obtained from the first author.
12. See Chapter 2 of this volume for a more detailed discussion of these three estimates and the CPS definition of “alternative work arrangements” as distinct from
contingent work.
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13. By 1999, the numbers had changed slightly to 60.7 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively (DiNatale 2001, Table 6).
14. We report results from our analysis of the 1995 data because little has changed
over time in the CPS variables employed in this study.
15. Managers and employees make decisions about the duration of a position, the
compensation for the position, and the attributes of the workers simultaneously.
To appropriately estimate all the relationships between these variables would
require a system of equations. However, if employers can choose to save money
on wages and benefits by hiring contingent workers, this choice implies that the
employers are price takers.
16. Using Estimate 3 of contingent work, with self-employed and independent contractors included and the time frame restriction removed, those workers with
some graduate work are 12 percent more likely than other workers to be contingent. Well-educated people are apparently more likely to start their own businesses.
17. In fact, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that aggregate measures are superior to
firm-level data at capturing technological risk because shocks should affect all
industry users of the same technology.
18. Articles discussing theoretical approaches to strategic human resource management include Barney and Wright (1998); Gerhart, Trevor, and Graham (1996);
and Snell, Youndt, and Wright (1996).
19. Several researchers have considered whether bundles of human resources practices are more effective than individual practices at creating value through people. Influential papers include Youndt et al. (1996); MacDuffie (1995); Becker
and Huselid (1998); and Arthur (1992). An interesting and readable study is Upton (1995), in which the author finds that flexible manufacturing requires flexible
employees.
20. Case studies show that the benefits of using contingent-knowledge workers can
outweigh the costs (MacDougall and Hurst 2005). For a thorough discussion of
how to use contingent workers to accumulate and disseminate knowledge, see
Matusik and Hill (1998).
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There are several terms for contingent work and the activities surrounding the use of contingent workers. Some of the most common
terms are strategic staffing, market-mediated work, temporary help, and
alternative work arrangement. Furthermore, contingent employment
arrangements take many forms, including agency temporaries who
are paid by temporary employment agencies, contract workers whose
services are contracted out by their employer, per diem or on-call day
workers, part-time employees, independent contractors, and the selfemployed.
We use the term contingent work in this chapter because it best
characterizes the challenge this shift in the employment relationship
poses for unions. The term contingent workers was coined by Audrey
Freedman in 1985 to refer to employees whose work is contingent on
the variability of employers’ need for them (Nollen and Axel 1996b).
This description expresses the essential problem for unions: the use of
alternative work arrangements is largely an employer-driven phenomenon that will result in employment and earnings instability for many
employees working under these arrangements.
Several measures of contingent work are available. What they have
in common are the characteristics of short-term work, variability in
work schedule, absence of either an implicit or explicit contract, and
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lack of worker attachment to a particular employer (Nollen and Axel
1996a).1 Additional characteristics often are noted, such as the involuntary nature of such arrangements, inferior pay and benefits, absence of
promotion opportunities, and lack of opportunity to build human capital
(Barker and Christensen 1998, p. 223).
Why Use Contingent Workers?
There are a variety of reasons for employers to use contingent work
arrangements. Contingent workers can fill temporary vacancies, work
during peak periods, and provide specialized skills needed for brief periods (Roberts and Gleason 1999). However, from the perspective of
workers the use of contingent workers allows employers to pass on to
workers the economic insecurity associated with changing product markets, new technologies, and the business cycle (Tilly 1992, p. 23). This
is clearly antithetical to union goals of protecting worker earnings and
job security. Historically, this goal has meant negotiating for long-term,
stable employment for full-time employees, with little attention paid to
part-time or other work arrangements (Cobble and Vosko 2000).
The use of different kinds of contingent work arrangements represents two broad strategies by employers to gain greater flexibility
in their production methods. One is the very short-term, often ad hoc
strategy of using individuals to fill particular jobs or accomplish specific tasks. Often workers under these arrangements are working side by
side with traditional full-time workers. Examples of these arrangements
include using workers from temporary employment agencies, casual
day workers, and perhaps part-time workers. The other strategic use of
contingent work typically involves a relatively large-scale, long-term
reorganization of how work is done and who does it, and frequently is
associated with efforts to reduce labor costs. Usually this results in work
being moved off site. Examples of these arrangements include subcontracting portions of work previously done internally, the use of leased
workers, and privatization in the public sector. From a union perspective, both of these strategies represent a common threat: the removal of
work from the bargaining unit. This creates two serious problems: the
workers are no longer subject to contractual protections, and the union
is weakened by reduced membership.
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How Do Unions Respond to Contingent
Employment Arrangements?
The analysis in this chapter is based on the review of standard contract language in the industrial and service sectors and the public and
private sectors. The assumption underlying our methodology is that collective bargaining agreements represent the negotiated resolution at a
point in time of the classic conflict between management desire for full
discretion in the use of labor and the union goal of protecting the welfare of its members. Even when unions and management are working
relatively cooperatively, a tension exists between management desire
for unfettered authority over labor and the union objective to protect
workers from management discretion (Sloane and Whitney 1994, p.
458). Consequently, the content of the agreements is the operational
articulation of that tension.
Unions can respond to the use of contingent work by pursuing a
strategy of exclusion or inclusion of contingent workers as reflected in
the language of the contract. A strategy of exclusion entails deliberately
excluding contingent work arrangements from the bargaining unit and
attempting to limit the employer’s use of workers outside the bargaining unit. The strategy of inclusion seeks ways to include contingent
workers in the bargaining unit and attempts to negotiate good wages
and working conditions for those workers while protecting traditional
full-time union members, thus eliminating the cost advantage of nontraditional workers.
In this chapter, examples of each strategy are discussed for temporary employees, part-time employees, leased employees, and other
categories of employees. We review union responses to employer efforts to remove significant numbers of workers from the bargaining unit
through the use of subcontracting, outsourcing, privatization, and independent contractors. We present mechanisms for inclusion of contingent workers in the unit and the protection of their seniority rights and
other benefits, and identify the issues that organized labor will face in
the future. We conclude with a discussion of future research questions.
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How Contingent Workers Gain Union
Representation: The Definition of the
Bargaining Unit
When unions decide to follow an inclusionary strategy, they can
either include contingent workers in the bargaining unit, which is the
most common approach, or negotiate separate contracts for traditional
and contingent workers (Sloane and Whitney 1994, p. 21).
Selecting the Strategy of Exclusion or Inclusion
Our review of contract language suggests that the way in which
a union responds to the threat of contingent work depends in part on
whether the employer is a goods producer or a service producer. The
language in the contracts of industrial or goods-producing employers is
more likely to address subcontracting and the use of leased employees.
These unions have pursued a strategy of exclusion which contractually excludes alternative work arrangements and attempts to limit management rights to subcontract bargaining unit work. Contract language
in manufacturing, for example, tends to address the conditions under
which work can be assigned outside the bargaining unit and when the
employer can outsource. There is little language limiting the ad hoc use
of individuals with the exception of fairly standard language about the
number of days a temporary worker can work before becoming a permanent employee and a dues-paying member of the bargaining unit.
In contrast, service sector contract language is more likely to address issues regarding the ad hoc use of individual contingent workers.
In general, service sector unions tend to agree to include some types
of contingent workers in the bargaining unit. As a result, the contract
language must address a variety of issues clarifying the rights and uses
of traditional and contingent workers in the same bargaining unit. These
issues include distinguishing between different types of employees included in the bargaining unit, the differential accumulation of seniority
by employee category, and prorating benefits. One prominent exception
to this service sector approach is privatization efforts by public sector employers. Over the last two decades, there has been an effort on
the part of some state and local governments to privatize government
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functions. Privatization is the public sector analogue to private sector
outsourcing, since work is taken out of the bargaining unit and given
to a separate organization. Depending on how the bargaining unit is
defined, it is possible for privatization to effectively eliminate the unit
(DuRivage, Carré, and Tilly 1998).
Deciding which approach to take is complicated by the fact that,
in some instances, a contingent work arrangement meets the needs of
union members (SEIU 1993). There are workers who prefer a flexible
work schedule so they can manage family demands, return to school, or
for some other reason. According to the American Staffing Association
(2001), 28 percent of the temporary employees placed by their member
agencies prefer temporary work to gain flexibility for nonwork interests, and 43 percent chose temporary work for family reasons. In its
2001 survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2001) found that 39
percent of workers in contingent arrangements preferred these arrangements to traditional work. Furthermore, 14.9 percent of full-time and
6.8 percent of part-time workers are union members, suggesting that
part-time workers are an important union constituency. These figures
suggest that a union taking a doctrinaire approach advocating the elimination of contingent work would not serve all of its members.
Defining the Bargaining Unit
Organizing activities and the representation of contingent employees in the public and private sectors generally are governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). (Some exceptions occur in states
with separate legislation for public employees and in the few states that
offer no collective bargaining rights at all. See SEIU [1993]). For contingent workers to have the right to collectively bargain with their employer, there must be a union able to represent them. As is the case with
traditional workers, union representation is obtained through a union
organizing drive.
Unions build their memberships through organizing campaigns that
are regulated by federal or state agencies. Only one union can represent
a group of workers at a time. Unions may specialize in the workers
they attempt to organize. For example, some unions operate only in the
public or private sectors, while others are organized along industrial,
service, or craft lines. In general, unions determine their preferences for
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who should be included in the bargaining unit based on the membership
most likely to be successfully organized. During an organizing drive
the union will determine the preferred bargaining unit membership and
file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or the
state agency governing public sector industrial relations in that state.
The relevant agency will determine if these workers are an appropriate
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. The composition of the
unit is extremely important to both the employer and the union because
this will be the electorate that determines the outcome of the election.
Typically, each group attempts to create the bargaining unit that will
best support its objectives.
The NLRB refers to the “community-of-interest principle” when
establishing the appropriate bargaining unit, which refers to what the
employees within the potential bargaining unit have in common with regard to wages, working conditions, and regularity of hours (DuRivage,
Carré, and Tilly 1998). The more homogeneous the employees are according to these criteria, the more likely it is that the board will find
that they have a community of interest and are thus an appropriate unit
for bargaining. Using the community of interest principle, the NLRB
rulings have identified general principles or guidelines governing the
inclusion of various types of workers within the bargaining unit (SEIU
1993).
If workers in contingent employment arrangements pass the community of interest test and other guidelines for inclusion, they may be
included in a bargaining unit. Contract language suggests that unions
address three types of contingent work arrangement: temporary employees, part-time workers, and leased workers. Other categories of
employees also may be covered in some contracts such as student employees in university contracts. Unions must determine which aspects
of the contract will apply to contingent workers.
Temporary Employees
According to the NLRB, temporary employees can be included in
the bargaining unit when they are hired or employed for an indefinite
period. The NLRB uses a “date to certain” test, meaning that a temporary employee should be included in the unit if no certain date has
been set for termination of employment.2 As discussed above, union

Gleason.indb 104

11/13/2006 9:06:48 AM

Union Responses to the Challenges of Contingent Work Arrangements 105

strategies vary in the handling of temporary employees. Our review
suggests that, typically, although not always, service sector unions are
more likely to use contract language that includes specific definitions of
employee categories. However, some service sector unions use exclusionary language and limit the hours of work of temporary employees.
Industrial unions generally bargain for exclusionary contract language.
Contracts with both Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, Michigan, and
Mercy Hospital of Buffalo, New York, provide examples of inclusive
language. The Sparrow contract specifically includes regular part-time
and per diem employees in the professional bargaining unit.
The Hospital recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive representative of its full-time, regular part-time and per diem professional employees employed by the hospital for the purpose of collective bargaining with the respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment and other conditions of employment.3

Because it covers such a broad spectrum of workers, the Sparrow
agreement includes long descriptions of each category of employment.
These descriptions are necessary to define precisely the duties and rights
of each job classification. This agreement includes explicit definitions
for three types of temporary workers (External Temporary Employees,
Union Temporary Employees, and Float Employees) as well as FullTime and Regularly Scheduled Part-Time (Core) employees. Each of
these descriptions details the number of hours available to be worked
and is explicit about when an employee in each of these categories becomes a dues-paying regular employee.
In the agreement between Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and the Communications Workers of America (CWA) the categories of employment
also are specified carefully. The categories as defined in Mercy and CWA
provide an example of the explicit specification of employee types:
Article 15, Purpose – A. Flexible employee is one who is hired for
a specified number of hours per week . . . Flexible Employees respond to variations in workload created by increases or decreases
in census and/or acuity. Flexible employees also provide general
staffing relief for planned and unplanned absences (e.g. Paid Time
Off).
Article 16, Section 1 – A Per Diem Employee is one who works on
a day to day as needed basis without a guarantee of set hours per
week and without benefits.
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Article 17, Section 1 – A temporary employee is an employee designated as such, hired for a specific job of limited duration not
exceeding six (6) months. This period may be extended for up to
another six (6) months by mutual agreement of the Hospital and
the Union.4

However, not all service unions take an inclusive approach. Some
unions exclude temporary employees from their bargaining unit and
then try to limit the encroachment of temporary workers through contract language. Kaiser Hospital in Portland, Oregon, is a good example of this. First, they exclude temporary workers from the bargaining
unit.
Temporary or irregularly scheduled employees shall be excluded
from this agreement so long as they are not used to deprive regular
employees of work time. All regular employees must be working
before temporary or irregularly scheduled employees are used. It is
further agreed that such employment will not result in any reduction in the number of persons employed in the bargaining unit or
in the number of regular hours of employment of any employee in
the bargaining unit.5

Second, a limit is placed on the period of time the services of temporary workers can be used.
A temporary employee is one who is hired from outside the Bargaining Unit to work for a specific period of time not to exceed
three (3) consecutive months, or to replace a permanent employee
not to exceed (6) months or to replace an employee on Union-related leave not to exceed twelve (12) consecutive months. Specific
exceptions to provide for an additional and limited time period in
a temporary status may be made by mutual agreement in writing
by the parties.6

This explicit limitation on the number of hours a temporary worker
can work is seen relatively frequently in service agreements, suggesting
that the use of short-term temporary workers is a strategy commonly
used by service sector employers.
Most industrial contracts use the exclusionary approach. One tactic
is defining normal hours of work to ensure that only full-time, regularly scheduled workers are used. A typical example is LTV Steel and
the United Steelworkers of America agreement. The hours of work are
defined as
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[t]he normal work day shall be any regularly scheduled consecutive twenty-four (24) hours of work comprising eight (8) consecutive hours of work and sixteen (16) consecutive hours of rest except for such rest periods as may be provided in accordance with
practices heretofore prevailing in the Works of the Company. The
normal work pattern shall be 5 consecutive workdays beginning
on the first day of any 7-consecutive-day period.7

This language limits the use of nontraditional employees by restricting how hours of work will be assigned to employees.
Part-Time Employees
According to the NLRB, regular part-time employees can be included in a bargaining unit and are entitled to vote in an election. An
employee is included in a unit if the employee works a sufficient number of hours on a regular basis to have a substantial interest in the wages, hours, and working conditions in the unit.8 Thus, an employee who
works only one day a week every week as a weekend relief can be
included in the bargaining unit.
Unions pursuing a strategy of inclusion generally have used one
of three tactics: including part-time workers in the bargaining unit as
regular part-time employees, including language converting part-time
jobs to full-time jobs, or negotiating separate contracts for full-time and
part-time workers. For example, the language in the Sparrow Hospital
and Michigan Nurses Association contract cited earlier includes parttime workers in the bargaining unit. Similarly, the language in the contract between Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and Communications Workers
of America, Service, Technical, and Clerical Employees also includes
these workers.
Article 4, Categories of Employees; Section 2 – A regular part time
employee is defined as one who is regularly scheduled to work less
than thirty-four (34) hours per week but fifteen (15) hours or more
per week.9

A third example is the contract between the United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc.
The Employer recognizes the Union as the collective bargaining
agent for all full-time and regular part-time Grocery, Meat, Produce, General Merchandise, Warehouse and Property Services em-
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ployees at the covered units, excluding any employees of any lease
operation, employees of any existing or future operations which
are either not physically attached to a covered unit or are not operated within the same premises as a covered unit, Manger Trainees,
Store Directors, Line Managers, Department Managers, Property
Services Supervisors, Distribution Center Supervisors, Working
Supervisors and the management to which such Managers report,
Auditors, Registered Pharmacists, Pharmacy Technicians, Professional, Confidential, Office, Clerical, Systems Monitors, Managerial employees, Security employees and other Guards and Supervisors as defined in the Labor Management Relations Act as
amended and all other employees.10

The tactic of converting part-time jobs to full-time jobs is illustrated by the 1997 and 2002 contracts between the United Parcel Service
(UPS) and the Teamsters. The 1997 Teamsters strike against UPS was
an example of an aggressive approach to limiting employer use of parttime workers. During this strike the Teamsters were able to generate
public support in part because part-time work symbolizes reduced job
security and benefits to much of the American public (Tilly 1998). The
UPS-Teamsters contract clearly committed UPS to slowing the increase
in the number of part-time jobs and beginning to convert part-time into
full-time jobs.
The 1997 contract was emphatic that full-time and part-time workers would be included in a single bargaining unit:
All employees, Unions and the Employer covered by this Master Agreement and the various Supplements, Riders and Addenda
thereto, shall constitute one (1) bargaining unit. It is understood
that the printing of this Master Agreement and the aforesaid Supplements, Riders and/or Addenda in separate agreements is for
convenience only and is not intended to create separate bargaining
units.11

It was also clear that the purpose of including part-time workers in
the bargaining unit was to facilitate their movement to full-time employment.
The parties agree that providing part-time employees the opportunity to become full-time employees is a priority of this Agreement. Accordingly, the employer commits that during the life of
this Agreement, it will offer part-time employees the opportunity
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to fill at least twenty thousand (20,000) permanent full-time job
openings throughout its operations covered by this Agreement.

The result of contract renegotiation in 2002 was a UPS contract that
has been described as “the richest contract in Teamster history” (LRA
2002). In this contract UPS agreed to bring in-house nearly 10,000 subcontracted, nonunion jobs to create a pool of union jobs that would go
to current part-timers. Thus, the Teamster agreement helped to reduce
the gap between full-time and part-time workers by reducing wage differentials and providing more job mobility, job security, and retirement
security for both part-time and full-time workers.
A third tactic unions use is to negotiate separate contracts for fulltime and part-time workers. Marriott Management Services and the
United Catering, Restaurant, Bar, and Hotel Workers negotiated separate contracts for workers providing food service to the Ford Motor
Company, thereby creating two separate bargaining units. The two contracts are virtually identical except for the provisions for hours of work
and costs of benefits to employers.12
In the industrial sectors, the contract language is more likely to be
exclusionary. One tactic to eliminate part-time workers from the bargaining unit is to define the hours for shift work so that part-time employment is prohibited. This strategy is illustrated by LTV Steel contract.
The normal work day shall be any regularly scheduled consecutive twenty-four (24) hour period comprising eight (8) consecutive
hours of work and sixteen (16) consecutive hours of rest except for
such rest periods as may be provided in accordance with practices
heretofore prevailing in the Works of the Company.13

Leased Employees
Leased employees are workers on the payroll of one employer (the
leasing firm) who are supplied to another employer (the client employer) based on a contract negotiated between the two employers. Leased
employees can be included in the bargaining unit of the client employer
if the client employer and leasing company are deemed to be “joint employers.” Joint employment occurs if the two employers share and codetermine matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. The essential terms and conditions of employment typically
include hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, direction, and scheduling
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of work. To establish joint employer status, one must show that both
employers meaningfully affect some or all of these matters relating to
the employment relationship.
The NLRB has found that two employers are joint employers where
regular and leased employees have the same supervision, perform essentially the same tasks, have functionally integrated work, and receive
the same wages (Jenero and Spognardi 1995). Joint employment provides limited protection to workers because the NLRA does not prohibit
the client employer from failing to renew a subcontract, thus eliminating the leased workers from the bargaining unit (DuRivage, Carré, and
Tilly 1998). However, leased employees included in the bargaining unit
are eligible to vote in NLRB elections to determine whether they are
represented by a union. Consequently, leased employees who traditionally receive fewer benefits than regular employers would have the right
to unionize as a means of improving their terms and conditions of employment.
Other Employee Categories
Unions also may seek to include other categories of employees in
collective bargaining contracts to manage contingent work. For example, students may be included in a bargaining unit depending upon their
communities of interest. A student working after school on a regular
schedule can be included in the unit as a regular part-time employee.
The inclusion of students in an agreement is illustrated by the contract between the Board of Regents Montana University System and
the Montana Faculty Association. Since students are a major part of the
university labor force, the union has included them as a tactic to control
this form of employment.
Any student who is employed as a “temporary” employee on a
“full‑time” basis for seven hundred (700) or more hours in any one
fiscal year, and is doing work within the position description of a
classified position within a bargaining unit, or doing work which
is within the described scope of work of a bargaining unit, shall
be required, as a condition of continued employment, to pay the
equivalent of initiation fees and/or monthly dues, or a service fee
in lieu of dues, to the union in accordance with Article 11, Section
A of this agreement.
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Furthermore, the contract includes language that specifies under
what circumstances the university can use students as employees.
In keeping with the federal and state policies of providing employment for students to provide economic opportunity to obtain further education, and in order to make available to students the benefits of state and federal work-study and financial aid programs,
the employer shall continue to employ students.14

However, the contract makes certain that student workers will not
encroach on protected union positions.
Students shall not be hired into any position, which would result in
the displacement of any employee.

In the LTV Steel and the United Steelworkers of America contract
student employment also is addressed. In an appendix to the contract on
student employment in the summer, language establishes limitations on
the period of employment and protects core jobs from being filled by
student workers.
During the term of the labor agreement, the probationary provisions of the Labor Agreements shall be modified as follows for students hired for summer employment on or before May 1 provided
those students terminate their employment on or before September
15 of the same year.15

Other types of nontraditional employees also may be included in
the bargaining unit under specified circumstances. On-call employees
may be included in a bargaining unit if the employee works regularly,
such as those needed by a large employer that has regular absences
to be filled. Seasonal workers, such as resort or agricultural workers,
may be included in a bargaining unit of regular full-time employees if
the seasonal workers have a reasonable expectation of returning each
season. Retirees who work regularly may be included in the bargaining
unit even if working a limited number of hours.
The NLRB uses a test to determine whether a trainee who might become a supervisor or fill a management position is eligible to vote. This
eligibility is determined by: 1) the kind of work being done, 2) whether
work is done under the same conditions and for the same pay as other
employees, 3) whether special training is required, 4) whether there
is an eventual guarantee of a top management job, and 5) the length
of the training period (Schlossberg and Scott 1983, p. 250). In a re-
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cent decision concerning a Massachusetts teaching hospital, the NLRB
overruled a long-standing precedent about doctor trainees who are now
considered employees under federal law. The NLRB found that doctor
trainees were employees because they were involved in a master-servant relationship that provided services for the hospital, received compensation for working in the physician-training program, and received
fringe benefits similar to other employees. This change in board opinion
opens up a new area for union organizing (Ruskin Moscou Faltischek,
P.C. 2003).
Probationary employees with a reasonable expectation of completing their probationary periods and being permanently hired also are included in a bargaining unit.

Union Efforts to Limit Use of Contingent Work:
Responses to Subcontracting, Privatization,
and Independent Contractors
The two major large-scale contingent work arrangements used by
employers are subcontracting and privatization. Subcontracting, also
called outsourcing, is the contracting out of a portion of the employer’s
work that was previously done in-house, such as janitorial services. It
can occur in both the private and public sectors. Privatization is giving
to private individuals or corporations the assets or functions that were
previously performed by state or local government employees. It occurs
only in the public sector (Bilik 1990). An example is contracting with a
private company to run a correctional institution. In addition, employers
in both the private and public sectors also use independent contractors.
All of these contingent work arrangements are perceived by unions as
eroding the strength of the bargaining unit and consequently reducing
unions’ ability to protect their members.
Subcontracting
One major goal of collective bargaining for industrial unions is to
negotiate language that continues the work of the bargaining unit and
limits the use of outside workers. Traditionally this has been done by
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negotiating language that excludes contingent workers from the bargaining unit and blocks or limits the ability of management to subcontract work to outside companies and vendors. However, in recent years
unions such as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) have recognized
the importance of helping the employer remain competitive in a global
market. As a consequence, unions have used different tactics, such as
negotiating early involvement in outsourcing planning, to limit the impact of subcontracting on the job security of their members.
Under the NLRA, contractual limits on the employer’s ability to use
contingent workers are a mandatory subject of bargaining. This means
that the union may bargain over these issues to the point of impasse and
then, if necessary, strike to obtain an agreement from the employer. The
NLRB has ruled that if the type of subcontracting clause sought by the
union is lawful, an employer has an obligation to bargain with the union
over the issue of subcontracting unit work when subcontracting will
adversely affect the bargaining unit (Helper 1990).
The variations in the strength of the contract language indicate that
some unions have been more successful than others in negotiating limitations on subcontracting. One example of strong language limiting the
use of subcontracting is seen in American Axle and Manufacturing, Inc.
and the UAW contract.
In no event shall any seniority associate who customarily performs
the work in question be laid off as a direct and immediate result
of work being performed by any outside contractor on the plant
premises.16

The agreement between the United Steelworkers of America
(USWA) and LTV Steel is an example of weaker language that provides management the latitude to use subcontractors while generally
acknowledging a spirit of limiting the use of subcontracting. Although
the USWA contract states that the guiding principle should be to keep
work in the bargaining unit, many areas are left to the discretion of
management.
The parties have existing rights and contractual understandings
with respect to contracting out. These include the existing rights
and obligations of the parties which arose before the parties included specific language in their collective bargaining agreements,
the arbitration precedents which have been established before and
since the parties included specific provisions addressing contract-
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ing out in their collective bargaining agreement, and the agreements resulting from the review of all contracting out work performed inside or outside the plant under the provisions of the Interim Progress Agreement dated January 31, 1986. In addition, the
following provisions shall be applicable to all new contracting out
issues arising on or after the effective date of this agreement.

The General Motors Corporation and the International Union of
Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine & Furniture Workers AFLCIO contract is another example where management retains considerable discretion in the use of subcontracting. The contract includes a
general acknowledgment that management will not use outside workers
unless necessary.
The corporation states that it will make a reasonable effort to avoid
contracting out work which adversely affects the job security of its
employees and that it will utilize various training programs available to it, whenever practicable, to maintain employment opportunities for its employees consistent with the needs of the corporation.17

However, there is additional contract language that includes a provision requiring management to provide advance notice in writing of
its intention to subcontract: “In all cases, except where time and circumstances prevent it, Local Management will hold advance discussion
with and provide advance written notice to the Chairperson of the Shop
Committee.”18
A loophole remains for management in the words “where time and
circumstances prevent it.” Nevertheless, the inclusion of a written justification for subcontracting is a significant limitation on management.
More recently unions have used tactics to ensure their early involvement in planning for subcontracting to limit its impact and protect the
job security of their members. For example, the 1996 contract language
from the UAW and General Motors negotiations is very explicit about
the tendency toward subcontracting while demonstrating the ability of
the union to limit that trend. This language ensures income security
protection for workers by involving the union in the process.
During the life of the current Agreement, the Corporation will advise, in writing, the Union members of the Sourcing Committee of
the Labor Policy Board meeting results relative to sourcing recommendations, including the number of potential jobs affected. Addi-
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tionally, data regarding incoming and outgoing work will be given
to the International Union in a quarterly meeting. (The Corporation will provide inquiry access to the International Union through
the use of a computer terminal.) In this manner, the parties can
judge the success of mutual efforts toward improved job security.
The Corporation agrees to incorporate the procedures and structure outlined herein when making sourcing determinations during
the current Agreement.19

The language reflects not only union concerns about job security
but also its respect for management concerns about productivity. This is
an important shift in position for the UAW since it reflects the recognition of the need for the employer to be economically competitive. It also
provides the union with the opportunity to demonstrate its support of
improvements in productivity by creating a cooperative labor relations
environment.
This contract also addresses the extent to which management can
use outside vendors for equipment maintenance.
Employees of any outside contractor will not be utilized in a plant
covered by this Agreement to replace seniority employees on production assembly or manufacturing work, or fabrication of tools,
dies, jigs and fixtures, normally and historically performed by
them, when performance of such work involves the use of Corporation-owned machines, tools, or equipment maintained by Corporation employees.20

This language ensures protection for senior employees by limiting the duties open for subcontracted work. It also restricts contract
workers from using GM equipment, thereby limiting the use of contract
workers on the shop floor. But the next section of the agreement builds
in flexibility for management to contract out repair work:
The foregoing shall not affect the right of the Corporation to continue arrangements currently in effect; nor shall it limit the fulfillment of normal warranty obligations by vendors nor limit work
which a vendor must perform to prove out equipment.21

This language provides a loophole for management to continue the
use of outside vendors but also indicates that the union will attempt to
place some conditions on management.
A separate UAW-GM contract provides another example of the recognition by the unions of the need to support productivity improvements.
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The UAW has developed programs to provide income security and encourage union locals to form “productivity coalitions” to compete for
work that management might otherwise outsource. One such program,
referred to as the Job Opportunity Bank Security (JOBS) Program, has
been negotiated between the UAW and the Big Three automakers. The
General Motors Corporation and UAW contract language provides an
example of increased job security through a JOBS Program, while not
explicitly prohibiting the use of subcontractors. It “protects eligible employees against layoff for virtually any reason except volume-related
market conditions.”22
Unions have consistently argued that their membership can do most
of subcontracted work if given the proper equipment. Language such
as that for the JOBS program provides a formal mechanism for them to
demonstrate their productivity.23 Implied in this language is the guarantee that core employees will not be replaced due to subcontracting as
long as they meet productivity standards.
The above examples of contract language range from strong statements prohibiting subcontracting to full management discretion over
subcontracting decisions. In a few cases the union has been able to
entirely prohibit the use of subcontractors. However, in general most
contracts indicate that management retains this right to varying degrees. The effectiveness, therefore, of these provisions varies with the
strength of the union local and the intransigence of management. The
most promising resolution of this tension between the employer’s need
for flexibility and the union’s need for job security appears in the UAWGM JOBS Program. This program gives the union the opportunity to
demonstrate the productivity of its workers and their ability to do jobs
that would otherwise be subcontracted outside the company.
Privatization
Similar to private sector unions, public sector unions are facing a
variety of actions on the part of employers to reduce their workforces. By reclassifying and relocating positions, public sector unions are
moving work beyond the reach of bargaining agreements and personnel
policies. While the term “subcontracting” is used in the private service
and manufacturing sectors, “privatization” refers to the same actions in
the public sector.
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In the current antigovernment environment, where limiting the size
and power of government is a popular bipartisan goal, the privatization
of government services often is advocated as a way to provide these
services more efficiently. However, privatization removes unionized
employees from the public sector union. This erosion of public sector bargaining units is especially troublesome to unions in the United
States because the public sector has been the only economic sector in
which union membership has grown over the past quarter century. In
2001, 37.4 percent of government workers were members of unions,
compared to 9.0 percent among private sector employers (BLS 2001).
Unions have two major concerns about privatization: 1) that privatization will undermine wage and benefit standards and reduce the number of full-time public sector jobs, and 2) that privatization will result
in the deterioration of the quality of public services since these will be
delivered by organizations motivated by profit and cost control rather
than a service orientation.
A wide range of state services have been privatized, including mental health, parks and recreation, employment security, education, data
processing, police, vehicle registration, corrections, and airport services
(Bilik 1990). Mirroring their private sector counterparts seeking to control subcontracting, public unions have developed proactive strategies
to counteract privatization, such as identifying the early signs of privatization efforts in order to bargain, strong contract language prohibiting
or limiting privatization, and legislative solutions. In addition, many
unions also are using legal remedies as an ongoing tactic. An example
is seeking court injunctions to stop employer actions opposed by the
union.24
One example of the use of legal solutions is seen in the actions of
Michigan State Government Local UAW 6000 in its opposition to the
privatization of the Michigan Department of Corrections Health Care
Unit. The department concluded a bidding process aimed at examining
the feasibility of subcontracting health care unit staffing at five facilities to a private sector company (Michigan Department of Corrections
1999). The union opposed this measure because it would put the Department of Corrections’ health care system under the jurisdiction of a
private company and remove the current health care providers from the
bargaining unit. UAW Local 6000 representatives testified before the
Michigan Senate Committee on Corrections Allocations stating that
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[t]he department wants to make physicians and PA’s the gatekeepers of managed care systems. There seems to be a clear and direct
conflict of interest, when the gatekeeper of a system is an employee of that same system. Local 6000 strongly urge you to stop
the privatization of physicians and physicians’ assistants. (Rivera
2000)

The union also contended that it is better to keep jobs within the
system to ensure the quality of the service. It further argued that there
is no conclusive research to document that privatization will result in
cost savings (Rivera 2000). The Department of Corrections’ action is
currently being grieved before the State Civil Service Commission.
Independent Contractors
Another employer tactic is the conversion of current employees
into independent contractors (Coalition for Fair Worker Classification
1994). Independent contractors are excluded from the definition of employee under Section 2(3) of the NLRA and therefore are considered
part of the contingent workforce. Independent contractors are generally distinguished from employees based on the amount of control the
employer exercises over how a person does the work. However, there
is often confusion about who is truly an independent contractor. Consequently, misclassification has been a frequent problem, as discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5.
The impact of misclassification on employees is illustrated by the
experience of reporters and photographers working for the Philadelphia
Inquirer. The 175 employees who covered the news in the city’s suburban bureaus were assigned stories and deadlines by managing editors.
However, for many years the Inquirer classified the city reporters and
photographers as full-time employees, while classifying the suburban
workers as “independent contractors.” As a consequence the suburban
workers did not qualify for health or pension benefits and were responsible for paying their own employment taxes. It was not until the suburban employees joined the Newspaper Guild/Communications Workers
in 1997 that they were classified as Inquirer employees.
The AFL-CIO has responded at a national level by backing federal legislation making misclassification more difficult. Under current
law, a 20-factor IRS formula is used to determine whether a worker
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is classified as an employee or independent contractor. The Independent Contractor Classification Act of 2001 addresses the worker-classification issue by creating a new section 3511 of the Internal Revenue
Code to simplify the criteria used to distinguish between employees
and independent contractors. It requires employers to reclassify as
full-time employees many workers currently considered independent
contractors (AFL-CIO 2002). The act reduces the classification test to
three criteria. Workers will be considered independent contractors if
1) their employers have no right to control them, 2) they can make their
services available to others, and 3) they have the potential to generate
profit and bear significant risk of loss.

Bargaining on Wages, Seniority, and Benefits
for Contingent Workers
Once employees in a workplace have voted to be represented by a
union, an employer is required by law to bargain with the union as the
sole representative of the workers. The duty to bargain imposed by the
NLRA entails a requirement of the employer to bargain in good faith on
hours, wages, and conditions of work, which generally includes seniority and nonwage benefits. The union, on the other hand, is obligated by
the “Duty of Fair Representation” to represent the interests of all of its
members (Feldacker 1990, p. 352).
During contract negotiations unions consider the advantages, disadvantages, and effects on the different groups in its membership of the
various clauses being discussed for inclusion in the collective bargaining agreement. Typically the union will have to make some decisions
that favor some bargaining unit employees over others. However, as
long as the union does not act in an arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory,
or perfunctory manner, its legal obligations are fulfilled. Because of the
differing interests within the bargaining unit, some negotiated language
may have an adverse effect on contingent workers. Important issues
regularly negotiated that affect contingent workers are wages, seniority,
and nonwage benefits, including medical care, disability coverage, and
sick leave.

Gleason.indb 119

11/13/2006 9:06:49 AM

120 Lundy, Roberts, and Becker

Wages
Unions use two strategies to raise wages for contingent workers.
The first and most direct strategy is the inclusion of these workers in
the bargaining unit so the discussion of their wages is included in negotiations. Examination of recognition clauses in collective bargaining
agreements suggests that this approach is most often used for part-time
workers. More rare is language covering wages for non–bargaining unit
workers. The Teamster-UPS agreement settled in July 2002 (discussed
earlier) was an example of a union using a strike to achieve considerable gains for part-time members.
While full-time workers will receive wage increases of $5 per hour
over the life of the six-year agreement, part-time workers will receive $6 per hour over the life of the agreement, achieving a longterm Teamster goal of reducing the gap between full-time and parttime wages. (LRA 2002)

In a 2002 settlement, the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) negotiated a contract for janitors in downtown Boston with
wages equal to the hourly rate of full-time workers (Bureau of National
Affairs 2002).
Another union strategy is to support public policy changes and
living wage ordinances to improve wages for all contingent workers
(Carré and Joshi 2000). The Association of Community Organizations
for Reform Now (ACORN), the oldest and largest grassroots organization of low- and moderate-income people, is an example of this type of
support. ACORN, which has 100,000 members in over 30 cities, argues
that when public dollars are used to subsidize employers, these employers should not be permitted to pay their workers less than a living wage
(ACORN 2003).
Seniority
Seniority is a defining principle of unionism. Employees with the
longest period of service with the organization receive the greatest job
security, improved working conditions, and frequently greater entitlement to employee benefits (Sloane and Whitney 1994). Under most
collective bargaining agreements, seniority is the basis for determining
pay, job opportunities and assignments, the right to paid time off, recalls
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after layoffs, overtime options, and other nonmonetary aspects of work.
An employee’s relative seniority status in the company usually depends
on three basic considerations: when seniority begins to accumulate, the
effect of changes in work assignments on seniority, and the effect of
interruptions in employment on seniority.
Determining whether and how seniority can be accumulated for
contingent workers remains a challenge to unions. Due to the importance of seniority in determining the economic welfare of full-time
workers, many unions are reluctant to grant seniority rights to temporary workers. However, when seniority rights have been successfully
negotiated for contingent workers, these rights generally are accrued on
a prorated basis. One common feature of contract language governing
part-time workers is that they never accumulate more seniority than
full-time workers. This approach is illustrated by the United Food and
Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc. contract.
7.3—Seniority shall be of two (2) types, full-time and part-time.
Full-time seniority shall be convertible to part-time. Full-time seniority shall not accumulate during periods of part-time jobs, and
part-time seniority shall not be convertible to full-time seniority if
a part-time employee becomes full-time. Part-time seniority shall
not be lost by transfer to full-time work. In no case will part-time
employees accumulate seniority over full-time employees.25

In the American Red Cross and Service Employees International
Union contract, per diem employees are allowed to accumulate seniority but at a slower rate than full-time workers.
Per diem nurses shall be placed on the seniority list calculated on
fifty percent (50%) of length of service with the Employer as a per
diem nurse plus any seniority earned within any other classification covered by the Agreement.26

This language ensures that for the purposes of layoff and recall
these employees are the last on the list to be returned to work.
Sparrow Hospital and the Michigan Nurses Association allow temporary workers to accumulate seniority if they convert to either fulltime or part-time status. Their seniority date is the date they convert to
permanent status, not the date on which they began as temporaries.
Section 10.4—Employees hired for a limited period of time not
to exceed a total of six (6) months shall be classified as temporary
employees. Such temporary employment may be extended by the
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Human Resources Director or designee if such extension is necessary. A temporary shall be treated as a probationary employee
under this agreement. In the event a temporary employee is reclassified to full time to part-time status, the date of hire in the new
classification shall be the date of hire as a temporary employee.27

These examples indicate that unions clearly favor their full-time
members with continuous service over those who work under contingent arrangements. It also suggests, however, that unions are trying to
negotiate the protection that comes with seniority for contingent workers, although on a less preferential basis.
Benefits
When unions include contingent workers in their membership,
there are two reasons to negotiate benefits for their contingent members. First, these benefits enhance worker welfare, which is a central
union objective. Second, one important strategic response to the use by
employers of contingent workers is to try to eliminate the cost advantage of contingent work arrangements. The closer the cost of noncore
contingent workers to the cost of employing traditional core workers,
the less attractive contingent work is to management. The types of benefits commonly included in contracts are health care and dental insurance, paid time off, including disability pay and sick leave, and holiday
pay. Our review suggests that prorated health care benefits are offered
to contingent workers more often than other types of benefits.
The Sparrow Hospital contract is among the most generous in its
treatment of contingent workers to support the recruitment and retention of registered nurses. It provides benefits to both full- and part-time
employees. As seen in the language below, the employer pays the full
medical health care premium for all workers and only prorates dental
benefits.
Flexcare Plan
Section 33.1—Purpose. To provide full‑time, part‑time, and per
diem employees with tax-free reimbursement for health care and
dependent care expenses incurred on behalf of Plan participants,
spouses, and dependents, and to allow participants to provide for
additional expenses on a pre‑tax basis through voluntary wage/salary reductions.28
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Dental Insurance
Section 32.1—All full and regular part‑time employees (normally
scheduled to work 32 or more hours per pay period) are eligible to
enroll for dental insurance.
Section 32.2—The Employer will pay 100% of the premium for
single coverage and 90% of the premium for applicable dependent
coverage for eligible full‑time employees. The Employer will pay
100% of the premium for single coverage for part‑time employees. Eligible part‑time employees pay the full cost for dependent
coverage.29

The agreement between 1199W/United Professionals for Quality
Health Care and the State of Wisconsin is more typical in the health
care coverage provided to part-time workers (referred to here as project
workers).
Article VI–Employee Benefits, Section 1, Health Insurance:
The Employer agrees to pay 50% of the above listed contributions
amounts for insured employees in permanent part time or project
positions defined under 230.27, who are appointed to work at least
600 but less than 1,044 hours per year.30

Another example of a contract providing health care coverage is in
the United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc.
contract. Benefits for part-time workers are not as extensive as those
given to full-time employees, but the union did negotiate partial health
care insurance for its part-time workforce.
Article 11: Employee Benefits:
Part-time employees are eligible for benefit coverage for the Comprehensive 200 Medical Plan (COMP200).
Medical Plan (including prescription drug coverage), the Dental/
Optical Plan, and the required weekly pre-tax contribution rates
for health coverage are set forth in this subsection 11.1J.31

Although there is some variation in the generosity of the health
benefits, these examples suggest that, when unions include contingent
workers in the bargaining unit, they are able to negotiate at least partial
medical benefits for them. To the extent that the contracts reviewed here
are typical, they indicate that unionized contingent workers receive better health care coverage than nonunionized workers (BLS 2001).
Contracts also vary in how generously they provide for paid time
off, including disability pay and sick leave, and holiday pay. The Uni-
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versity of Michigan nurses contract with the University of Michigan
allows part-time workers to receive long-term disability benefits.32
Sick leave benefits also are provided to part-time employees in the
agreement between American Red Cross, Southeastern Blood Services
Region, and the Michigan Council of Nurses and Health Care Professionals, Service Employees International Union, Local 79.
Employees will earn sick leave benefits at the rate of one and twothirds days per month of service. Employees may accrue up to
ninety days of sick leave. Part-time employees shall receive the
proportion of sick leave, which the average days worked per week
bear to the full-time employees’ five-day week.33

Unlike full-time employees, part-time union members generally are
unable to receive time and a half or double time for working on holidays. This can be seen in the language from two contracts shown below.
The agreement between Sparrow Hospital and the Michigan Nurses Association shows that contingent workers are only paid for holidays if
they work and only then at straight-time hourly rates.
Article 35, Holidays
Section 15.2 B. Part-time and per diem employees receive the base
rate of pay for each hour actually worked on each of the six holidays as they occur. Holiday pay is paid for hours worked in excess
of a full shift (i.e. 8 hours, 10 hours, or 12 hours).34

In the Kroger and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local
951, Western Michigan Clerks agreement, contingent workers do receive some holiday pay if they have worked as scheduled both before
and after the holiday. However, this limits their ability to take extended
time off during holidays without losing pay.35

Future Challenges for Unions
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the challenges unions
face in their efforts to contain or manage the use of contingent work arrangements by employers. These approaches, particularly those used by
industrial unions, still reflect a historical orientation toward traditional
employment arrangements (Zalusky 1986). As a result, most unions remain structured to protect job and income security for full-time work-
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ers, particularly male workers in blue-collar jobs such as manufacturing,
mining, construction, and transportation, whose relative importance in
the economy is declining.
If unions want to grow in membership numbers and relative importance in the labor force, they must find ways to meet the needs of
a workforce that is about 50 percent female—three-quarters of which
is working in the service sector. Furthermore, with a 76 percent labor
force participation rate among women between the ages of 25 and 54
who worked in 1998 and 62 percent of women working with children
under the age of six, flexibility and alternative scheduling arrangements
must be addressed (Fullerton 1999; Hayghe 1997). Worker demands for
family-friendly policies and flexible schedules combined with employers’ desire for workforce flexibility are forcing unions to rethink their
adherence to the traditional employment relationship as the sole mechanism for gaining economic security (Nussbaum and Meyer 1986). As
discussed earlier, some unions in the service sector have already begun
the process of adapting to the changing demographic characteristics of
the labor force by including contingent workers in their bargaining and
negotiating their wages and prorated benefits.
Unions will continue to be concerned about the negative impact
of part-time and alternative employment arrangements on all aspects
of economic welfare. However, unions must address these concerns in
an environment in which some employers have legitimate needs for
alternative arrangements and some workers prefer them. In facing these
challenges, unions cannot afford to take an exclusionary approach that
protects only the “haves” of the workforce.

Directions for Future Research
Using the lens of negotiated contract language, this chapter has reviewed strategies for inclusion and exclusion used by unions to cope
with the challenges created by contingent work. What is clear from this
review is that organized labor has not devised a consistent strategy for
handling contingent work. Research can explore four important questions that will provide guidance to unions on appropriate future strategies for managing contingent work.
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First, investigation has rarely focused on why union locals pursue
an exclusionary or inclusionary strategy and the factors influencing this
decision. It is necessary to analyze the impact of factors such as the
demographic characteristics of the workforce and member preferences
for nontraditional work schedules, as well as the internal politics of the
union, in the decision to exclude or include part-time workers. For example, evidence indicates that women are more likely to work part time
or in some form of alternative work arrangement to balance work and
family responsibilities. The greater concentration of women in service
occupations may partially explain the contract language negotiated by
service sector unions.
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) executive council has
long been concerned about the use of part-time faculty employment.
The AFT notes that the use of part-time faculty jeopardizes the quality
of education and is used to threaten full-time faculty. The union argues
that these part-time positions
. . . provide the cheap, no-strings-attached labor which makes it
unnecessary to declare regular positions open, enables an institution to staff classes even though faculty are denied tenure, reduces
the proportion of a department entrusted with decision-making,
and intensifies the burden of committee work and departmental
governance for full-time faculty. (AFT Higher Education 2000)

A detailed case study can help unions understand why there have
been so few examples of successful union activities on behalf of parttime faculty. It has been argued that success has been limited in part because neither universities and colleges nor their full-time faculties have
been willing to make equity for part-time faculty a negotiating priority
(Leatherman 2000). In July 2002, the UAW won the right to represent
more than 4,000 part-time faculty members at New York University,
creating the largest adjunct-only union in the nation at a private university (Smallwood 2002b). Adjunct faculty at the University of Massachusetts at Boston, assisted by the local chapter of the Chicago Coalition
of Contingent Academic Labor (COCAL), pressured the local union to
negotiate for higher pay and greater equity. With this success, COCAL
would like to move beyond this campus to the other 58 colleges and
universities that lie within a 10-mile radius of Boston (Leatherman
2001).
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A second related research topic is determining the effectiveness
of various forms of language in protecting bargaining unit work while
meeting the needs of the membership for flexibility. It is sometimes
argued that contingent work actually protects “good” jobs by insulating
core workers from market variability (Mitchell 1986). However, a careful evaluation of this argument is needed.
A third area for investigation by researchers is the successes and
failures in unionizing part-time and other contingent workers in other
countries, which can provide guidance for future negotiating and organizing strategies in the United States. For example, Japanese unions
are faced with the same dilemma as unions in the United States. In
2000 their membership fell by 2.8 percent, partially because they concentrated their attention on regular full-time employment and failed to
adjust to the diversification of employment arrangements toward more
part-time and other nonregular forms of employment (Euroline 2002a).
The Canadian experience contrasts with that of Japan. Zeytinoğlu
(1992) conducted a survey of 188 employers in Ontario, Canada, who
had collective bargaining contracts covering both “full-time and parttime workers who are in the same occupation and who perform the
same or substantially similar tasks.” This survey found that the major
reason employers included both groups in their contracts was the desire
for flexibility in scheduling work that part-time workers make possible.
Research on collective bargaining practices in other countries that identifies lessons learned will be useful to U.S. unions.
Finally, future research should explore how public policy can be
integrated with collective bargaining to protect part-time workers as
well as those in other alternative work arrangements. Experiences in
other countries can provide useful insights and models for the United
States. For example, in the European Union (EU), some legislation and
collective bargaining agreements have been designed to regulate parttime work in a complementary fashion. The European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC) believes that part-time work should be made
more attractive and acceptable for workers while also providing the assurance of “decent social protection” (Euroline 2002b). If unions want
to rebuild their memberships, they must find ways to unionize part-time
workers. The research outlined in this chapter should provide insights
into the appropriate strategies for success.
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9. Mercy Hospital of Buffalo and Communications Workers of America, Service,
Technical and Clerical Employees, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2004–
2008, p. 12.
10. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, and Meijer, Inc., Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 2003–2007, Article 2, Coverage, R-2.
11. United Parcel Service and International Brotherhood of Teamsters Collective
Bargaining Agreement 2002–2008 and Michigan Supplemental Agreement, August 1, 2002.
12. Marriott Management Services and the United Catering, Restaurant, Bar and
Hotel Workers Local Union 1064, R.W.D.S.U., AFL-CIO, Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 1998–2001 (1998), p. 10.
13. See Note 7.
14. The Board of Regents Montana University System and the Montana Faculty
Association, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2003–2005, Article I Section B
– Student Workers, p. 45.
15. LTV Steel and the United Steelworkers of America, Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 2004–2008, Section X, Coverage, p. 117.
16. American Axle and Manufacturing, Inc. and UAW, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2004–2008, (183)(e), p. 107.
17. General Motors Corporation and the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine & Furniture Workers AFL-CIO, Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 1996–1999, p. 201.
18. Ibid., Appendix B, 220.
19. Ibid., Appendix L, 233. In addition to this language the contract also has five letters of understanding about specific subcontracting issues.
20. Ibid., (183) (a), 134.
21. Ibid., (183) (b).
22. Ibid., 345.
23. Interview with D. Hoffman, Specialist, Michigan State University Labor Education Program, April 2000.
24. Interview with S.A. Rivera, Secretary/Treasurer for UAW Local 6000, April,
2000.
25. See Note 10.
26. American Red Cross, Southeastern Michigan Blood Services Region and Michigan Council of Nurses and Health Care Professionals, Service Employees International Union, Local 79, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1993–1996, Article
X, p. 21.
27. See Note 3.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. 1199W/United Professionals for Quality Health Care and the State of Wisconsin,
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2002–2005, Article VI, Employee Benefits,
2002–2005, p. 22.
31. See Note 10.
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32. The Regents of the University of Michigan and the Michigan Nurses Association, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2001–2004, p. 118.
33. See Note 26.
34. See Note 3.
35. Kroger and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, Western Michigan Clerks, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1995–2000, p. 10.
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5
No Safe Harbor
A Review of Significant Laws
Affecting Contingent Workers
Thomas A. Coens
Alvin L. Storrs
Michigan State University

There has been an increase in contingent employment arrangements
in the United States for more than two decades. This increase has generated much discussion in the legal and human resource practitioner
communities, as well as legislative activity and litigation, about how
to apply federal and state laws governing these forms of employment.
However, many of the key precedents used to apply the laws to contingent employment arrangements have been established already through
case law. Consequently, the challenge has been to apply these guidelines to new emerging employment arrangements, such as the growth
of employee leasing.
The overriding common purpose of U.S. labor and employment laws
for more than a century has been to protect the wage-earning worker
hired by an employer. This means that virtually every employment-related statute includes an explicit definition of the terms “employee” and
“employer” to determine the coverage of the statute and permit enforcement.1 As a result, many of the issues related to a given statute can be
resolved through reference to guidelines and precedents that have been
in effect for decades.2 Unfortunately, the fact that each law has its own
unique definitions and evolving case law, and the lack of generic definitions that may be used interchangeably from one statute to another, can
be quite confusing to employers.
This confusion has caused some employers to think that contingent
employment arrangements offer an easy escape from the obligations
and constraints imposed by these laws, and thus a way to reduce labor costs. With a few notable exceptions, however, this belief is falla-
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cious. Classifying people as independent contractors, placing people in
temporary or part-time jobs, or retaining employees through a leasing
company does not provide a “safe harbor” for employers.3 Employers
should not assume that their legal liabilities are reduced because they
hire contingent workers.4
This chapter discusses the basic criteria and provisions of the major workplace laws influencing controversial issues pertaining to the
contingent worker. Most of the issues are not new, but rather reflect
the challenge of applying them in some new contexts and to a larger
number of workers. The discussion focuses on the most critical and
broadly applied legal interpretation issues embodied in the employment arrangements of independent contractors, temporary employees,
and leased employees.5 The use of the common-law control test and
the economic realities test in the interpretation of the laws is reviewed.
The key issues then are discussed as they apply to the federal income
tax, employment tax, and retirement benefit laws; wage and hour rules
(minimum wage); workers’ compensation; and equal employment opportunity laws. In closing, recommendations to improve public policy
focused on contingent employment issues and questions for future research are discussed.

Variations in Terminology and Legal Tests
The application of employment-related laws by employers to the
contingent workforce is clouded by the lack of common or universal
terminology used to identify the different types of workers or employers within federal statutes or across state statutes. Furthermore, there
is confusion about applications of the legal tests used to interpret the
meaning of “employee” and “employer” for each law.
Variations in Terminology
Two variations are important to this discussion: the definition of
an employee and the definition of an employer. For example, a person
may clearly qualify as an independent contractor based on the definition
of an employee in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the National
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules, but be classified as an employee
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and workers’ compensation laws. Thus, because of these differences, an attorney who is asked
whether an individual qualifies as an independent contractor can only
respond, “Under what law?”
One illustration of the confusing variety of terms for employers is
the identification of a temporary agency or employee leasing company.6
These firms may be referred to as the leasing company, general employer, primary employer, labor broker, lessor, loaning employer, staffing company, or contractor employer. Similarly, the employee placed
by a temporary or leasing company may be referred to as a temporary
employee, leased employee, borrowed employee (or servant), loaned
employee (or servant), coemployee, or joint employee.
However, although these terms are similar, they are not necessarily interchangeable due to differing technical definitions. Also, some
laws regulate these categories but do not precisely distinguish them. For
example, many employment statutes, such as FLSA and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) laws, generally do not distinguish between
leased employees and temporary employees per se. However, under
other laws, such as worker compensation statutes, these categories are
addressed with great specificity.
This chapter will use the terminology commonly associated with
the particular law being discussed. In some cases distinguishing features will be noted, but every distinction cannot be articulated.
Common-Law and Economic Realities Tests
Statutes, regulations, revenue rulings, and legal tests are used to
interpret issues of worker status (for a more detailed discussion of these
tests, see Muhl [2002]). The beginning point in analyzing the relationship between a worker and a company is to determine whether the
worker is an employee under a given statute. This question is critical
because it determines the responsibilities of the employer for a variety
of employment taxes in addition to pay and benefits. If a worker can
be classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, the
employer can reduce costs.7
Two similar legal tests, or a hybrid of the two tests, have been used
by the courts to make this determination: the “common-law control
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test” and the “economic realities” test.8 These tests ask multiple questions to evaluate all aspects of the employment situation, and the courts
examine each fact pattern independently. Particular attention is paid to
who has the right to control the work process, but all factors must be
considered to determine the outcome. If the employer has this right,
then the person controlled generally will be considered an employee.
Consequently, it is the conditions of employment that are key in determining employee status, not the classification of the workers assigned
by the employer.
These two legal tests vary in the breadth of the circumstances investigated. The common-law test is the most widely used in federal
cases. It is based on the legal concept of agency in which the employee
is given authority to act for the employer by the employer. This test
generally uses 10 factors to determine who has the right to control the
work process.9
However, the IRS uses 20 factors to determine the presence or
absence of control.10 Also, when presenting a case before the IRS or
courts, taxpayers can introduce other factors beyond the 20 as persuasive evidence negating or establishing control. Moreover, some IRS
agents use three types of evidence in determining a worker’s classification: behavioral control, financial control, and the relationship of the
parties. The intent of the parties, industry custom, independent contractor agreements, and the provision of employee-type benefits are other
factors which have been considered by courts.11
If a company misclassifies a worker as an independent contractor,
the IRS will reclassify the independent contractor as an employee and
impose taxes, interest, and penalties that can create large tax bills.12 In a
typical reclassification, the company may be assessed for income taxes
that were not withheld and employment taxes; the employment tax liability would include both the employer’s and employee’s share.
The economic realities test usually is applied where the purpose of
the law is to protect or benefit a worker who is financially dependent
on an employer. It focuses on the nature of the economic relationship
between the employer and the worker. It uses six factors to determine
whether a worker depends on the employer for ongoing employment
and economic livelihood. Since this test has a broader focus than the
common-law test, individuals are more likely to be classified as employees by the court.13
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The hybrid test also examines all of the circumstances affecting the
employment relationship by combining elements from the commonlaw and economic realities tests. It considers the economic realities
particularly critical, but it also considers who has the right to control
the work process.
These different tests have resulted in varying interpretations of who
is an employee and who is an independent contractor across the spectrum of tax, labor, employment, and retirement benefit laws. As a consequence, a worker in the same job category can be either an employee
or independent contractor, depending on the facts and circumstances.14
For example, in Consolidated Flooring Services v. United States (1997),
a holding company owned two companies in which workers were installing floor coverings. The workers in both companies were doing the
same work but were classified differently due to varying circumstances.
One company, Monroe Schneider Associates (MSA), used union employees to install floor coverings while the other company, Consolidated
Flooring Services (CFS), contracted with nonunion workers for installation services. The Court applied the common-law test to conclude that
the CFS nonunion installers were independent contractors. The Court
stated: “. . . where CFS did maintain some control . . . installers retained
their independence with respect to the sequence, manner and skill with
which jobs were completed. Installers bore the risk of profit or loss on
their jobs and controlled their own work force.”

Federal Income Tax, Employment Tax, and
Retirement Benefits Laws
Identifying a worker as an employee or independent contractor is
critical for federal income tax, employment tax, and retirement benefits
laws. The determination of employee or independent contractor classification is made by examining statutes, regulations, revenue rulings,
and case law. Once it is established that a worker is an employee, then
full-time, part-time, temporary, or leased employee status must be ascertained. The full- or part-time status of an employee generally will
be decided by the number of hours worked. The arrangement with an
outside company will determine whether the worker is a temporary or
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leased employee instead of an employee of the company for which a
worker performs services. The application of the test and the factors
used to guide decisions are discussed below.
Federal Income and Employment Tax
Employee or Independent Contractor
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and Federal Insurance
Contribution Act (FICA) are employment taxes.15 Employers generally
prefer to hire independent contractors when appropriate because it reduces both their administrative costs of collecting and paying federal
income and employment taxes. In contrast, the IRS prefers to have
workers classified as employees so that it can collect the maximum
amount of tax revenue.
If the worker is an employee, the company as employer has the responsibility to withhold income and employment taxes (e.g., to pay for
the Social Security and Medicare programs supported by FICA) from
the compensation of the employee.16 The payment of one-half of the
FICA tax with the accompanying filing and reporting obligations is a
primary reason many companies attempt to classify a worker as an independent contractor. In addition, the employer must pay the FUTA tax,
which covers the cost of administering the unemployment insurance
system and the states’ Job Service programs, and provides 50 percent
of the cost of extended unemployment benefits when unemployment is
high.17
In contrast, payments to independent contractors are not subject to
withholding of any taxes because the company is not considered an
employer of this type of worker. Independent contractors therefore
must pay the proper amount themselves in estimated quarterly income
tax payments or be subject to penalties and interest.18 A negative consequence for independent contractors is that they are not covered by
unemployment insurance and are not entitled to these benefits if they
become unemployed.19 Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 6, many parttime employees are not eligible for FUTA coverage due to working too
few hours.
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Coemployment
The determination of the “employer” who is liable for tax and employment law compliance can be particularly perplexing when a company is employing temporary workers provided by a temporary employment agency or leased workers provided by a leasing agency.20 The
issue created by these arrangements is whether the worker can be an
employee of both the employment agency and the client (customer)
organization. This dual status where two or more parties both stand legally as the employer of a single employee is “coemployment.”21
In the typical one-to-one employment situation, the employer for
whom the worker performs services is responsible for income tax withholding. However, in a coemployment situation in which another party
has control over the payment of wages, then that party is considered to
be the employer. For example, in a case involving the General Motors
Corporation, the company was held not to be the employer for employment tax withholding purposes when it contracted with a foreign
company to obtain design engineers (General Motors Corp. v. United
States 1990). The court concluded that regardless of whether the auto
company ultimately controlled each design engineer while on the job,
the facts supported a finding that the foreign company was responsible
for paying the wages of the design engineers. This court focused on
which party had control over the payment of wages to determine which
company was the employer and therefore responsible for the employment taxes.
Retirement Benefits
A qualified retirement plan offers attractive tax features to employers and employees. Generally, for federal tax purposes, an employer is
allowed a deduction when an employee includes the amount in gross
income; however, the employer receives an immediate deduction for
contributions to qualified retirement plans, even though employees do
not have to include the amount of the contribution in gross income.22
The tax consequences for the employee are deferred until the employee
receives a distribution from the qualified plan. Contributions maintained in a trust or other qualified fund accumulate tax free, resulting in
an accelerated accumulation of pension funds for employees.
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However, a qualified plan must meet a strict set of statutory requirements. Generally, a qualified retirement plan by its design and operation must satisfy standards requiring coverage of a minimum percentage of employees and not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees in contributions or benefits.23 The definition of employee is
critical in the qualified plan arena.
Employee or Independent Contractor
A specific definition of “employee” for qualified retirement plans
is not contained in the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). The Supreme
Court applied the common-law test in determining whether a worker
was an employee for the purpose of a qualified plan, but did not conclude that the common-law definition must apply in all employee benefit cases.24
The continuation of the qualified status of a retirement plan can be
dependent on the proper classification of workers. If workers who are
actually employees but improperly classified as independent contractors are excluded from a qualified plan, then the minimum coverage or
nondiscrimination standard could be violated, resulting in disqualification of the plan. Similarly, the requirement that the plan should be for
the exclusive benefit of employees would be violated if an independent
contractor was incorrectly classified as an employee and included, and
could cause disqualification.25 Also, the qualified status of the plan may
be in jeopardy if a sufficient number of part-time employees who have
one year of service have not been allowed to join the plan.26 Even where
the tax-qualified status of a plan is not in jeopardy, the erroneously excluded part-time employee would be entitled to participate in the plan.
This would require the employer to make any missed past contributions
to the plan on behalf of such improperly excluded employees.
Disqualification of a qualified retirement plan is viewed as the ultimate penalty because of the severe tax consequences on the employer,
plan participants, and the plan trust. The IRS has recognized the severity of the plan disqualification penalties and the need to encourage
plan sponsors to correct defects by introducing a set of administrative
programs that allow many defective plans to correct problems without
disqualification.27
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Leased Employees
Leasing employees may be an attractive option for companies that
are concerned with the higher costs associated with full-time permanent employees, such as the payment of retirement benefits. The U.S.
Congress was apprehensive that some companies might attempt to reduce their retirement benefit costs by hiring a large number of leased
employees who would perform the same services as employees without
being eligible to participate in the retirement plan. Congress therefore
enacted strict statutory guidelines to provide leased employees with additional qualified retirement plan protection. The statutory guidelines
require the leased individual to be treated as the recipient’s employee
when verifying standards such as coverage and nondiscrimination if
1) the services are provided pursuant to an agreement between
the recipient and any other person,
2) the individual has performed services for the recipient . . . on
a substantially full-time basis for a period of at least one year,
and
3) such services are performed under primary direction or control
by the recipient.28
As a result, when using leased employees, the employer must track
the number of employees in this category to ensure that the stated percentage of employees benefit under the plan’s coverage and participation tests. If the company has too many leased employees who are not
eligible solely due to their statuses, then the plan will be disqualified for
failing the coverage and participation standards.
Coemployment
Two frequently cited cases illustrate the challenges of determining
who is the employer in a coemployment situation: Vizcaino v. Microsoft
(1997) and Bronk v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, Inc.
(1996). In both cases the workers brought their action under ERISA, but
different outcomes resulted due to the differences in the interpretation
of ERISA by the courts. In Vizcaino v. Microsoft the court ruled that
workers were employees for the purposes of participation in a retirement plan, while in Bronk the opposite conclusion was drawn.
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Microsoft had a practice of supplementing its regular employee pool
with workers who were classified as independent contractors or temporary agency employees. In some job categories the regular employees,
independent contractors, and temporary agency employees were performing the same work under the direction and control of Microsoft.
The IRS, in an employment tax audit, made a determination that the
independent contractors should have been classified as employees. Microsoft responded to the IRS audit reclassification by offering jobs to
a small number of the independent contractors as regular employees.
However, the majority of Microsoft’s independent contractors were
given the choice of being fired or converting to temporary agency employees. The temporary employment agency merely provided payroll
services; the working relationship between new temporary employees
and Microsoft remained substantially the same as before the IRS audit.
Former independent contractors then filed an action on behalf of
workers who met the definition of employees under the common-law
test but who were not allowed to participate in the retirement benefit
plan because Microsoft considered them independent contractors or
employees of a temporary employment agency. The 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals stated: “Even if for some purposes a worker is considered an
employee of the agency, that would not preclude his status of common
law employee of Microsoft. The two are not mutually exclusive.”29
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Bronk reversed the earlier District Court’s holding that employers must include in pension plans leased
employees who were considered by the IRS as “employees” based on
the common-law test. The Court of Appeals held that the I.R.C. and
Treasury regulations governing the tax qualification of retirement plans
did not implicitly modify ERISA to require employers to include in
their retirement plans those leased employees who had been excluded
from the plans because they were not “regular employees.” Moreover,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congressional action would be required to modify the tax qualification provisions of the Code to permit
retirement plans under ERISA to require the inclusion of properly excluded leased employees. Thus, some uncertainty remains about how
“employee” will be interpreted by the courts as evidenced by the inconsistent decisions in Vizcaino (In re Vizcaino 9th Cir 1999), the lower
court in Bronk v. Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Inc. (1996),
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and other cases Abraham v. Exxon Corp. (1996); Clark v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours and Co. (1997).

Federal Wage-Hour Law: The Minimum Wage Law
The FLSA is the primary federal wage-hour law.30 It imposes on
covered employers a minimum wage, a requirement to pay overtime pay
at time and one-half after 40 hours of work in a week to employees earning less than $24,000 a year, and child labor restrictions applicable to
persons under 18 years of age. This law provides nearly universal coverage for full-time and part-time employees with few exceptions other
than independent contractors, white-collar exemptions, and trainees.
Employee or Independent Contractor
Historically, the DOL enforcement policy has carefully monitored
and limited the use of independent contractor status because it creates
a potential escape for employers from wage and overtime obligations.31
Based on the influence of an early Supreme Court decision in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb (1947a) the DOL has applied the economic
realities test in deciding who qualifies as an independent contractor because, as the Supreme Court cautioned, “there is . . . no definition that
solves all problems to the limitations of the employer-employee relationship” (Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb 1947b). The economic
realities test is strictly applied to achieve the purposes of the FLSA to
ensure that workers are not deprived of protection due to an artifice of
making a would-be employee into a contractor.
The official guiding principles applied by the Wage-Hour Division
emphasize four factors in the Field Operations Handbook (U.S. Department of Labor 2003, p. 10b06).32 These and additional control factors,
considered in combination with economic reality factors, resemble the
approach used by the IRS discussed above (U.S. Department of Labor
2003, p. 10b07). Interestingly, the wage-hour guidelines further advise
that the method of compensation, the issuance of governmental licenses, the place where the work is performed, and the absence of a formal
agreement are immaterial to the determination of contractor status. The
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exclusion of these four factors may reflect the fact that each can be easily manipulated by employers to create the artifice of an independent
contractor status.33
In cases with many factors suggesting an employment relationship,
the outcomes can vary, as illustrated by two well-known cases from the
U.S. Court of Appeals: Brock v. Superior Care (1988) and Herman v.
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Services (1998). In Brock v. Superior
Care the U.S. Labor Department sought to classify nurses working for a
nursing agency as “employees” under the FLSA to support the claims of
the nurses for unpaid overtime compensation. Superior Care, a provider
of temporary health care nurses to individual patients, nursing homes,
and hospitals, contended that the nurses were independent contractors.
The arguments employing six key factors from the economic realities
test are summarized in Table 5.1.
In a two-to-one split decision in Brock, the 2nd Circuit U.S. Court
of Appeals found that the nurses were employees under the FLSA,
overruling the trial court’s decision. Noting the closeness of the case,
the court found that the integral relationship between the work and the
agency’s business, the lack of significant investment, and no risk of loss
required a finding of an employee. The court further gave weight to the
fact that the agency retained “employees” doing work similar to the alleged contractor nurses. However, the dissenting judge opined that the
weight of evidence favored an independent contractor determination.
In contrast, in Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Services
(1998), where the facts of the case were not substantially different from
Brock, the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals majority opinion ruled
against the DOL in a split decision.34 The court found that drivers for
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, a courier delivery service,
were independent contractors even though they performed work that
was integral to the nature of the company. In determining that the individuals were contractors, the court relied on the same tests used in
Brock.35
These two cases demonstrate that the legal tests do not lend themselves necessarily to consistent interpretation and application; even
learned judges with the benefit of extensive testimony and thousands of
pages of documents cannot agree on the application of the independent
contractor factors in the same case. Such uncertainty may encourage
prudent employers to classify borderline cases as employees.
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Table 5.1 Key Factors in Arguments in Brock v. Superior Care
Key factors in
economic realities
test

Company arguments for
independent contractor
status for nurses

DOL arguments for
employee status for
nurses

Degree of control
exercised by alleged
employer

No control: nurses worked
with little supervision;
primarily interacted with
patients

Nurses’ hours and notes
were reviewed; worked
subject to procedures in
extensive manual and
received some direction
from physicians

Similar to independent
Degree to which
contractor, some nurses
employee’s
opportunity for profit paid flat fee per visit
or loss is determined
by alleged employer
Permanency of
relationship

Assignment spanned
from a few days to a few
months, depending on
patient needs; not ongoing

Skill and initiative
required

Highly skilled work
requiring exercise of
independent judgment and
discretion and interactions
with physicians and
patients, similar to
independent contractor

No indication that
nurses used skills
independently with
business like initiative

Dependence on
alleged employer
for economic
livelihood

Permitted to work for other
agencies and many did, not
dependent on employer for
livelihood

Some paid by the hour
based on local labor
market conditions; had
on payroll some nurses
doing similar work paid
as “employees”

Performing core
work of alleged
employer
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Coemployment
Joint liability under the FLSA allows either party to be held accountable for the full amount of liability. By making both the staffing contractor and the client company responsible there is a greater likelihood
that employees will be paid properly. Also, if one “employer” should go
out of business, the other party is responsible for unpaid minimum and
overtime wages. Furthermore, this avoids the legal complexities associated with determining which employer is responsible. Consequently,
the DOL holds both temporary employment agencies and leasing companies jointly liable with their customer companies for back wages and
penalties. In theory, by making both employers liable, the client company may be more careful in choosing responsible staffing providers.
Thus, although there are a variety of risks with coemployment, those
under the FLSA are potentially the most expensive (Moldover 2005).
The DOL provides this protection to employees by broadly defining
coemployment status in its compliance guidelines. The regulation states
that two or more employers may be deemed to be coemployers under
any one of three circumstances:
1) There is an arrangement between employers to share an employee’s services even with separate payrolls.
2) One employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
the other employer or employers in relation to the employee.
3) The employers are not completely disassociated with respect
to the employment of a particular employee and may be
deemed to share control of the employee, whether directly or
indirectly.
Client companies using temporary or leased employees may think
that the above definitions do not cover them because they do not hire
or assign the employee, or discipline or discharge. However, the second criterion extends employer status to them since they act indirectly
in relationship to an employee. Typically, the client company pays the
staffing company amounts that are based on the hours worked and the
hourly wage and benefit costs. The staffing company then acts directly
in the interest of its client company with regard to the employment of
individuals assigned to work at the client’s establishment. Also, the client company typically “directly acts” through supervision of the tem-
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porary or leased employee in the performance of the day-to-day work.
In many leasing and temporary arrangements, this may hold true even
when the staffing company has a personnel administrator on the client’s
premises to deal with attendance, payroll, disciplinary, and discharge
issues. Accordingly, in conventional temporary staffing and leasing arrangements, both the staffing company and client company are jointly
responsible for FLSA compliance (see DOL 1969, 1975).
The courts generally have been supportive of the DOL coemployment guidelines. For example, in a 1998 decision, Baystate Alternative
Staffing v. Herman (1998), the 1st Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found
that a corporate staffing company and its officers were liable for unpaid
overtime even though the client employer directed the workers in their
day-to-day work. Similarly, in Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, Inc. (1973),
the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found that a fruit and vegetable
company qualified as a joint employer of farm workers who were supplied by independent contractor crew leaders.

Workers’ Compensation Laws
The goal of the workers’ compensation programs since their creation36 has been to maximize the social safety net provided for employees when they are injured or disabled in the course of their employment.
The program covers the loss of wages and medical expenses resulting
from these injuries and disabilities. Except in a few industries such as
railroads, air carriers, shipping, and the federal government, workers’
compensation is provided through state laws.37
Workers’ compensation was developed as “no-fault” insurance designed to address quickly the financial effects of inevitable industrial
accidents. The “exclusive remedy” doctrine grants employers immunity
against personal injury lawsuits brought by employees for work-related
injuries except in extremely narrow exceptions. In granting this immunity, state legislatures require employers to participate in workers’ compensation plans that cover virtually all work-related injuries regardless
of whether the employee is full- or part-time. The basis of payment is the
experience rating of each employer: the greater the number of claims,
the more the employer pays. Overall, the workers’ compensation pro-
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gram is beneficial to the employer because the dollar amount awarded
for workers’ compensation claims is only a fraction of what would be
awarded by a jury if the employee could sue the employer in a personal
injury lawsuit. Moreover, the claims adjudication process in workers’
compensation largely alleviates much of the costs of litigation.
Employee or Independent Contractor
Because only employees are eligible for workers’ compensation
coverage, there can be savings from employing “contractors” instead
of employees, especially when an employer has an unfavorable injury
rating. This situation may tempt employers to classify workers as independent contractors. However, legislatures and workers’ compensation
agencies have imposed stringent limitations on classifying employees
as independent contractors to provide the broadest basis for coverage,
so the outcome is nearly identical to that of the FLSA.
The difficulty for multistate employers and insurance carriers is that
the economic realities tests used in these cases vary somewhat from
state to state. For example, case law refers to a test that has been derived
from various Michigan Supreme Court decisions over the years. This
list identifies eight issues:
1) What liability, if any, does the employer incur in the event of
the termination of the relationship at will?
2) Is the work being performed an integral part of the employer’s
business which contributes to the accomplishment of a common objective?
3) Is the position or job of such a nature that the employee depends
upon the emolument for payment of his living expenses?
4) Does the employee furnish his own equipment and materials?
5) Does the individual seeking employment hold himself out to
the public as one ready to and able to perform tasks of a given
nature?
6) Is the work or the undertaking in question customarily performed by an individual as an independent contractor?
7) Control, although abandoned as an exclusive criterion upon
which the relationship can be determined, is a factor to be con-
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sidered along with payment of wages, maintenance of discipline and the right to engage or discharge employees.
8) Weight should be given to those factors which will most favorably effectuate the objectives of the statute (McKissic v.
Bodine 1972).
The court cautioned that these issues “must be applied as a whole and
on a basis of common sense” (McKissic v. Bodine 1972).
Other states apply factors similar to the above list with many expansive questions on control, not unlike the IRS 20-factor test. However, the
lack of legislative activity on this issue seems to indicate that the courts
are applying strict standards for independent contractors since a liberally
construed test would open the floodgates for employee lawsuits.
Typically, employers err on the side of caution and carry workers’
compensation insurance to cover any independent contractor who ultimately may be determined to be an employee. Absent willful deception on the part of the employer, the employer will be fully covered as
though the contractor was an employee. However, the carrier or state
agency often will have the right to seek retroactive premiums for any
misclassified individuals.
Coemployment Issues
For many decades workers’ compensation tribunals and state legislatures have recognized the “borrowed servant” doctrine (see, for example, West Publishing Co. [2002]). This doctrine recognizes that both
the general employer (in this context, the temporary agency, leasing
company, or staffing company) and special employer (the client company) may be obligated to provide workers’ compensation benefits. This
doctrine generally has been applied when one employer borrows another’s employees or to specialty staffing companies, such as custodial
firms, or employees that come with special equipment from the staffing
company. However, it has not been consistently applied to temporary
and leased employee arrangements. Because of the exclusive remedy
provisions there have been inconsistencies in the interpretation of this
doctrine for these two categories of workers.
When an employer retains a temporary agency’s employee or enters into an employee leasing contract, the working agreement provides
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that the temporary agency or lessor company will handle all payroll
and insurance matters and expressly includes the provision of workers’
compensation benefits. When the coemployment doctrine is applied to
these arrangements, often the state statute requires or implies that both
companies are legally obligated to ensure that workers’ compensation
coverage is provided. Therefore, if the temporary agency should go out
of business without providing this coverage, the employee can seek
workers’ compensation benefits from the client company that directly
supervised the employee in day-to-day work. This generally holds true
even when the temporary agency has breached its contract by failing to
provide workers’ compensation benefits. If the client company brings
a lawsuit for breach of contract against the temporary agency, this will
not alleviate any of its joint obligations in the workers’ compensation
system.
However, the courts generally afford the client company immunity
from lawsuits when workers’ compensation is provided by a temporary
agency. For example, in Sorenson v. Colibri (1994), a Rhode Island
case, an employee who was injured on the job collected workers’ compensation benefits from the temporary agency’s policy and then filed a
lawsuit against the client employer for the same injuries under tort law.
Even though the Rhode Island workers’ compensation law requires that
the “general” employer (the temporary agency) must provide the workers’ compensation coverage, it upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit, holding that the client company was immune from employee lawsuits. The
court reasoned that extending immunity to the client company was an
equitable result because it is presumed that the temporary agency had
charged an hourly rate to the client company that was high enough to
recover the cost of workers’ compensation premiums.38 In a minority of
states, however, different decisions have been made, particularly in the
context of leasing arrangements, which do not give exclusive remedy
immunity to the client employer.39
Concern has been growing among associations concerned with
workers’ compensation, such as the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions and the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, about a relatively new challenge: the use
of leasing arrangements by client employers to circumvent their experience ratings.40 For example, an industrial employer may experience a
high injury rate, resulting in a large increase in the price of its work-
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ers’ compensation premiums. In response it could “terminate” all employees but continue to employ them through a leasing agency, thereby
avoiding higher payments for its poor injury experience rating. In contrast, the leasing agency as a separate entity pays a neutral and lower
rate for workers’ compensation premiums. Also, there may be deliberate misrepresentations or concealments by the employer or its agents
of the reported job duties of workers used for workers’ compensation
underwriting and quarterly earning and payroll reports.41 Amendments
to workers’ compensation statutes have attempted to create a basis for
using the experience ratings of the client company when employees are
leased.

Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Laws
The challenge for EEO laws is to hold accountable those who are responsible for ensuring equal opportunity and to prevent discrimination
in the workplace. Application of the EEO laws to the contingent worker
raises issues similar to those raised under wage and benefit laws.
This discussion focuses on the three major federal statutes: Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is part of the FLSA,
so liability for equal pay violations generally follows other FLSA applications as discussed above.42 State fair employment practice or EEO
laws usually follow to varying degrees the precedents set in the federal
laws.
In 1997 the EEOC assembled what had been a scattering of court
decisions, segments of language from various statutes and regulations,
and formal guidance letters into one document addressing the applications of Title VII, ADA, and ADEA to the contingent workforce. These
enforcement guidelines were provided in an easy-to-follow format illustrated with examples.43 Although not binding on the courts, the document generally follows the weight of the case law, and may be given
“due deference” by the courts. The EEOC focus on contingent work
is not surprising in light of the patterns related to race and gender discussed in Chapter 2. The enforcement guidelines expressly note that the
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employees of temporary employment agencies are disproportionately
female and African American, while workers provided by contract staffing firms are disproportionately male (U.S. EEOC 1997a, pp. 1–2).
Employee or Independent Contractor
Employers commonly use the independent contractor status as a
defense against EEO claims made by individuals who work with little
supervision and are paid on a commission or incentive basis. However,
the EEOC has maintained a conservative posture in allowing employers to assert the independent contractor defense. The EEOC has its own
unique list of 16 factors that are used to determine independent contractor status, but none of them are controlling.44 The courts have liberally
applied the hybrid test with varied outcomes, based on the facts of each
situation.45
Coemployment
Like other employment law agencies, the EEOC has applied broadly
the definition of employer to achieve the purposes of the laws for which
it is responsible. In relationships between client companies and temporary agencies or employee leasing arrangements, the EEOC guidelines
place great weight on whether one or both parties are in a position to
control the outcome that is the subject of an alleged EEO infraction. For
some infractions liability may extend to nonemployers.
Customarily the temporary staffing agency hires the individual and
pays her wages throughout her tenure with the client company. The
client company supervises the employee, indirectly pays for her wages
and benefits, and has the right to terminate the employee and ask the
temporary provider to send another worker. Under these circumstances,
the EEOC guidelines indicate that both the temporary staffing agency
and the client company are “employers” under the civil rights laws
(U.S. EEOC 1997, p. 10). In other variations, the gradations in control
and lack of control by the respective parties may change the outcome.
For example, although a staffing company provides landscaping employees that it trains and supervises, the client company also may legally become an “employer” if it reserves the right to direct the workers
to perform particular tasks or otherwise controls the specific manner of
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performance (p. 11).46 In contrast, the guidelines indicate that in a leasing arrangement in which the leasing firm merely provides services for
wages and benefits administration, the leasing firm would not be considered to be the “employer” for the purposes of Title VII (p. 8).
The EEOC broadly applies the coemployment doctrine even when
one party more clearly seems at fault. For example, if a staffing firm
providing nurses is asked to provide a “white nurse,” and the client firm
says that it will only accept white nurses, the staffing firm nonetheless is
liable. The firm making a discriminatory request also is liable if it meets
the threshold size test for liability (U.S. EEOC 1997, pp. 18–19).47
In sexual harassment cases, liability is more closely related to fault.
The guidelines provide an example of a temporary agency assigning
a receptionist who then is sexually harassed at the work site by her
supervisor. The supervisor is an employee of the client company. She
complains to the temporary agency and the temporary agency advises
the client company. The client company refuses to investigate and asks
for another receptionist who is not “a troublemaker.” The temporary
agency tells the employee that it cannot force the client to investigate
and assigns another worker to the receptionist job. The guidelines conclude that, in this situation, both the temporary agency and the client are
liable. The temporary agency failed to take adequate corrective action;
it should have insisted that the client investigate and asserted that its
workers have the right to work free from harassment.

Implications for Future Research
The use of various types of contingent workers and the expansion
in outsourcing to fill workforce gaps is predicted to continue in the future (Society for Human Resource Management 2005). However, the
complexity of laws, lack of clarity, and potential for adverse economic effects on employers using contingent workers will continue until
changes are made. Public policy initiatives designed to reduce those
compliance errors that occur despite the good faith efforts of employers
and make compliance easier must be balanced against the objectives of
the statutes to protect workers or provide benefits to as many workers as
possible. Changes pursued jointly by the federal and state governments
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should include agreements that create greater uniformity and consistency in the terminology, simplify and clarify the legal tests, and improve
guidance for compliance.
Greater Uniformity and Consistency in Terminology
One of the major compliance challenges is the lack of a single definition of “employee” that can be used in all work-related laws. This
challenge was recognized by the Dunlop Commission when it recommended the adoption of one definition of “employee” and one definition
of “employer” for all workplace laws (DOL 2004). This change would
greatly simplify employer compliance, particularly for small and medium-sized companies which, unlike large companies, cannot afford to
retain legions of lawyers and consultants and employ staffs of dedicated
experts in human resource departments. Furthermore, the cost of compliance for large firms is substantial. An economic analysis detailing the
time and costs associated with the absence of universal definitions, as
well as inconsistent rules and practices, will provide useful insights into
these employer costs.
A comprehensive analysis of the compatibility of uniform terminology and definitions for tax, employment, and retirement benefits laws
is an important first step. This analysis could help encourage federal
and state agencies to reach agreement on the usage of common terms
and begin to apply the laws with greater consistency. In some instances,
however, this change in approach will require diligent support from legislative bodies.
Such initiatives have already begun in some areas of the law. The
development of uniform model laws and practices has been urged or
adopted by industry associations. For example, model legislation drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has been
designed to promote a common approach by state legislatures to the licensing of leased employees and to ensure the proper experience-rating
of workers’ compensation premiums (Employee Leasing Registration
Model Act 1997). To achieve optimal results in the interest of public
policy, these cooperative efforts should be undertaken not only through
the efforts of government, but with participation of the academicians,
industry representatives, and technical professionals, such as lawyers.
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Simplify and Clarify the Legal Tests
At present each law has a unique definition of “employee” and is interpreted by referring to lists of factors used to evaluate the facts of each
situation. These legal tests have been developed over time by government bodies or created by the courts. As a consequence the interpretations of many tax, employment, and benefit laws are needlessly arcane,
verbose, and perplexing.
Despite each law having its own particular guidelines, the factors
used to evaluate the facts of each situation are remarkably similar. Therefore it is feasible that careful analysis of cases can lead to the development of a uniform test, or perhaps two or three types of uniform tests,
to classify workers consistently in all work-related laws. It is likely that
greater uniformity can be achieved without significantly sacrificing the
enforcement objective of minimizing the number of independent contractors so the maximum number of employees is covered.
Provide Useful Compliance Guidelines
While it is evident that many employers struggle to understand their
legal obligations when classifying workers and engaging in coemployment arrangements, governmental agencies have done little to help.
Guidelines can be written in a user-friendly, “plain English” style with
clear examples and illustrations that employers can easily understand
for the various employment laws. An example of this approach is the
EEOC’s enforcement guidance document (U.S. EEOC 1997). Although
the agency enforces many different laws with unique legislative histories and lengthy tests, it has created a single document that presents the
full range of contingent work issues with many helpful illustrations.
Case-law authority, distinctions in the application of particular EEO
laws, and clear explanations of principles in an easy-to-follow, question-and-answer format are provided. More primers of this sort would
be helpful to employers to demystify the legal enigmas of contingent
employment arrangements.
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Notes
Alvin Storrs is indebted to Matthew Rocky-Hawley, a student at Michigan State University Detroit College of Law, for his assistance with the research in this chapter.
Although the topic of this chapter is legal in nature, its content is intended solely to
facilitate the purpose of general information and learning. Nothing herein is intended to
serve as legal advice relative to any specific or general legal question or problem. Legal
advice should only be obtained through retained legal counsel who is fully informed of
all of the particular facts and circumstances.
1.	 These include the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and state laws governing unemployment and workers’ compensation. Citations for the federal statutes in the order listed are: 42 U.S.C. § 410(e); 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a); 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1);
42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 2611; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6); and 29 U.S.C. §
652(6). For an example of state unemployment and workers’ compensation laws,
see Michigan compiled Code Laws §§ 421.42, 418.161(b).
2. 	The major exception is the legislation in employee benefits. The tax code amendments in the 1980s and 1990s significantly altered the arena of deferred benefits.
3. 	In § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Congress provided so-called safe harbor
tests, which prevent the IRS from retroactively reclassifying an independent contractor as an employee. This provision is extremely beneficial because it provides
retroactive relief for employment taxes, penalties, and interest. A company seeking relief under § 530 must meet these requirements: have a reasonable basis for
classifying a worker as an independent contractor; demonstrate consistent treatment of the worker as independent contractor for periods beginning after December 31, 1997; and file all required federal tax returns consistent with classifying
the worker as independent contractor. Although the requirements appear to be
straightforward, the interpretation has proven to be complex; only a relatively
small number of businesses have qualified for relief.
There are, however, other methods available to mitigate or reduce potentially onerous employment tax penalties and interest. For example, see I.R.C. §
3509 which provides reduced employment tax liability for certain retroactive reclassifications of workers. Form 1099 is a document used to report nonemployee
compensation for independent contractors. If Form 1099 is filed for workers,
then the employer’s tax liability is 1.5 percent of wages for income tax withholding and 20 percent of employee’s share of Social Security taxes. If Form 1099
is not filed, the above 1.5 percent is increased to 3.0 percent and the above 20
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4.
5.

6.

7.

8.
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percent to 40 percent. I.R.C. § 6205 allows a special interest-free adjustment for
certain underpayments of FICA and income tax withholding. I.R.C. § 3402(d)
provides for retroactive relief from the assessment of income tax liability if the
employer can prove that the worker reported the income assessed on the Form
1040 return. Also, in I.R.S. Notice 98-21, 1998-15 I.R.B. 14, the IRS classification settlement program has been extended indefinitely. This program is designed
to resolve worker classification issues as soon as possible in the administrative
process. If a taxpayer satisfies certain requirements then the taxpayer may pay a
reduced employment tax liability.
For example, see the summary of the risks of leasing workers in Dunn and Berkery (2005).
Part-time and seasonal employees are not discussed in depth. Contrary to popular belief, there is no universal or even prevailing definition of a part-time employee among the various labor, employment, and retirement benefit laws. Many
of these laws employ exact definitions determined by the number of hours in a
year or in a week that can affect coverage, exemptions, and obligations. Consequently, human resources, employee benefits, and attorney practitioners are
cautioned to review carefully how employees are defined relative to the number
of hours worked and full-time status in every labor, employment, and retirement
benefit law. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts from
overtime certain seasonal employees connected with amusement industries (29.
U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)). Eligibility for coverage under statutes such as the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) often is defined in terms of a minimum threshold of a specific number
of hours worked in a year or given time period. For example, ERISA requires
a minimum threshold of 1,000 hours before existing law mandates that an employee cannot be excluded from participation in a retirement plan on the basis of
hours worked. The FMLA does not apply to a worker who has worked less than
1,250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the commencement of the leave.
Similarly, the firm contracting its services may be referred to as the lessee, lessee
employer, special employer, secondary employer, client employer (or company),
customer employer (or company), borrowing employer, or contracting employer.
More recently, leasing companies have begun calling themselves professional
employer organizations (PEOs) (BPI Communications 1999).
For example, in 1999 the U.S. Department of Labor alleged that Time Warner
misclassified as many as 1,000 of its 40,000 workers to reduce its employee
benefits costs (Herman v. Time Warner, Inc. 1999). A similar case occurred with
FedEx in California when it classified drivers as independent contractors (Nicholas 2005).
The common-law test is used by the IRS and has been applied by the courts to
the FICA, FUTA, ERISA, NLRA, and income tax withholding. The economic
realities test has been applied by the courts to the FLSA and Equal Pay Act, Title
VII, ADEA, ADA, and FMLA. The hybrid test has been applied by the courts to
Title VII, ADEA, and ADA (Muhl 2002, p. 6).
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9. These 10 factors are 1) right to control, 2) type of business, 3) supervision, 4)
skill level, 5) tools and materials, 6) continuing relationship, 7) method of payment, 8) integration, 9) intent, and 10) employment by more than one firm (Muhl
2002, pp. 5–7).
10. The 20 factors are: 1) instructions; 2) integration; 3) right of discharge; 4) right
to terminate; 5) services rendered personally; 6) hiring, supervising, and paying
assistants; 7) training; 8) payment by hour, week, month; 9) payment of business
and/or traveling expenses; 10) continuing relationship; 11) set hours of work;
12) full time required; 13) working for more than one firm at a time; 14) making
service available to general public; 15) furnishing of tools and materials; 16) doing work on employer’s premises; 17) order of sequence set; 18) oral or written
report; 19) significant investment; and 20) realization of profit or loss. See Rev.
Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 for a description of each factor.
11. For example, see Illinois Tri-Seal Products, Inc. v. U.S. (1965); Bonney Motor
Express Inc. v. U.S. (1962); In re Rasbury (1991); and Butts v. Comm’r (1993).
12.  For example, see the following sections of the Internal Revenue Code: 1) §
6651: The penalty for the failure to pay employment taxes has a maximum of
25 percent, which is calculated at 0.5 percent of the unpaid tax each month. This
code section also has a penalty for failure to file employment tax returns with a
maximum of 25 percent, which is assessed at 5 percent per month; 2) § 6662: It
imposes a penalty of 20 percent of the underpayment attributable to negligence;
3) § 6663: If serious abuse is found there is a 75 percent penalty of underpayment
due to fraud; 4) § 6656: A failure to deposit penalty can range from 2 percent to
15 percent of the underpaid deposit. This penalty is imposed in addition to failure
to pay the penalty; 5) § 6721: A penalty of $15 to $50 per return is charged for
the failure to file the correct information return such as a W-2. The maximum
penalty is $250,000 with a reduced maximum of $100,000 for small employers;
6) § 6722: If an employer fails to provide timely W-2s to employees, a penalty of
$50 per return may be assessed. The maximum penalty is $100,000.
13. The six factors are 1) integration, 2) investment in facilities, 3) right to control,
4) risk, 5) skill, and 6) continuing relationship (Muhl 2002, pp. 6–9).
14. Artists – Compare Rev. Rul. 57-155, 1957-I C.B. 333 with Rev. Rul. 65-262,
1965-2 C.B. 391; Loggers – Compare Rev. Rul. 71-273, 1971-1 C.B. 286 with
Rev. Rul. 71-274, 1971-1 C.B. 287; Repairers – Compare Rev. Rul. 55-248,
1955-1 C.B. 117 with Rev. Rul. 55-370, 1955-1 C.B. 122.
15. I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (FUTA); 3101–3128 (FICA).
16. The Social Security tax is imposed at a rate of 12.4 percent on a changing wage
base, while the Medicare tax is 2.9 percent on all wages. These taxes are imposed
half on the employer as an excise tax and half on the employee in the form of a
withholding tax collected from the employee’s wages by the employer.
17. The FUTA tax is imposed solely on employers at a rate of 6.2 percent on the first
$7,000 of the employee’s wages. Generally, a credit is allowed against the FUTA
tax for amounts paid into state unemployment funds. This credit cannot exceed
5.4 percent of first $7,000 of wages. If the maximum credit of 5.4 percent is allowed, the FUTA tax rate after the credit is 0.8 percent.
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18. Compensation paid to independent contractors is subject to the Self Employment Contributions Act (SECA) tax. The self-employed tax rate is 15.3 percent
(I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403). The independent contractor pays an amount equal to the
employee plus the employer portion of the FICA tax. In an attempt to mitigate a
double tax burden, the independent contractor is allowed to deduct one-half of
self-employment taxes as an adjustment to gross income and for SECA purposes (I.R.C. §§ 164(f)(1); 1402(a)(12)). The same definition of employee used in
FICA also applies for SECA to exclude individuals who are not subject to SECA
tax (I.R.C. § 1402(d)).
19. Two recent cases in Idaho illustrate that this classification problem continues to
create enforcement challenges. See the discussion of the problem of classifying
workers at Excell Construction, Inc. (Idaho Supreme Court Reviews Test for
Independent Contractor Status [2005]).
20. A temporary employee is sometimes defined as one who is retained with an expectation of being employed for one year or less and who has worked for the
current employer for less than one year. There are two categories of temporary
employees: 1) employees of an organization in a “temporary” status with no
expectation of continued employment and 2) employees who are hired, referred,
and sometimes supervised in part by a temporary employment agency. See Hipple (1998).
The terminology “leased workers” is somewhat new. However, the concept of “borrowed servant”—when one employer borrows the employees of
another—can be traced at least to the 1930s and the early years of workers’
compensation laws. An entire industry known as “employee leasing” emerged
in the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s. Setting aside the various
statutory definitions, in this discussion the term “leased employees” refers to
employees who are hired, referred, assigned, and in some respects supervised by
an outside firm (leasing agency) with an expectation of employment longer than
one year, but the assignment can be indefinite. Thus, a leased employee is different from a temporary employee since the latter is assigned with the expectation
of employment for one year or less.
21. It also may be referred to as “joint employment” or “dual employment.”
22. I.R.C. § 404.
23. I.R.C. §§ 410(b) and 401(a)(4).
24. See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden (1992), where the court used
only 12 factors in making the decision. See also Hensley v. Northwest Permanete
P.C. (2001), in which it was determined that the plan administrator did not err
when interpreting the undefined term “employee” in a pension plan by using the
W-2 definition and not the common-law definition.
25. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2).
26. The definition of one year of service is a 12-month period during which an employee works at least 1,000 hours. I.R.C. § 410(a)(l)(a)(ii) & (3). Careful monitoring of hours worked is required to ensure that part-time employees expected
to work less than 1,000 hours are included if they in fact work more than 1,000
hours.
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27.  	See Rev. Proc. 2003-44, 2003-C.B. where the administrative program is called
the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) and includes
the following corrective programs: Self-Correction Program (SCP), Voluntary
Correction Program (VCP), and the Audit Closing Agreement Program (Audit
Cap).
28. I.R.C. §§ 414(n)(3)(a) and 414(n)(2). However, there is a statutory exception that
provides that the recipient organization will not be required to include the leased
employees for testing purposes if the leasing organization maintains a money
purchase plan which meets certain requirements and no more than 20 percent of
the non-highly-compensated employees of the recipient are leased. The money
purchase plan must provide: 1) a minimum contribution of 10 percent of compensation; 2) immediate participation in the plan; and 3) 100 percent vesting in
benefits at all times (I.R.C. § 414(n)(5)). However, it is unusual for a leasing
organization to maintain such a generous qualified retirement plan.
29. The protracted Vizcaino v. Microsoft litigation spawned appellate victories for
independent contractors and Microsoft. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp. (1996,
1997). Microsoft, as part of the settlement for the case, changed its worker classification practices. This resulted in 3,000 of the litigants being hired as regular
employees entitled to participate in the retirement plans. A similar case occurred
in Massachusetts (Langone v. USCO Distribution Services, Inc. 2005). See Barran (2005).
30. The FLSA is enforced by the Wage-Hour Division of the U.S. Department of
Labor. While state laws also regulate wages and hours and impose similar and
additional obligations, this discussion is limited to the FLSA. The FLSA regulations were revised to add income tests effective August 23, 2004. 1938 law, as
amended (Fair Labor Standards Act 2003).
31. A recent example of a company misclassifying street sweepers in California as
independent contractors is seen in Garces v. Cannon Pacific Services (October 4,
2005) (Cole 2005).
32. The four factors are 1) the extent to which the services in question are an integral part of the employer’s business, 2) the amount of the alleged contractor’s
investment in facilities and equipment, 3) the alleged contractor’s opportunities
for profit and loss, and 4) the amount of initiative, judgment, or foresight in open
market competition required for the success of the enterprise.
33. The courts do not consider the wage-hour guidelines as controlling, although the
weight of the case law is largely consistent with the guidelines. Some courts have
amplified the tests with factors such as the skill level of the alleged contractor
and the contractor having other clients. For example, see Brock v. Superior Care,
Inc. (1988).
34. In a five-page dissenting opinion, Judge King concluded that the workers were
employees. The majority opinion, he said, erred in departing from a long line of
cases followed in that circuit.
35. The five tests used were 1) Control: Even though the individuals were required
to wear uniforms and attend a special training session, the court found that they
could control their own hours, days of work, and reject any delivery without re-
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taliation. 2) Opportunity for profit and loss: Drivers were paid on a commission
basis, but the majority opinion found that profit and loss was nonetheless driven
by worker’s ability to cut costs and understand the courier business. 3) Permanency of relationship: The court observed that most of the drivers only worked
for the company for a short period of time and were able to work for other companies. No noncompete agreement was required. 4) Skill and initiative required:
The court found that the drivers must determine the route, read MAPSCO, and
choose alternate routes. The majority opinion further noted that these skills require the workers to use industry and efficiency indicative of independence and
nonemployee status. 5) Relative investment of the worker and alleged employer:
The court found that the necessity of owning a vehicle, paying insurance, and
buying a dolly, tarp, a two-way radio, pager, and a medical delivery bag constituted a substantial investment.
36. Wisconsin was the first state to pass a comprehensive workers’ compensation
law (1911), and Mississippi was the last state (1948) Guyton (1999).
37. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA); 45 U.S.C. Section 5(1), et seq.
(airline and railroad employees); Longshoreman’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 901 et seq., and the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 8101 et seq. Unemployment compensation benefits also are offered under state laws to complement workers’ compensation.
However, the basic features of these state programs must comply with federal
laws to be eligible for revenues and funding from the federal unemployment tax
(FUTA).
38. Other state jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion in analogous cases.
For example, a Florida court reached a similar conclusion. In Maxson Construction Co. v. Welch (1998), an injured leased employee brought a tort action
against the client company of his leasing company employer. The Florida Court
of Appeals held that immunity would apply to the client employer even though
Florida’s leasing statute made the leasing company responsible for paying workers’ compensation premiums. As in the Rhode Island decision, the court justified
its decision pointing out that the client company indirectly paid workers’ compensation premiums. Also see cases in California, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, Texas, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (Wedeck v. Unocal Corp.
(1997); Jones v. Sheller-Globe Corp. (1992); Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. and Eng’g
Co., Inc. (1977); Farrell v. Dearborn Mfg. Co. (1982); LaVallie v. Wire and Cable Co. (1992); Regalado v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. (1993); Gansch v. Nekoosa
Papers, Inc. (1990)).
39.  	 For example, an injured employee in North Dakota who was covered by the
workers’ compensation policy of the leasing company that hired him brought
a tort action against the client company. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to extend employer status and its accompanying immunity to both the
leasing company and the client company. The court explained that the North
Dakota workers’ compensation law relieves only “contributing employers,” even
though the client company paid an hourly fee that “probably” covered the cost
of workers’ compensation premiums. The court noted that allowing such indirect
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payment to trigger immunity could extend immunity to most independent contractors who indirectly recoup the costs of benefits from their clients (Cervantes
v. Drayton Foods, L.L.C. 1998). A similar decision was rendered by the Ohio
appellate court, which also held that such indirect payments were insufficient to
extend immunity to the client company (Carr v. Central Printing Co. 1997).
Telephone and personal interviews conducted by Thomas Coens with representatives and members of these associations in several states and Washington, D.C.
(March 1999–September 1999).
For examples of cases of judgments against client companies in workers’ compensation cases, see West Publishing Company (2001, 2003) and Del Industrial,
Inc. v. Texas (1998).
Equal Pay Act: 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for the
enforcement of Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, and EPA (EEOC 1997).
The 16 factors are 1) the firm or the client has the right to control when, where,
and how the worker performs the job; 2) the work does not require a high level
of skill or expertise; 3) the firm or the client rather than the worker furnishes the
tools, materials, and equipment; 4) the work is performed on the premises of the
firm or the client; 5) there is a continuing relationship between the worker and
the firm or the client; 6) the firm or the client has the right to assign additional
projects to the worker; 7) the firm or the client sets the hours of work and the duration of the job; 8) the worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than for
the agreed costs of performing a particular job; 9) the worker has no role in hiring
and paying assistants; 10) the work performed by the worker is part of the regular
business of the firm or the client; 11) the firm or the client is itself in business;
12) the worker is not engaged in his or her own distinct occupation or business;
13) the firm or the client provides the worker with benefits such as insurance,
leave, or workers’ compensation; 14) the worker is considered an employee of
the firm or the client for tax purposes, i.e., the entity withholds federal, state, and
Social Security taxes; 15) the firm or the client can discharge the worker; and
16) the worker and the firm or client believe that they are creating an employeremployee relationship (U.S. EEOC 1997).
For example, see the following cases: Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of
Tex. (1993); Jones v. Seko Messenger, Inc. (1997); and Lane v. David P. Jacobson
& Co., LTD. (1995).
The EEOC’s position stems, in part, from an earlier case, Amarnare v. Merrill
Lynch (1984). In this case an employee of a temporary agency sued for race
and gender discrimination under Title VII when she was discharged from her
temporary assignment and the client company refused to offer her a regular position. The client company contended that there was no employer-employee relationship. The court found, however, that the client company was the employer
because it controlled the plaintiff’s hours, workplace, and assignments; it supervised and trained her; and ultimately it “discharged” her.
The threshold for liability for the client firm is 15 employees for Title VII and
ADA and 20 employees for the ADEA.
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6
Public Policy and
Contingent Workers
Jeffrey B. Wenger
University of Georgia

The growth of contingent employment from 1970 to the present has
been met with a resounding silence about possible federal and statelevel public policy responses. This lack of response is not surprising
since systematic public policy responses to changes in the labor force
are difficult to enact in the United States due to the absence of a true
national labor policy. There exists instead a fragmented system: federal
legislation is implemented by the states, but the rules are interpreted by
the courts. Policy responses therefore are limited by both U.S. federalism and the autonomy of the states. (For one example see the detailed
discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding the Social Security
Act of 1935 in Haber and Murray [1966]). This cumbersome system
often fails to keep pace with the needs of workers as labor market conditions change. Current public policies governing contingent employment have arisen from the haphazard application of existing policies
rather than the development of new policies designed to address the
specific circumstances of contingent workers.
The policy difficulties inherent in the system stem from the singleminded aim of policymakers when the existing labor market policies
were being developed: to provide protections for the benefit of regular full-time workers. This focus was a historical accident because the
workforce was primarily full time and male when the key U.S. labor
policies such as unemployment insurance and the minimum wage were
enacted in the 1930s. Policies that have an impact on nonstandard and
contingent workers do so only because contingent workers are caught
in the penumbrae of policies developed for full-time workers, not because policies have been developed specifically for the benefit of contingent workers.

169
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Eligibility requirements are the key to understanding the impact
of labor market policies on contingent workers. These requirements
establish the rules by which an individual qualifies for benefits. By
specifying eligibility criteria, policymakers determine whom they want
covered by the policy. Often the unintended consequence of these eligibility requirements is to limit access to social insurance by minorities
and women, who are disproportionately represented in the contingent
workforce (as discussed in Chapter 2).
There are essentially three ways in which a contingent worker
may be deemed ineligible for coverage. Most commonly, the contingent worker fails to meet the work-based requirements for eligibility.
These requirements stipulate rules governing the hours worked, amount
earned, or the distribution of earnings during the year. Those with fulltime jobs and those who earn more qualify for benefits, while those
with part-time jobs or limited hours of work are deemed ineligible. A
second factor determining ineligibility is employment in an industry or
with a firm that is exempted from the legislation. There are numerous
examples of farm workers and employees of small firms that are not
covered by labor legislation. Finally, there are the gray areas of labor
legislation where the courts have not yet decided whether the laws apply to certain types of workers. These gray areas have emerged in issues
concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) discussed
on p. 192 and employer-provided benefits such as pensions and stock
options, as in Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation (May 12, 1999).
When evaluating the impact of labor market policies, analysts use
four criteria: 1) economic efficiency, 2) equity, 3) security, and 4) liberty. (For a complete discussion of these criteria, see Stone [1988]).
Economic efficiency is determined by evaluating the relationship between the increased coverage and its marginal cost. In this sense we can
consider a policy efficient if the most people are covered for the least
cost. Equity means treating people in similar situations in the same way.
Security is defined as providing benefits to those most at risk. However,
economic efficiency and security often will be at odds with one another.
For example, providing health insurance to the most ill may improve
security, but the extra cost is likely to be disproportionately high. Finally, liberty examines when a policy intervention is justified: when should
a government impress a collective outcome on an individual? This is
generally interpreted to mean that government should intervene during
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those times when an individual’s actions adversely affect other people.
One example is when an individual does not take into consideration the
effects of auto emissions on others. In this case there is an opportunity
for government action to correct this outcome.
For each of the public policies discussed in this chapter, eligibility
rules are used as a starting point to examine the efficiency and equity of
the program. Eligibility rules determine whether contingent or nonstandard workers are likely to be eligible and therefore covered (equity),
and whether coverage can be expanded to include contingent workers with only modest increases in cost (efficiency). The likelihood that
nonstandard workers will need the program (security) and the rationale
for altering the eligibility criteria and coverage of these public policies
(liberty) also are examined.
The discussion is focused on those policies that affect individual
workers directly: employer-provided benefits of health insurance and
pensions, unemployment insurance, family and medical leave, minimum wages, and occupational safety and health. Clearly this is not
an exhaustive list of public policies affecting workers; however, these
policies are representative of those that are likely to directly impact
contingent and nonstandard employment relationships.

Employer-Provided Benefits
Employer-provided benefits have recently been the subject of considerable litigation and debate in the courts and state and federal legislatures. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in the widely publicized case Vizcaino v. Microsoft that temporary employees were in fact
“common law” employees of the Microsoft Corporation. Consequently,
the court found that Microsoft had wrongly denied benefits worth millions of dollars to employees because they had been misclassified as
independent contractors or freelancers.
Legal challenges to the classification of contingent workers have
a long history. Part of the challenge of properly classifying employees
results from the ambiguity of the tax status of these workers. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has filed a number of lawsuits in an effort
to determine who is responsible for an employee’s payroll taxes. (For a
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discussion of the legal relationship between temporary help employers
and workers, see Parker [1994)]; Gonos [1997]; duRivage, Carré, and
Tilley [1998]). The court also has made considerable headway in determining who is an “employee” and under what criteria the employer is
responsible for enforcing a number of federal statutes. Carnevale, Jennings, and Eisenmann (1998) have outlined many of the requirements
necessary to be considered an employee (as opposed to a contractor
or temporary worker). As discussed in Chapter 5, there are a number
of multifactor legal tests for distinguishing between an employee and
an independent contractor. One of the most important factors has been
determining “the extent of the employer’s control and supervision over
the worker, including directions on scheduling and performance of
work” (p. 288).
Health Insurance
Legislative changes extending employer-provided benefits to employees have been considerably more modest than legal rulings. Most
changes have been concerned with maintaining worker access to health
insurance benefits. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985 (COBRA) allows employees (under certain circumstances1) to continue their employers’ group health care plan by paying for
the policy themselves. COBRA provides insurance at group rates rather
than individual health insurance rates for up to 18 months after coverage would have otherwise ended. More recently, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 protects workers
when they seek to buy, keep, or switch their health insurance, even
when workers have serious preexisting medical conditions.
From the perspective of contingent workers, these workplace policies have two highly problematic eligibility criteria. To be eligible, your
employer must have insurance that covers 20 or more employees. Also,
the worker must have been laid off or had her working hours reduced.
A worker fired for gross misconduct is ineligible. One of the most serious limitations of the policy is that it provides no subsidy for those who
cannot afford the coverage. HIPAA protects only those who can demonstrate health insurance coverage for 18 months without a significant
interruption, where significant interruption is defined as an interruption
that exceeds 63 days.
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However, these policies are of little help to contingent workers since
very few have health insurance coverage provided by their employer.
We can see in Table 6.1 that most contingent workers and most nonstandard workers do not receive health insurance from their employers.
The low rates of employer-provided health insurance among nearly
all types of nonstandard employment demonstrates the narrow cast of
HIPAA. Few workers are helped by a policy providing health insurance
portability if they do not have health insurance initially. Looking at the
insurance rates overall, a better picture emerges: workers in nonstandard employment are approximately 12.6 percent less likely to have
health insurance coverage than regular full-time workers (75.6 percent
and 88.2 percent, respectively). It is also likely that some of those with
insurance will fail to meet the continuous coverage requirements of
HIPAA that ensure portability. The biggest differences are among parttime and full-time workers. For example, only 18.5 percent of regular
part-time workers receive health insurance from their employers, while
69.0 percent of regular full-time workers receive employer-provided
health insurance.2
While Table 6.1 indicates that the majority of workers in nonstandard employment do not receive health insurance benefits from their
employers, the majority of nonstandard workers do have some insurance, most likely through a family member or the government. While
the lack of coverage is not dire for nonstandard workers, spousal coverage is costly since employers typically pay only their employees’ portion of the premium. This means greater out-of-pocket expenditures
for health coverage for workers in nonstandard employment relative to
regular full-time jobs.
Pensions
Much like health insurance, pension coverage for nonstandard
workers is very limited. Table 6.2 shows that workers in full-time employment are about 3.5 times more likely to receive a pension from their
employer than are workers in nonstandard jobs (52.8 percent and 16.0
percent, respectively). The biggest differences in pension coverage are
based on hours of work. Part-time workers are considerably less likely
to have pension coverage. This finding is consistent with some literature
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Table 6.1 Percentage of Workers with Health Insurance Coverage, by Work Arrangement and Sex, 2001

All
All nonstandard arrangements
Full-time
Temporary help agency
On-call/day laborer
Self-employed
Independent contractor, WSa
Independent contractor, SEb
Contract company
Regular full-time
Part-time
Temporary help agency
On-call/day laborer
Self-employed
Independent contractor, WSa
Independent contractor, SEb
Contract company
Regular part-time
a

Women
Any
Through own
coverage
employer

Men
Any
Through own
coverage
employer

84.8
75.6

54.3
13.7

86.0
77.7

50.7
14.8

83.8
73.0

57.4
12.4

46.9
69.1
82.2
66.8
73.2
84.7
88.2

12.8
49.0
n/a
23.2
n/a
58.2
69.0

49.9
76.4
80.1
65.4
75.2
88.8
89.6

11.0
39.8
n/a
17.6
n/a
54.9
66.8

43.0
66.3
83.0
67.5
72.5
83.3
87.0

15.2
52.5
n/a
25.8
n/a
59.4
70.8

58.3
67.0
85.6
72.8
75.1
81.0
76.6

0.6
11.0
n/a
10.1
n/a
14.9
18.5

70.0
69.9
88.0
77.8
81.5
80.5
78.5

0.9
10.6
n/a
4.7
n/a
12.7
19.4

36.9
60.8
78.5
64.5
61.4
82.0
72.0

0.0
12.0
n/a
19.0
n/a
19.0
15.9

Wage and salary.
Self-employed.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001; analysis by author.
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Table 6.2 Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage, by Work Arrangement and Sex, 2001
All
Any
Through own
coverage
employer

a

Men
Any
Through own
coverage
employer

60.4
38.5

52.8
16.0

59.3
37.7

52.4
20.1

61.5
39.6

53.3
11.1

24.1
51.9
51.7
37.2
44.5
64.7
68.3

11.3
47.7
n/a
17.8
n/a
56.1
66.2

24.9
48.2
38.8
36.7
44.4
68.7
68.9

10.2
40.4
n/a
15.8
n/a
64.0
66.5

23.0
53.3
57.0
37.5
44.5
63.3
67.9

12.7
50.4
n/a
18.7
n/a
53.2
66.0

7.7
30.9
43.9
32.7
41.5
27.5
32.0

2.2
17.3
n/a
8.8
n/a
14.5
25.2

11.5
33.6
42.7
28.0
44.9
28.3
36.1

3.3
18.7
n/a
4.3
n/a
17.1
28.0

0.0
25.5
47.2
40.1
34.0
26.1
21.4

0.0
14.4
n/a
15.9
n/a
9.6
17.1

Wage and salary.
Self-employed.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001; analysis by author.
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All
All nonstandard arrangements
Full-time
Temporary help agency
On-call/day laborer
Self-employed
Independent contractor, WSa
Independent contractor, SEb
Contract company
Regular full-time
Part-time
Temporary help agency
On-call/day laborer
Self-employed
Independent contractor, WSa
Independent contractor, SEb
Contract company
Regular part-time

Women
Any
Through own
coverage
employer

176 Wenger

that shows that firms use nonstandard work arrangements to offset the
high benefits costs of regular full-time employees (Abraham 1988).
Policy Evaluation
While these findings for health insurance and pension coverage are
not surprising given the design of the public policies, there is little evidence that public policy is moving to remedy the lack of coverage for
workers in nonstandard employment. Temporary employment agencies
have been sensitive to the criticism that workers are unable to receive
health insurance; many of these agencies have begun to make it available to their workers. Despite the increased availability, few workers
take advantage of the insurance, most likely due to the high costs relative to their earnings.
The health care and pension systems demonstrate the difficulty
public policy has in adequately addressing incomplete markets, that is,
those markets where there are only limited products available at a wide
range of prices. From an economic efficiency standpoint (as defined
above), it is unlikely that the market is efficient; many uninsured workers with health statuses similar to workers with insurance do not get
health insurance as a result of where they work. Thus, many workers
who have relatively low insurance costs go without insurance. From
a social standpoint health insurance markets are very flawed. Many
workers who initially have low-cost insurance go without medical care.
Some of them get treatment too late, raising overall medical costs and
potentially decreasing their health outcomes. Since employers who
do not provide insurance bear only a fraction of the cost of uninsured
workers, there is little economic incentive to provide insurance. From
an equity standpoint these markets are very inequitable: workers in ostensibly the same work situation receive different compensation.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this policy is security. The
analysis in Table 6.3 from the matched February/March 2001 Current
Population Surveys indicates that workers in nonstandard employment
are much more likely to report “fair” to “poor” health. Involuntary parttime workers (part-time workers who would prefer full-time work) are
4.5 times as likely to report diminished health status as regular fulltime workers. This may be due to a variety of factors, not the least of
which is employee self-selection: fewer healthy workers may choose
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Table 6.3 Percentage of Workers Reporting Health Status as “Fair” or
“Poor,” 2001
Employment type
Regular full-time
Contract worker
Independent contractor
On-call
Temporary help
Involuntary part-time

Fair to Poor
2.2
6.3
6.5
7.5
10.3
10.0

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001 and March Annual Demographic file 2001; analysis by author
of matched February/March CPS data.

these forms of employment based on employment flexibility. However,
this reduced health status does point to the need for health insurance
coverage.
The rationale for government intervention is very strong in this case.
Socially, the benefits of insuring this large group of workers are likely to
be quite high, and the market has been unable to achieve these improvements on it own. However, it is unlikely that we will see government
mandate that businesses cover these workers. Their lower health statuses
imply that they would be increasingly costly to insure. Under these circumstances government intervention is warranted and necessary.

Social Insurance: Unemployment Insurance
The provision of employer-provided health insurance or pensions
fails to provide systematic coverage since only workers whose employers provide benefits and who earn enough to afford the benefits actually
receive the coverage. In contrast, social insurance is provided for all
people who meet certain eligibility requirements. These requirements
often have a differential impact on workers in nonstandard employment
arrangements. The most important form of social insurance that directly
affects employees is unemployment insurance (UI).
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Overview of Unemployment Insurance
The UI system in the United States began with the Social Security
Act of 1935, which provides the primary line of defense against earnings losses when workers become unemployed. For those eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits, the typical state program provides 26
weeks of benefits at approximately 50 percent of the worker’s normal
wage. Although federal and state statutes have been revised periodically to increase the level of benefits, the basic system created by the act
has remained the same. The most significant change is that the program
now covers nearly all employees; therefore, nearly all employees or
their employers pay unemployment insurance taxes. However, coverage does not mean eligibility. Unfortunately, this first line of defense is
so porous that it leaves many full- and part-time workers uninsured.
The overall picture of unemployment insurance is one of a declining share of the full-time workers who lose their jobs receiving UI benefits (Blank and Card 1991; Vroman 1991; Wenger 2001). In this situation, workers may have to choose some form of contingent work as an
earnings substitute for UI benefits. While this may be a good strategy
in a robust economy, during periods of economic malaise even these
nonstandard jobs will be hard to find. During the current recession, the
temporary employment sector lost more than 900,000 jobs. Under these
conditions temporary employment is not likely to provide income security to those who have lost jobs in other sectors.
The situation for workers in nonstandard arrangements is even
bleaker. Eligibility requirements for hours of work and earnings are
particularly onerous for contingent workers. Clearly, both these criteria
are related: as hours decrease we see a commensurate reduction in earnings. Due to the sporadic nature of contingent work, hours and earnings
are unpredictable, making eligibility difficult to establish.
Determining Eligibility for UI
From the perspective of nonstandard workers, unemployment insurance has five major problems related to the determination of eligibility for UI. First, the system is biased toward regular full-time work.
Workers with low wages and those with fewer than full-time hours may
have difficulty qualifying for benefits.
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Second, the system is confusing. A wide array of initial and continuing eligibility requirements create uncertainty about eligibility. Complex payment and benefit duration formulae confuse workers about
the potential value of benefits. Limited labor market experience only
compounds the confusion since contingent workers do not have stable
employment relationships that allow them to share information about
eligibility and benefit amounts.
Third, waiting periods prior to eligibility have a disproportionate
negative impact on low-wage workers, especially those with limited
resources. Many states have waiting periods for eligibility of one to two
weeks. Families with limited resources may find a two-week waiting
period financially unmanageable, choosing instead to return to contingent employment if they can find a job in that sector.
Fourth, the most difficult eligibility rules for a nonstandard worker
to satisfy may be the rules that deny benefits if the worker refuses to
accept a job offer. Part of the ongoing eligibility requirements in UI
are the job search requirements. To collect unemployment benefits the
unemployed must continue to search for work. In most states a worker
who turns down any job offer is no longer eligible to receive benefits.
Federal law does provide some worker protections by prohibiting states
from denying benefits under the following conditions:
1) if the job vacancy was the result of a labor dispute;
2) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered fail
to meet prevailing standards;
3) if joining a company union or being required not to join a bona
fide union is a condition of employment.
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia stipulate that the
worker must be available for any type of work to maintain eligibility.
Ten states require the worker to accept “suitable work,” although this
has a broad definition and changes as the duration of unemployment
increases. Finally, nine states require the worker to accept work in his
usual occupation or in jobs for which he is reasonably matched due to
prior training or experience. The penalties for turning down a job offer
vary from a reduction in benefits to benefits being postponed for the
duration of the unemployment (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).
However, the nonstandard labor market is so volatile that part-time
job offers for work in nonstandard jobs may be a regular facet of this
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type of employment. For workers who seek to leave contingent employment and use their unemployment insurance benefits to subsidize
their search for a full-time job, requiring contingent workers to accept
any position may amount to placing them in a UI eligibility trap from
which escape to better employment is difficult. Thus, this type of eligibility requirement may be particularly difficult for a contingent worker
to satisfy. Turning down a job offer in hopes of landing a better job may
result in ineligibility.
Finally, a number of states explicitly exclude from eligibility workers who search for part-time work exclusively. These workers are considered “not available” for full-time work and consequently are not eligible to receive benefits (Wenger, McHugh, and Segal 2002). In essence
these workers’ unavailability is evidenced by their substantial restrictions on the conditions of their employment. Consequently, for nonstandard employees, especially part-time workers, eligibility requirements
may all but eliminate them from collecting UI benefits in some states.
Empirical evidence suggests that the eligibility restrictions take a
much higher toll on contingent and nonstandard employees. Table 6.4
Table 6.4 Percentage of Workers Satisfying Monetary Eligibility
Requirements for Unemployment Insurance, 2001
Type of employment
Temporary help
Contract
On-call/day laborer
Independent contractor, WSa
Involuntary part-time
Voluntary part-time
Contingent worker type 1
Contingent worker type 2
Contingent worker type 3
Regular full-time

Status: Ineligible
15.9
6.8
20.7
63.1
25.7
30.0
26.3
30.5
11.6
6.1

NOTE: Self-employed and independent contractors not paid by wage or salary are
omitted since these workers are not covered by the UI system.
a
Paid by wage or salary so covered by UI.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001 and March Annual Demographic file 2001; analysis by author
of matched February/March CPS data.
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Table 6.5  Maximum Weekly Benefits, Lowest and Highest Paying
States, 2000 ($)
Alabama
190
Massachusetts
Mississippi
190
Washington
Arizona
205
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
224
New Jersey
California
230
New York

477
441
430
429
405

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (2001).

compares the monetary eligibility of contingent, nonstandard, and regular full-time workers.3 Regular full-time workers are more likely than
any other group to satisfy the earnings requirements for unemployment
insurance. The workers least likely to be eligible are the independent
contractors who are paid a wage or salary.
Previous earnings determine both who is eligible and the amount of
benefits the unemployed receive. Those workers who have lower earnings and fewer hours of work receive smaller benefit amounts, and are
likely to receive benefits for a shorter period of time. These differences
in benefit calculations are not trivial; the maximum weekly benefit in
different states varies by hundreds of dollars. Table 6.5 compares the
maximum weekly benefits for the five highest and lowest paying states
in the United States.
The difference in maximum weekly benefits between Massachusetts and Alabama is striking. From a policy perspective we can see
both sides of the UI debate reflected in these two states. Lower-threshold earnings requirements increase the likelihood of being eligible but
often result in low benefit levels. Conversely, higher benefit allowances
usually require higher earnings and/or hours. These higher threshold
levels may exclude low-wage workers from benefits.
One initially surprising empirical finding is that contingent and
nonstandard workers receive higher benefit levels than their regular
full-time counterparts. Considering only those who received UI benefits in 1994, nonstandard workers received on average $2,781 (N =
417) while regular full-time workers only received $2,349 (N = 2435).
This is likely due to self-selection: only those contingent workers who
expect higher benefit payments are likely to apply. Typically these are
workers with higher incomes and steadier employment such as contract
workers who are independent contractors in the least volatile employ-
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ment arrangements and paid a wage or salary (see also Kunda, Barley,
and Evans [2002]).
Consequently, it appears that there are two groups of contingent employees who view UI options quite differently: those who are reasonably certain of a high benefit amount are likely to choose to apply for
UI. However, given the confusing array of eligibility rules and complex
benefit formulae, we can speculate that a second group—probably the
majority of contingent workers—find it easier to seek other contingent
work rather than apply for benefits. Employees in this second group
find that reentering the contingent labor market is a way of avoiding the
waiting periods, uncertain benefit amounts, administrative hassles, and
the potential social stigma arising from being an unemployed worker.
Policy Evaluation
The nature of UI usage is changing. The new labor market actors,
contingent and nonstandard workers, are not using UI in the same way
that regular full-time workers use the system. Yet despite the reduction
in use and inapplicability to new work forms, systematic change is unlikely. States compete among themselves to create favorable business
conditions to attract employers. They are unlikely to yield to pressure
from labor groups to systematically extend benefits to contingent workers that will increase the cost of labor for employers. When jobs are
relatively plentiful, this lack of concern for the public policy reform
may not be problematic. Rather than suffer from the social stigma that
may occur from UI use, workers will remain productively employed in
the labor force, even if in less than full-time positions. However, as the
economic climate shifts toward recession, job availability diminishes
and contingent employment becomes less of an option. The opportunity to use contingent work as a substitute for UI will be reduced for
many of these workers. We therefore would expect UI rolls to increase
because they will be more willing to tolerate the waiting period requirements, administrative hassles, and social stigma.
From a policy perspective, unemployment insurance includes many
complicated components to analyze. Economic efficiency, as measured
by the cost of adding workers in nonstandard arrangements to unemployment insurance, is not likely to be very costly. Wenger (2000) shows
that the effects of unemployment insurance on the likelihood of workers
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becoming unemployed are about the same for regular full-time workers
and workers in nonstandard arrangements. It would appear that the cost
per person of extending unemployment insurance benefits to workers in
nonstandard arrangements is similar to the current per person costs of
regular full-time employees.
Unemployment insurance suffers from considerable inequities.
Particularly vexing is the inequity across states. Identical workers employed in different states will likely receive different benefit amounts,
may have different eligibility outcomes, and may have different weeks
of eligibility. This inequity is especially problematic to address since
each state makes its own policy within loose federal guidelines. Creating a national policy from such a system would be nearly impossible
since states control almost all of the important aspects of eligibility and
benefits.
There can be little doubt that workers in nonstandard employment
arrangements need UI. They are more likely to become unemployed
and less likely to be eligible for benefits. The least stable of these arrangements, such as temporary employment, has both intermittent employment and low wages. This means that UI eligibility will be more
difficult to attain due to low wages, but spells of unemployment are
more likely due to sporadic employment. Overall, the current UI system
is relatively inefficient, highly inequitable, and fails to provide security
for a class of workers with considerable need. The justifications for
government intervention are myriad. Government clearly has a role in
easing the destructive forces that the market rains on the unemployed.
Additionally, from a broader economic perspective, UI has a stabilizing
effect on the economy as a whole (Chimerine, Black, and Coffey 1999).
However, the real shortcoming of the current unemployment insurance
program is its lack of modernization to adapt it to the new labor market
realities in the United States.

Social Insurance: Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA)
One of the most recent additions to the U.S. social insurance system
is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), enacted in 1993. The act
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was established to “allow employees to balance their work and family
lives by taking reasonable unpaid leave for certain family and medical
reasons.” The act also seeks to promote the “economic security of families” and “national interests in preserving family integrity.” The FMLA
accomplishes this by providing eligible employees with up to 12 weeks
of unpaid, job-protected leave each year. Additionally, the act requires
employers to continue to provide health benefits during the leave.
Unfortunately, for workers in nonstandard employment the FMLA
provides at best a marginal benefit to those contingent workers who
already have the option to sporadically leave the labor force for periods
of time and receive no pay.4 While the job protections and especially the
preservation of health insurance may be of some benefit for contingent
workers and those in in nonstandard arrangements, eligibility rules and
low levels of employer-provided insurance provide nearly nonexistent
benefits.
Factors That Determine Contingent Workers’ Use of FMLA
The FMLA eligibility requirements are much less complex than
those for the UI system. However, they are far more likely to classify
contingent and nonstandard workers as ineligible. There are three main
criteria for FMLA eligibility: the employer must have more than 50
employees, and the employee must have worked for the employer for
12 months or more and worked a minimum of 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months (approximately 31 weeks of work at 40 hours per week).
These criteria eliminate the majority of contingent workers from eligibility. Part-time workers (those who work year round fewer than 24
hours per week) or workers who move from job site to job site or who
have multiple contracts are unlikely to satisfy the eligibility criteria.
The ability to use the FMLA leave option is determined by the work
schedules of contingent workers. Not all workers in nonstandard employment have flexible schedules. For example, part-time workers may
have little control over their work schedules. Contract workers may
only be able to take time away from work between contracts. The selfemployed must schedule time off during the ebb of customer demand.
Consequently, for workers like these, the FMLA policies could provide
flexibility while affording them some job security. However, contingent
workers typically cannot afford the cost of taking the time off even if
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they would benefit from the protections prescribed in the FMLA. Only
long-term contractors and “perma-temps” are likely to benefit from the
act. The primary benefit to these two groups is the continued availability of employer-provided health insurance during a leave of absence.
However, because contingent workers are unlikely to receive employerprovided health insurance, this benefit will cover few workers, as shown
previously in Table 6.1.
Thus, the FMLA is unlikely to be an important policy for contingent
workers since very few will be able to satisfy the eligibility criteria.
However, the FMLA has created an increased dependence on workers
in nonstandard jobs since contingent workers are likely to be hired to
replace regular full-time employees when they use the provisions of the
act. As of 2000, 98.2 percent of all firms reported assigning work to other employees, while 41.3 percent reported hiring outside temporary-replacement workers. The use of temporary workers declined from 1995
to 2000, but their role in making FMLA successful remains important.
Policy Evaluation
The FMLA does not perform well in terms of our four policy criteria
of economic efficiency, equity, security, and liberty. It is clear that the
policy was essentially formulated for workers in standard jobs where
leaves of absence normally would require an employee to quit a job.
Therefore, from an equity perspective, the FMLA program treats inequitably workers in nonstandard jobs who are excluded from this leave
option. From the business perspective it would appear that there is little
additional cost if all employees are allowed to take leave, regardless of
how many hours of service a worker had rendered in the previous 12
months. However, it may be harder for employers to manage the loss of
a full-time employee than a half-time employee.
Evaluating the FMLA on the criteria of security poses an interesting
problem. Many nonstandard arrangements offer little flexibility. Consequently, workers in part-time and contract jobs may have a considerable
need for the policy. In many cases, workers in these arrangements are
more likely to meet the hours requirements for eligibility. For the other
types of work arrangements such as temporary help agency workers,
independent contractors, and the self-employed, these work forms may
offer enough flexibility to be able to accommodate an unpaid leave.
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After more than 12 years of experience with the FMLA, we have
not managed to expand coverage, nor have we found a way to provide
paid leave for those who need to take care of children or sick relatives.
With an aging U.S. population the demand for this leave option is likely
to increase. However, without a mechanism for paying for leave, much
of that demand will go unsatisfied. Consequently, the federal government is likely to experience increased pressure to intervene.
Many of the U.S. labor market policies started by providing modest coverage, and over time that coverage has been expanded. This was
true for UI, the minimum wage, and disability insurance. It remains to
be seen whether the FMLA follows this path as well.

Minimum Wages
In contrast to the public policies discussed above, federal minimum
wage legislation instituted with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
in 1938 provides nearly universal coverage. The FLSA establishes standards for minimum wages, overtime pay, and child labor. States may
choose to set minimum wages above the federal level. As of January
2003, 11 states had minimum wage laws that exceeded the federal minimum wage.5
While the FLSA provides nearly universal coverage, there are two
notable exceptions: the self-employed and independent contractors. As
a consequence, nearly one-third of all workers in nonstandard employment arrangements are not covered by minimum wage laws. For those
who are likely to be covered, such as workers at temporary help firms,
on-call workers, wage and salary independent contractors, and parttime workers, they are more likely to earn low wages.6 Table 6.6 shows
mean wages by work arrangement and gender. Average hourly wages
are lowest for workers in part-time jobs and those who work for temporary help agencies. Regression analysis that controls for human capital
characteristics also shows that regression-adjusted wages are lower for
part-time and temporary workers relative to full-time workers.
The low levels of the minimum wage, the decline of its real purchasing power, and tight labor markets throughout most of the 1990s
have eroded the efficacy of the minimum wage.7 Analysis of the Feb-
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Table 6.6 Average Hourly Wages (1999) and Percent Change in Wage Since 1997, by Work Arrangement and Sex

All
a

15.56

4.3

Women
1999 Wage ($) % Change
11.81
11.4
10.00
−1.9
12.89
12.8
14.21
8.3
15.76
22.5
17.66
−3.6
16.86
15.4
13.78
0.7
13.51

2.9

Men
1999 Wage ($) % Change
12.00
14.7
12.01
−2.0
13.47
4.0
19.57
0.5
19.10
10.0
20.50
0.4
20.15
13.7
17.43
5.8
17.37

5.6

Wage and salary.
Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 1997 and 1999; analysis by author.
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Regular part-time
Temporary help agency
On-call/day laborer
Self-employed
Independent contractor, WSa
Independent contractor, SEb
Contract company
Regular full-time

All
1999 Wage ($) % Change
11.86
12.2
10.84
−2.9
13.19
8.0
17.68
2.8
17.42
15.6
19.60
−0.8
19.09
13.7
15.83
3.7
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ruary Current Population Survey Contingent Work Supplement from
1999 indicates that, overall, approximately 10 percent of the labor force
in 1999 earned less than the federal minimum wage of $5.50 per hour,
as shown in Table 6.7. However, there were more low-earning workers
in nonstandard arrangements than in regular full-time jobs. The only
nonstandard group where the percentage of low earners was below the
national average was contract workers. These findings may be somewhat misleading since many contract workers are self-employed and
earn the difference between their revenue and expenditures, regardless
of the number of hours worked. Consequently many of these workers
have very low hourly wages. By contrast, workers in nonstandard arrangements who are employed by others are also much more likely to
be low earners.
Since some state-set minimum wages are considerably higher than
the federal minimum wage, they may provide more income security to
contingent workers. In these states minimum wages ranged between
$6.15 per hour in Rhode Island and $7.15 in Alaska. This means that
considerably more workers in contingent employment will be covered
by the minimum wage legislation in these states. In general, while all
Table 6.7 Percentage of Workers in Nonstandard Arrangements Earning
Less Than $5.50 Per Hour, 1999
Regular part-time
Temporary help agency
On-call/day laborer
Self-employed
Independent contractor, WSa
Independent contractor, SEb
Contract company
Regular full-time

22.5
5.6
17.1
18.6
9.5
12.1
4.2
4.5

All Nonstandard
All

15.1
9.9

a

Wage and salary.
Self-employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 1999; analysis by author.

b
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states are required to follow federal minimum requirements for the
FLSA, many have chosen to raise the minimum requirements. This occurs more frequently when the federal government fails to maintain the
real value of the minimum wage as in the 1980s.
Policy Evaluation
The heterogeneity of workers across nonstandard employment arrangements means that earnings will vary. The lack of coverage for the
self-employed and independent contractors means that the minimum
wage is not a policy with a high score on equity. The economic efficiency considerations for the minimum wage have been written about
extensively. In general, researchers argue that increases in the minimum
wage result in a reallocation of labor that is not efficient. The standard
claim is that increases in the minimum wage increase unemployment,
thereby displacing lower-skilled workers. However, research conducted
using quasi-experimental analyses of state minimum wage increases has
called into question much of the earlier results.8 There is little reason to
believe that workers in nonstandard arrangements present a unique case
in terms of efficiency. Empirical evidence suggests that the minimum
wage does not cause meaningful reductions in efficiency within a relatively narrow range of values.
As with many of the other policies discussed in this chapter, the
largest failing of the minimum wage is on the criterion of security. The
people with the most exposure to the vicissitudes of the market are receiving neither enough coverage nor the same coverage. Simply stated,
an increase in minimum wages will have a disproportionate impact on
part-time workers and temporary help workers.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of minimum wage policy
from an economic point of view is determining whether the government has a legitimate role to play in setting a wage floor (liberty). Many
economic analysts believe that markets are better suited to determining
wages and that government intervention is unwarranted. This neoclassical or libertarian viewpoint overlooks some of the inequities between
the parties negotiating a wage. Employers are in a much better bargaining position; they have more resources, more information, and more
bargaining power. Workers in contingent employment arrangements are
often at a disadvantage. They have limited bargaining power, largely as
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a result of many people vying for the same job, and often have limited
information about the job requirements and hence an appropriate wage.
In these cases it would seem appropriate to impose a collective outcome
on the lowest wage earners and employers.

Other Employment Policies: Safety at the
Work Site
The discussion in this chapter has shown that many of the employment policies in the United States were enacted before the large shifts
to contingent and nonstandard employment occurred. The fundamental
problem with these policies is that their institutional development took
place at a time when the contingent workforce was minuscule. As the
nature of work and U.S. labor markets have changed, public policy has
increasingly relied on the judicial interpretations of the statutes rather
than redesigning the policies to keep pace with the changing patterns of
employment. Many of the statutes that seek to provide other protections
for workers, such as the reduction of discrimination, protection from
workplace hazards, and the protection of workers’ rights to fair wages
and work conditions, also suffer from these same drawbacks.
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)
is used here to illustrate the problems inherent in much workplace law,
these lessons are applicable across a broad range of workplace policies.
Included among these are the National Labor Relations Act (1935) that
governs collective bargaining activities, the Fair Labor Standards Act—
Equal Pay Amendment (1963), the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1981,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (1990), as well as a host of federal and state labor and
employment statutes (Maltby and Yamada 1997).
The mandate of OSHA is to provide, inasmuch as is possible, a
safe and healthful work environment for every working man and woman in the United States. The continuing problem for OSHA has been
determining who is responsible for providing this safe and healthful
workplace as these new employment relations and forms of work have
been developing. OSHA places this burden squarely on the employer.
The employer has the responsibility of providing “a place of employ-
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ment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees” (OSHA 1970).
However, identifying the employer is not always easy. One illustrative
example is the case of workers employed through a temporary help
agency who have dual employment relationships: they have one administrative employer (the employer of record) such as a temporary
help agency, and a host employer where the work is actually performed.
Considerable litigation has resulted around this coemployment issue
(see Chapter 5 for more details).
Thus the determination of who employs the worker is the first step
in determining the party responsible for carrying out the mandates of
OSHA. The issues can be thorny. The administrative employer such as
the temporary employment agency has little control over the risk associated with working at the host employer’s work site, and may have
only limited knowledge of the potential employment hazards. As a consequence, an information asymmetry is established. This may result in
workers being unfamiliar with the risks associated with the work. Worse
yet, the information asymmetry may be exploited by host employers
who use temporary workers to perform tasks or work under conditions
that their regular full-time employees would find objectionable.
The problem that has created much concern is employers classifying their workers to evade the requirements of various federal labor
and employment laws. The legal issues center on the legal definitions
of “an employee” (Carnevale, Jennings, and Eisenmann 1998). While
numerous criteria have been used, the policy consensus reached by the
Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations recommends that a single definition of employer be developed based on the
“economic realities” test employed by the courts (Dunlop Commission
1995). The commission recommends “adopting a single definition of
employer for all workplace laws based on the economic realities of the
employment relationship.” The commission also advises the National
Labor Relations Board to develop policies governing joint employment
relationships to prevent employers from using “contract arrangements
. . . as a subterfuge for avoiding collective bargaining or evading other
responsibilities under labor law” (p. 4).
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Policy Evaluation
Perhaps the largest single factor relating to the inadequacy of our
public policies and the concomitant gaps in coverage for contingent
workers is multiple employer relationships for these workers. Enforcement of antidiscriminatory or sexual harassment laws is difficult under
these circumstances. The differences in coverage for contingent workers and noncontingent workers is a considerable source of inequity. A
worker employed by a temporary agency has the same rights as the permanent worker, but the mechanism for enforcement is not available. In
this sense the contingent worker may be treated in a highly inequitable
manner.
From an economic efficiency standpoint, there is no reason to believe that enforcing the health, discrimination, and equal pay rules for
contingent workers would be more costly than enforcing them for regular full-time workers. However, from a security standpoint, contingent
workers are more likely to need the protections since there are opportunities for employers to take advantage of the information asymmetries described earlier. If contingent workers are hired for the purpose
of “protecting” core employees this would result in an increased role for
government to ensure security for these workers.

Conclusions and Directions for
Future Research
Labor market policies in the United States rarely work for contingent and nonstandard workers. The problem is twofold: U.S. employment policies were not designed to protect contingent and nonstandard
employees, nor have they kept pace with evolving trends in employment. The fault lies with the development and evolution of labor market
policies rather than with the employers and employees.
Public policies that fail to meet their objectives represent an opportunity for change. While any revisions will be complex matters of law,
they should be based on consistent criteria.
1) Economic efficiency. Policies should be efficient in that they
should not be so onerous as to cause undue hardship to employ-
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ers or eliminate the practice of contingent work. Since there
is some evidence that both employers and employees benefit
from certain types of contingent and nonstandard employment,
eliminating or curtailing the practice may do more harm than
good.
2) Equity. Policies should be fairly and justly applied to all workers regardless of their employment relationship. To the extent
possible, coverage should be extended to all employees regardless of occupation, industry, or firm size.
3) Security. Policies should be targeted to protect the most vulnerable workers from the volatility of the market. There is
considerable evidence that workers in nonstandard arrangements are exposed to more market volatility than other types
of workers. If this is truly the case, then protecting these workers through social insurance and public policy is important.
4) Liberty. To the extent that governmental intervention is unnecessary, markets and private parties should be allowed to
operate. However, private markets for the provision of disability and unemployment insurance have not been forthcoming.
Markets are not likely to provide many protections to these
types of workers due to their limited bargaining power relative
to employers.
Analysts should avoid understanding liberty as the freedom from
government intervention. Liberty is a much broader concept, and individual preferences may be such that freedom from fear and want outweigh freedom from intervention. On occasion, liberty may justify governmental intervention in the market rather than thwart it.
Making employment policy more economically efficient, equitable,
and just means that both employers and employees understand their
rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, these rights and responsibilities are universal: they do not depend on the class or kind of employment. To that end reform should promote economic efficiency, equity,
and security for both employers and employees. Therefore, reforms
should do the following:
• Simplify the eligibility rules for workplace policies such as unemployment insurance and family and medical leave. Addition-
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ally, reforms should extend these benefits to cover all workers
regardless of the industry or size of employer.
• Extend unemployment insurance so that it provides health insurance during the period of unemployment. This could be done by
paying the COBRA copayment to the previous employer.
• Strengthen the public pension system. Since so few workers in
nonstandard employment receive a pension from their employers, many more nonstandard workers will have to rely on the
public pension, Social Security. Nearly all workers are covered
by Social Security, and 40 quarters of work are enough to qualify
a worker for benefits, but the system must be made fiscally viable
in the future to guarantee benefits for the next generation.
• Increase the portability of benefits. For example, once eligible
for family medical leave, a worker would remain eligible so long
as they continued to work—even after they change jobs.9 Additionally, increased pension portability would expand coverage
for workers who move from employer to employer.
• Provide incentives to business to allay some of the costs associated with increased coverage and portability.
• Adopt the Dunlop Commission’s recommendation calling for “a
single definition of employer for all workplace laws.”
If enacted, these policy recommendations would provide increased
coverage for contingent and nonstandard workers by making them
equivalent, at least in the eyes of the government, to regular full-time
workers.
All responsible policy recommendations walk a fine line between
job creation and employee protection. Those concerned with the rights
of workers believe too little is being done to protect them from the hazards and vicissitudes of the labor market and workplace. Others believe
that saddling business with the burden of workplace protections reduces
employment and leads to a more insidious harm, strangling innovation
and job creation.
It can be argued that the development of contingent and nonstandard employment forms was, and continues to be, a direct response to
the increasing burden placed on firms in the form of new legislation. In
particular, Autor (2001) has found that limitations on the employment-
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at-will doctrine have resulted in an increased use of temporary help by
firms. (Employment-at-will basically guarantees the employer the right
to fire or lay off an employee without cause. In many states the courts
have curtailed the rights of employers to dismiss workers.) In programs
such as UI and disability insurance, employer costs are experiencerated; that is, employers are required to pay premiums based on their
employees’ claims. More claims result in higher payments. Experiencerated programs create incentives for firms to hire contingent workers
so that when a worker is laid off or injured, the claim is made against
the temporary firm. If policymakers believe that legislation protecting
workers from discrimination, unemployment, and workplace hazards
is important, they must work to close the loopholes that currently exist
and make the system flexible enough so that responding to changes in
employment relations is readily accomplished.
Given the increasing role of nonstandard employment both domestically and internationally, the need for policy changes is likely to become more pressing. The U.S. labor force is becoming older and the society is experiencing more inequality. As a result, nonstandard employment will likely increase over time as workers demand flexible work
schedules and employer demand for nonstandard employment services
increases.
Directions for Future Research
Scholarship on nonstandard employment to date has focused primarily on identifying nonstandard workers by their characteristics and
motives for engaging in this type of employment arrangement and why
this type of employment has grown. Recent research has begun to outline the deficiencies of current public policies in achieving the goal of
protecting these workers by providing them with the same safety net
available to regular full-time employees. The next phase of research
will have to answer the question “What can be done?” Much of the
challenge of this research is that it must transcend traditional disciplines
and employ an interdisciplinary approach. Four topics worthy of further
research are discussed below.
First, the excellent economy of the latter 1990s masked considerable inequalities in the U.S. labor force. With the onset of recession in
2001, health insurance coverage and pension coverage have emerged as
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areas of concern. As health insurance costs continue to climb, coverage
for workers in nonstandard employment will become more difficult to
secure. Shoring up the existing Social Security program will become
more important as the labor force ages. In both these cases research
should be done that specifically focuses on older workers in contingent
or nonstandard work arrangements. In particular, to what extent was
reemployment in contingent work necessary for the older retirees who
lost considerable sums in the equities markets? How will the lack of
health insurance coverage impact the health of older workers in these
types of employment?
Second, recessionary periods always refocus attention on the social
safety—in particular, the unemployment insurance system. The UI system is rife with inequality and fails to provide the security that many
workers need. Policy research about the design of a system that better
serves a more dynamic and mobile labor force than the one the current
system was created to serve is much needed.
Third, casual empiricism indicates that few contingent workers are
eligible for FMLA benefits. However, to understand the factors determining need, the Commission on Family and Medical Leave (1996)
recommends “additional research should be done to assess the impact
of family leave policies (both those required by the FMLA and those
voluntarily provided) on temporary, part-time and contract workers.”
Finally, as this chapter has repeatedly noted, eligibility criteria
determine who is covered under a specific law. Since the Fair Labor
Standards Act does not cover the self-employed, there is an increasingly large group of workers who are not protected by this act and its
provision for overtime pay. Other workers are not covered by minimum
wage laws for similar reasons. One promising area of research is to
investigate how well the Fair Labor Standards Act is operating. Are
workers being misclassified as independent contractors to avoid payroll
taxes? Have workers used nonstandard employment to lower their experience ratings on social insurance?
Workers in the United States have come to expect certain characteristics in a “good” job: reasonable wages, health and pension coverage, and government policies that protect them from the volatility of
the market (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). Unfortunately, many
workers in nonstandard employment cannot expect any of these. Wages
are typically below those of their full-time counterparts, pension and
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health insurance coverage are limited, and government policies have
not kept pace with these changes in the workforce.
The four main criteria used in this analysis—economic efficiency,
equity, security, and liberty—demonstrate very clearly the inadequacy
of much of our safety net for contingent workers. The irony is that many
of the policies that are inequitable (those that deny coverage to many
contingent workers while covering the full-time labor force) are also
those that would provide much-needed security to the contingent workforce. In essence, the workers who most need protection from the vicissitudes of the market are denied coverage. Extending coverage to contingent workers will likely cost more, but not disproportionately, so that
making most of these extensions in coverage is relatively efficient.
It is the issue of liberty around which much of the debate centers.
The legitimate role of government to intervene is hotly contested and
will be the battleground for this issue for years to come. Future research on expanding the safety net for those in need will help determine
how the characteristics of “good jobs” can be extended to nonstandard
employment. But research alone will not make political decisions to
extend the legitimate role of government. A deeper understanding of
government’s role coupled with political pressure remains the catalyst
for that type of change.

Notes
1. Typically, an employer must have at least 20 employees and offer a health insurance plan. COBRA allows continued coverage only for those who would be losing coverage for certain reasons such as the loss of a job, the reduction in hours
of work, the death or divorce of a parent or spouse, or the change in status as
dependent.
2. For a more general discussion of the role of professional part-time employees,
see Lawrence and Corwin (2003).
3. Monetary eligibility is determined by state requirements. It is a measure of
whether a worker earned enough to qualify for the state’s minimum benefit.
4. While the FMLA is not likely to provide much benefit to workers in contingent and nonstandard employment arrangements, this should not be considered a
wholesale criticism of the policy. There is considerable evidence that the policy
provides real benefits to those 50 percent of full-time workers covered by the
policy in small firms and the 95 percent of full-time workers covered by the
policy in large firms (Waldfogel 1999). However, the use of the FMLA leave
has been fairly modest. About 1.2 percent of all employees took leave under
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5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

the provisions of the FMLA between its enactment and 1999 (see Cantor et al.
2001). Those who needed leave but did not take leave represent 3.4 percent of the
sample. When asked, employees consistently remark that this low level of usage
is brought about by the lack of paid leave. Of those who needed leave for a birth
or illness in the family, fully 63.9 percent of respondents claimed they “cannot
afford the accompanying loss of wages” (Cantor et al. 2001).
Alaska ($7.15); California ($6.75); Connecticut ($7.10); Delaware ($6.15); Hawaii ($6.25); Maine ($6.25); Massachusetts ($6.75); Oregon ($6.90); Rhode Island ($6.15); Vermont ($6.25); Washington ($7.01).
Wage and salary independent contractors are paid on a regular basis with a wage
or salary instead of by the task.
From 1981 until 1990, the nominal value of the minimum wage remained constant at $3.35, while its real value shrank due to inflation. Phased increases in
the minimum wage from 1995 through 1997 have done little to restore it to its
pre-1980 levels.
There is considerable evidence that the employment disincentives have been
overstated by previous research (see, for example, Card and Kreuger 1995).
The only way to reform these types of policies is to generalize and make portable
a fund for both UI and FMLA. In this way workers make contributions to the UI
and FMLA funds. Once sufficient payments have been made, a worker may draw
them down. This eliminates eligibility requirements and long-term employment
relationships necessary for eligibility without eliminating the work requirement
of the policy.
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Temporary clerical workers. Computer programmers on short-term
contracts. Manual laborers hired by the day, part-time store clerks, middle managers on loan from related firms. The work they do is different,
but all have something important in common: they are hiseishain, or
nonregular workers, and by label at least they are non-core employees,
handicapped in their ability to take advantage of Japan’s strong internal labor markets. They are less likely than co-workers with the status
of regular employees to have access to the career ladders and relative
employment security that are often referred to as Japan’s “lifetime employment system.”1
According to a Japanese government survey, in July 2005 the country had an estimated 16.5 million nonregular workers in a workforce
that includes about 50 million employees nationwide (Japanese Statistics Bureau 2005). Nonregular workers thus represent nearly one-third
of the nation’s employees. Their ranks have been rapidly growing over
the past few years, while the number of regular employees has declined.
Figure 7.1 illustrates how the percentage of Japanese employees with
nonregular status has climbed as companies have turned to nontraditional employment arrangements in their struggle to deal with years
of economic malaise.2 Since the early 1990s, a sustainable recovery
has seemed elusive. Throughout 2005 there were several positive signs,
including the first rise in real estate prices in 15 years, an impressive
stock market index rise of around 40 percent, and indications of an
impending end to years of continued deflation. Many analysts are
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Figure 7.1 Changes in the Number
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optimistic that this time an end to years of misery is in sight, especially
since there has been considerable restructuring in many areas (Fackler
2006; Reuters, Bloomberg News 2005). Because of the economy, many
companies have been forced to merge, restructure, and reduce the number of employees through attrition, early retirement programs, or layoffs. Affected companies have also limited the number of new regular
employees hired, and many workers, both young and midcareer, found
themselves joining the ranks of the shadow workforce.
Who are these people? In this chapter we look at contingent work
in Japan and discuss the various types of workers that make up the
nonregular category of employees. Government statistics on nonregular
workers provide a good starting point for exploring this issue. Although
the terms nonregular employee and contingent worker are far from synonymous, these statistics are particularly helpful in understanding the
situation because employers themselves classify the workers as regular
or nonregular.3 We use demographic and industry data to identify the
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kinds of people employed in nonregular positions, the kind of work
they do, and where they work.
In the second section, we focus on the largest group of contingent
workers—part-time workers—and the group of workers expected to
grow the most rapidly—workers dispatched by temporary employment
agencies. From a policymaking perspective, the growth of contingent
employment raises an important issue: whether becoming a contingent
worker is a voluntary or involuntary decision. Are workers choosing
these jobs because they find them appealing for some reason, or do they
fall into them because they have few other options? To what extent are
organizational needs and worker desires behind the growth in nonregular employment? To evaluate this, we review the results of government
surveys of employers and employees. An important part of this issue is
the effect of nonregular employment on workers, and we look briefly
at some of the implications of such arrangements. We conclude with a
discussion of recent social and regulatory trends that may affect growth
in contingent work arrangements in the future and provide suggestions
for future research.

Core and Contingent Workers: Categories
and Demographics
To understand the position of core and contingent workers, it is useful to first discuss the terminology. In Japan, the majority of workers are
hired as seishain, which is frequently translated as “regular employees”
or “lifetime employees.” This group of full-time employees works with
the understanding that, barring serious misconduct or severe organizational problems, they will have jobs until retirement; in this chapter
we refer to them as regular or core employees. Those outside this category are called nonregular or noncore employees. In general, regular
employees have greater access to training, promotion tracks and associated pay raises, pensions and other forms of social insurance, as
well as greater job security. However, it is important to note that these
core employees will not all remain in their firms until their mid-sixties,
and many nonregular workers form long-term ties to the organizations
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where they work. Consequently, these categories are not as mutually
exclusive as they may appear.
To investigate where the changes in nonregular employment are the
most pronounced, we use the results of the Japanese Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare’s (MHLW’s) Comprehensive Survey on Diversification Employment Forms.4 This survey provides information on employment status based on industry, place of employment, gender, and
firm size in 1999 and 2003; these are summarized in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
Because of changes in classification, comparison with earlier editions
of the study are difficult; only data for 2003 are presented in Table 7.2.
As shown in the Table 7.1, in 2003 the vast majority of Japanese
(65.4 percent) were classified as regular employees. In this chapter we
focus on the remaining 34.6 percent who are nonregular employees.
They have been divided into seven major categories: transferred workers, reemployed seniors, workers dispatched by temporary employment
agencies, part-timers, temporary and day workers, contract workers,
and other nonregular workers, an ad hoc category that is not discussed
in detail here.
Transferred Workers
The first group of nonregular employees provides some insight into
Japanese personnel systems: shukko shain, or “transferred workers”
who are on loan from another organization, usually one with close ties,
like a parent firm, main bank, or sister subsidiary. While there are various reasons why a worker might be transferred, one increasingly common personnel practice is to transfer older workers who have reached
a career plateau to smaller, related firms (Sato 1997). Initially, these
workers remain part of their original firms and are paid at their current salary rates, and their pay is often subsidized or provided by their
original organizations. However, after two to five years they may be
asked to officially join the new firm. If they do, they are no longer classified as transferred employees but rather would be considered regular
employees of the new firm. Salaries at the new organization are often
lower, but one advantage for individuals is that they may be able to
work longer. This practice also can provide value for the new firm if it
lacks experienced managerial personnel and is able to acquire them in
this way. Transferred workers generally work full time. Although they
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Table 7.1 Regular and Nonregular Employment Forms, by Sex and Establishment Size (%)
Total
regular

Nonregular employees
Total

Transfer

Temporary

Contract

Dispatched

Part-time

Other

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

Total

72.5

65.4

27.5

34.6

1.3

1.5

1.8

0.8

2.3

2.3

1.1

2.0

14.5

23.0

6.5

4.8

Male

85.1

80.0

14.9

20.0

1.8

2.2

1.8

0.9

2.1

1.9

0.6

1.0

5.2

9.6

3.4

4.4

Female

53.0

44.4

47.0

55.6

0.4

0.6

2.0

0.8

2.6

2.9

1.8

3.4

28.9

42.5

11.3

5.5

Sex

Establishment size
74.9

81.0

25.1

19.0

1.0

1.8

0.4

0.2

2.7

2.4

2.0

3.7

14.1

7.4

4.9

3.4

500–999

75.7

73.8

24.3

26.2

2.0

2.9

0.9

0.4

1.7

3.4

1.1

3.9

12.3

11.1

6.4

4.5

300–499

69.1

69.1

30.9

30.9

2.5

1.9

6.7

0.2

3.3

2.8

1.1

2.6

12.1

18.1

5.2

5.4

100–299

73.4

68.6

26.6

31.4

1.9

1.5

0.7

0.3

2.8

3.1

0.9

2.3

13.8

18.5

6.5

5.6

50–29

69.8

63.9

30.2

36.1

1.5

2.0

2.2

0.6

1.7

2.5

0.7

2.6

14.9

23.6

9.3

4.7

30–49

74.6

63.4

25.4

36.6

0.7

1.4

1.8

0.7

2.2

2.2

0.5

1.5

13.4

26.1

6.9

4.8

5–29

70.2

62.1

29.8

37.9

0.5

1.2

2.6

1.3

1.8

1.9

0.4

1.2

17.3

27.5

7.2

4.8

Note: In 2003, the part-time worker category does not include pseudo-part-timers (those who are on part-time career paths but work over
35 hours a week). In 1999, such workers accounted for 5.8 percent.
Source: MHLW Comprehensive Survey on Diversification of Employment Forms, 1999, 2003.
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Regular
Industry
Construction
Manufacturing
Utilities
Transportation
Wholesale/retail
Finance/insurance
Real estate
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Restaurant/hotel
Medical/welfare
Education
Complex service
Service
Workplace
Office
Factory
R&D lab
Branch
Sale outlet
Other

Nonregular Transferred

Reemployed
seniors
Dispatched

Contract

Temporary
& day

Part-time

Other

85.6
76.7
91.2
77.3
54.7
78.3
64.1

14.4
23.3
8.8
22.7
45.3
21.7
35.9

1.8
1.7
1.1
1.5
0.8
1.4
5.0

1.6
1.5
2.0
2.2
0.8
1.6
5.2

1.0
2.0
0.8
1.6
1.4
8.7
2.0

1.9
1.4
2.2
3.2
1.4
2.2
4.8

0.8
0.3
0.0
0.7
0.7
0.0
0.5

2.5
12.7
1.6
10.8
37.3
6.2
15.5

4.8
3.8
1.1
2.7
3.0
1.6
3.0

29.1
70.2
60.8
79.8
58.7

70.9
29.8
39.2
20.2
41.3

0.4
1.5
0.4
0.6
2.6

0.6
1.3
1.7
1.0
2.3

0.5
0.8
2.0
0.7
2.2

2.0
2.8
10.3
1.9
3.5

0.5
0.2
0.3
1.1
2.8

62.8
20.7
21.7
7.9
23.6

4.1
2.4
2.8
7.0
4.4

74.7
73.8
82.9
73.1
35.2
66.7

25.3
26.2
17.1
26.9
64.8
33.3

2.3
1.6
3.4
1.7
0.3
1.3

1.9
1.4
0.7
1.6
0.4
1.5

2.9
1.9
5.7
2.2
0.7
1.3

2.8
1.1
3.0
3.8
1.1
4.1

1.4
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.8
0.8

10.7
15.9
3.7
14.7
57.8
20.7

3.3
3.9
0.4
2.7
3.7
3.5

SOURCE: MHLW Comprehensive Survey on Diversification of Employment Forms, 1999, 2003.
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Table 7.2 Regular and Nonregular Workers, by Industry and Workplace (percent of employed workers), 2003
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are not labeled as regular staff during this period, they are clearly still
participants in the lifetime employment system and tend to be covered
by social insurance and pension policies.
While this system has been gaining in legitimacy, the number of
workers on loan at any given time is fairly low. As shown in Tables
7.1 and 7.2, transferred workers are more likely to be older males, and
they are most strongly represented in the real estate industry. However,
growth in this type of employment has been limited in recent years.
Transferred workers made up only 1.5 percent of employees in 2003,
similar to the percentage reported in 1999 and previous years. Such
workers made up only 2.9 percent of employees in midsize firms with
300–500 employees, where they were most strongly represented. It is
important to recognize, however, that workers no longer fall into this
category if they have officially become regular employees of their new
firms, so this measure includes only those currently “on loan.”
Reemployed seniors
The second group of nonregular employees is older workers
nearing the end of their careers. Shokutaku, reemployed seniors, is a
group of older workers who generally have either resigned or retired
from positions as regular employees. Most Japanese companies
have mandatory retirement, usually at age 60 or 65.5 However, many
companies find that they can still use senior citizens’ knowledge and
skills. Employees, too, may wish to work longer for personal fulfillment
or financial reasons. As a result, many companies are rehiring retired
senior citizens as nonregular employees, often with different work
responsibilities, conditions, and compensation packages. This approach,
while likely to grow in importance as the workforce ages, is relatively
new, so data were not collected on this group as part of the Survey on
Diversification of Employment Forms until 2003. As Table 7.2 indicates,
these workers are most concentrated in real estate, where they represent
already 5.2 percent of industry workers. They also represent 2.2 percent
of employees in the transportation industry and around 1.5 percent
of employees in the construction, manufacturing, finance, medical,
and education fields. Reemployed seniors are most likely to be found
working in offices, where they make up about 2 percent of workers,
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or factories and branches, where they make up about 1.5 percent. Few
work in sales or research and development.
Because of the falling birthrate, the number of young people entering
the workforce has been declining over the years. Reemploying seniors
is one way to deal with the challenges of an aging workforce, so this
category of nonregular employees should be closely watched.
Temporary and Day Workers
While the number of reemployed seniors seems poised to grow, the
situation for the next category of nonregular workers is unclear—the
numbers of temporary and day workers have been shrinking, but they
may grow if the economy does. Approximately 2.8 percent of workers in service industries and 0.8 percent of those in the construction
industry are classified by their employers as temporary or day workers (Table 7.2). Temporary workers are those with work agreements
extending between one month and one year; day workers have been
hired for a period of less than one month. Many, however, are regularly
“rehired” under such agreements and may enjoy more employment security than this implies, particularly when the economy is strong. The
current percentages, particularly in the construction industry, are much
lower than in previous, more prosperous times.
In fact, employees in this category made up just 0.8 percent of the
country’s total workforce in 2003, as shown in Table 7.2. This is a drop
from the 1.8 percent estimated for 1999, which again is lower than in
previous surveys. While currently small, the number of workers in this
category, particularly in construction, may rise if economic recovery
continues strong.
Contract Workers
Contract workers, whose employment agreements have specific
rather than open-ended time limits, made up 2.3 percent of all employees in both 1999 and 2003, as shown in Table 7.1. Both genders are
represented: 1.9 percent of Japanese male workers and 2.9 percent of
female workers were employed on a contract basis in 2003. Foreign
workers and computer specialists are among those often hired on a renewable contract basis. Of all the categories of employment in Japan,
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this one most closely resembles the short-term consulting or projectbased hiring that has become a regular practice in some U.S. businesses
as firms have sought to downsize, only to discover that they still occasionally need the skills of their former employees. However, contract
workers in Japan are not necessarily former employees. The similarity
is due to the fact that they are hired for their skills for limited periods
which may be extended if the need continues.
Contract workers are most likely to be found in the education field,
where they made up 10.3 percent of all employees, or in real estate or
services, where around 5 percent of employees were hired under such
contracts. They are most often found working in branches, labs, or
offices (Table 7.2). Another group of workers that are hired under timelimited contracts are those who are dispatched by agencies.
Workers Dispatched by Temporary Employment Agencies
Although there were some firms that specialized in locating contract
employees, temporary employment agencies were officially prohibited
until 1985. This prohibition was at least partially because of Japan’s
history of limiting the activities of temporary agencies to encourage
long-term employment relationships between employers and employees. Even when legalized, temporary employment agencies were limited to providing staff for a few types of white-collar positions, such as
computer programming or secretarial work.
Workers dispatched by temporary employment agencies represented a mere 2.0 percent of all employees in Japan in 2003, as shown in
Table 7.1, but this is up from just 0.07 percent in 1994 and 1.1 percent
in 1999. This category has strong potential for continued growth due
to regulatory changes. In 1985 the Japanese government instituted new
regulations that opened the way for the expanded use of temporary employment agencies and gradually increased the number of occupations
for which agencies were allowed to provide workers to 26 by 1996. In
1999, the government further expanded the industries and occupations
that could be staffed by temporary workers to include all except port
transportation (longshoremen), construction, security services, and others so designated by the government. More regulatory changes came
into effect in 2004, when the length of time dispatched employees could
be used for a position was increased from one year to three.6 The new
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policy direction was chosen in the hopes of opening up new options for
skilled women and older men seeking employment.7
Dispatched workers are most concentrated in the finance sector. Table 7.2 shows that they made up 8.7 percent of workers in that industry
in 2003, a jump from the 3.6 percent reported in a similar survey done
in 1994. With the use of dispatched workers recently made legal in most
jobs, continued growth can be expected and additional study is needed.
The attention that dispatched workers have already received from researchers and policymakers is rivaled only by employees in one other
nonregular category, part-time workers.
Part-Time Workers
By far the largest group of nonregular workers is composed of
part-time workers. As shown in Table 7.1, 23.0 percent of all Japanese
employees were hired as part-timers in 2003, up from 14.5 percent in
1999. While nearly 10 percent of male employees were part-timers in
2003, 42.5 percent of female workers fell into this category, nearly equaling the 44.4 percent of women who were hired as regular employees.
As shown in Table 7.2, 62.8 percent of employees in the restaurant
and hotel industry were part-timers in 2003, as were 37.3 percent of
employees in the wholesale and retail field, and just over 20 percent of
workers in the medical and education areas. Even in factories, nearly 16
percent of workers are part-timers.
Although the data are somewhat older, one of the best sources of
information on this group of workers is the 2001 MHLW Survey on
Part-Time Workers. That study found that there were approximately
11.2 million part-time workers, representing 26.1 percent of all employees and about three-quarters of all nonregular workers. The difference
in percentages reflects a difference in the definition of part-timers.
While the Comprehensive Survey on Diversification of Employment
Forms includes only workers who work shorter hours, the MHLW study
includes giji-paato, or what we refer to in this paper as “pseudo-parttimers,” workers who are officially hired by their companies as nonregular workers and classified as “part-timers” but who actually work
over 35 hours a week. The study found that approximately 14.9 percent
of the country’s part-time workers are “other part-timers,” a broad classification that comprises pseudo-part-timers and several different types
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of nonregular employees, such as seasonal workers at auto factories.
In Japan, then, there are two different types of part-time workers—
those who work shorter hours, and those who have been labeled parttimers as a way of showing that they are not regular “lifetime” employees. In the United States, the determination of part-time employment is
based solely on hours of work. In Japan, on the other hand, the identification of an employee as part-time is a description of a career path and
the human resource (HR) practices that accompany it. The part-time label in Japan is similar to the American idea of a “mommy track” career
option for women. In the United States, the idea of a “mommy track”
first gained popularity in prestigious law firms where female lawyers
wished to reduce their weekly work hours from the 70-plus often required at junior levels to a more reasonable 35 to 45 hours, giving them
more time for their families. While a 40-hour week is not part-time, it
involves working fewer hours than more career-focused colleagues at
such firms. In Japan, the situation involving part-time workers is often
similar.
Many Japanese organizations have developed “part-time” positions
largely as a way to hire women in their thirties and older who wish to
combine work with caring for their families. These nonregular workers
vary in the degree to which their positions are truly contingent. Some
have low-skill, short-term, dead-end jobs, but others may do skilled
work for the same organization for years. They often perform the same
tasks as regular employees and work alongside them. While some organizations are experimenting with career paths specifically for part-timers or allowing workers to switch from part-time to regular employee
status, one problem for motivated “part-time” workers is that they are
less likely to have access to the same career options as regular workers.
They also tend to have lower hourly wages, something we will discuss
in greater detail later in the chapter.
Differences in education also provide some insights into wage differentials. Table 7.3 indicates that 59.8 percent of workers with only
a junior high education are in contingent work arrangements, while
only 17.1 percent of university graduates are in such arrangements. Just
under 40 percent of workers with a high school or technical school education are in contingent work, along with just over 30 percent of junior
college graduates.8
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Table 7.3 Employed Workers with Regular and Alternative Work
Arrangements, by Educational Attainment (percentage of
graduates), 2003

Regular employees
Nonregular employees
Transferred
Reemployed seniors
Temporary
Contract
Dispatched
Part-time
Other

Junior
high

High
school

40.2
59.8
1.4
6.9
2.3
3.4
1.5
34.2
10.1

61.2
38.8
1.5
1.7
1.0
2.0
1.6
27.6
3.9

Technical Junior
school
college University
62.0
38.0
1.1
1.0
0.3
4.3
2.9
23.8
4.4

68.2
31.8
0.8
0.5
0.2
2.5
3.7
21.2
2.9

82.9
17.1
2.5
1.0
0.4
2.6
1.9
7.1
1.6

NOTE: Figures indicate percentage of workers at each level of schooling whose jobs
fall into the employee category.
Source: MHLW (2005).

Dramatic growth in the percentage of employees with part-time status can be seen in nearly every industry and type of workplace. Because
they represent the fastest-growing category as well as the majority of
nonregular workers, we will explore the conditions and motivations of
workers classified as part-timers in greater detail.
Nonregular Employment: A Summary
While nonregular employment may not be strictly viewed as contingent, workers in this category in general enjoy less job security and
are less likely to be considered for training and promotion opportunities. As nonregular employees, they would rarely be considered for
middle- or upper-level management positions in larger organizations.
Although there are slight differences in the findings of various government surveys, it is clear that the number of nonregular workers is increasing in Japan. This trend is important since more than one-third of
the country’s workforce already falls into the nonregular category.
We have discussed all of the categories generally included in nonregular employment. We will now turn our focus to the largest group,
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part-time workers, and the group most likely to show strong growth in
the future: employees dispatched by temporary employment agencies.
Because these two groups have been studied more extensively than other nonregular workers, there are more data available about them.

Why Contingent Employment Arrangements?
The two groups on which we have chosen to focus have one important thing in common: they both are predominantly female. According
to the Japanese Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts
and Telecommunications (MPHPT) Labour Force Survey, in 2001 7.1
million of Japan’s 7.7 million part-timers were female (92 percent), and
women make up the majority of dispatched employees as well (MPHPT
2003). Currently, well over half of all working women fit into one of
these two categories, a marked contrast to 1960, when just 5.9 percent
of working women were classified as part-timers and worker dispatching was not permitted. Over subsequent years the percentage of female
employees who are classified as part-timers has gradually risen, passing the 20 percent mark in the early 1980s, the 30 percent mark in the
early 1990s, and the 50 percent mark early in the new century (Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2002, 2005). During that time, the percentage of
self-employed women and those working in the fields or family enterprises also has declined. As women have moved into the corporate
world, part-time employment and dispatching agencies have emerged
as routes to jobs for those who have quit regular employment to focus
on family. In this next section we will look at why employers and workers are choosing nonregular employment arrangements and some of the
broader implications.
Nonregular Employment: The Employer Perspective
Firms in the United States have found that the potential benefits
of using contingent workers include reducing wage and benefit costs,
saving money on training by employing already trained employees, and
flexibility in adjusting the size of the workforce to changing economic conditions. A common strategy is to keep core competencies in the

Gleason.indb 215

11/13/2006 9:06:57 AM

216 Ozeki and Wakisaka

hands of more permanent core employees, with temporary workers doing more simple and/or peripheral work and serving as buffers against
changing circumstances and needs.9 Japanese employers apparently
have found similar benefits in hiring nonregular employees.
As part of the General Survey on Part-Time Workers, the MHLW
surveyed both employers and employees on their reasons for choosing
this employment arrangement, analyzing the responses separately for
part-timers working less than 35 hours a week and for those hired on
part-time or other nonregular career tracks (pseudo/other part-timers)
but working essentially full-time hours. The results are summarized in
Tables 7.4 and 7.5.
Employers were allowed to choose all applicable reasons for hiring
part-time workers. As might be expected, the leading reason given for
hiring part-timers in all cases was reducing personnel expenses, chosen by 65.3 percent of employers in 2001 (see Table 7.4). While this
was also the leading response in 1995, at that time it was selected by
only 38.3 percent of employers as a reason for hiring part-timers, and
29.3 percent as a reason for hiring pseudo-part-timers. Also among the
top four reasons for hiring part-time workers in 2001 were coping with
peak demand periods on an annual (39.2 percent) and daily (27.3 percent) basis, and the fact that work tasks were easy (31.4 percent). While
increased work volume was also a popular response in 1995, only 17.1
percent of employers cited it as a reason for hiring part-timers in 2001,
about the same number who said that it was easy to hire such workers, and that such arrangements lead to easier employment adjustments
when work volume declines.
The 1995 survey asked employers to consider separately their reasons for hiring “true” and “other” part-timers. Overall they were similar,
but some differences did emerge. Respondents were much more likely
to say that they had hired pseudo- and other part-timers because they
wanted workers with skills, knowledge, and experience, and because
this was viewed as a useful mechanism for rehiring women who had
previously left the organization, presumably to care for their families.
They were much less likely to say that such workers were easy to hire,
that their tasks were easy, or that they were hired to help cope with annual peaks in demand.
Perhaps almost as interesting as looking at the reasons employers
gave for hiring workers as part-timers are the reasons they did not. In
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Table 7.4 Employer Perspective: Reasons for Hiring Nonregular
Employees (percentage of employers who agreed)
Part-timers
1995
2001
Increased work volume
Difficult to hire new graduates as regular
employees
Easy to hire such workers
Cope with peak demand periods each day
Cope with peak demand periods on an
annual basis
To hire workers with experience, skills,
and knowledge
The tasks involved are easy
To reduce personnel expenses
Easier to make employment adjustments
when work volume declines
Way of rehiring or extending the work years
of older workers
Useful to rehire women who have previously
left the organization
Other

Pseudo/other
part-timersa
1995

29.8
10.7

17.1
5.8

26.8
9.1

19.9
9.3
37.3

17.8
27.3
39.2

9.8
10.7
9.2

13.2

12.2

21.1

35.7
38.3
12.4

31.4
65.3
16.4

19.0
29.3
12.8

4.4

7.3

3.6

5.8

5.1

20.9

9.0

6.5

16.8

NOTE: Figures given indicate the percentage of responding employers who checked
each reason given for hiring such workers. Figures are totals for all industries; multiple responses were permitted.
a
Pseudo-part-timers are those who are classified as part-time workers by their employers but who actually work over 35 hours per week. Other part-timers are those who
have been included in this category because they are not regular employees but generally do not work shorter than normal hours (e.g., seasonal factory workers).
Source: MHLW (2002).

2001 a mere 7.3 percent mentioned using this as a means to extend
the employment of older workers, and only 5.8 percent said that they
had hired part-timers because it was difficult to hire fresh graduates as
regular employees.
In summary, employers preferred to hire workers under a part-time
arrangement because it reduced costs and provided labor force flexibil-
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Table 7.5 Employee Perspective: Reasons Women Work as Nonregular
Employees (percentage of workers who agreed)
Pseudo/other
Part-timers
part-timersa
1995 2001
1995 2001
The hours are a convenient fit with my
55.8 50.9
23.0 21.0
daily schedule
Shorter hours
27.9 34.2
10.5 12.2
Good pay and conditions
7.7
7.4
11.2 12.7
Interesting work
18.0 21.7
23.6 25.0
Easy to quit
7.8
5.6
6.1
3.7
Could not find a full-time position
14.3 20.8
33.0 37.6
Cannot work full time due to household
19.8 18.3
8.9
9.0
responsibilities
Cannot work full time due to elder/invalid
2.0
2.2
2.0
1.3
care responsibilities
Cannot work full time due to personal
5.9
4.7
5.9
2.9
health problems
Because my friends and acquaintances are
6.8
5.5
6.8
2.8
part-timers
Other
8.3
9.2
8.3 20.1
NOTE: Figures given indicate the percentage of responding female employees who
checked each reason given for taking a “part-time” position. Figures are totals for all
industries and demographic groups; multiple responses were permitted.
a
Pseudo-part-timers are those who are classified as part-time workers by their employers, but who actually work over 35 hours per week. Other part-timers are those who
have been included in this category because they are not regular employees, but generally do not work shorter than normal hours (e.g., seasonal factory workers).
Source: MHLW (2002).

ity. In the case of pseudo- and other part-timers, the firms hired these
workers in part because of their skills and knowledge, often obtained
through previous regular employment. Employers did not indicate they
were hiring part-timers because they were unable to recruit regular employees; instead, they appreciated the benefits of hiring workers under
nonregular agreements.
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Why Nonregular Work? The Employee Perspective
If economic benefits are the primary reason for employers to hire
nonregular employees, what is the appeal for the workers themselves?
The same study sheds some light on the issue. As shown in Table 7.5,
in 2001 only 7.4 percent of true female part-time workers cited good
pay and conditions as a reason they chose to take on their jobs. Only 5.6
percent of the surveyed women cited ease of quitting. The most popular
responses were that the hours were convenient given their daily routine
(50.9 percent) and the shorter working hours (34.2 percent). About onefifth cited interesting work and the need to handle household responsibilities as reasons for taking a part-time position. Almost 21 percent in
2001 said they did so because they could not find a full-time position;
14.3 percent gave that response in 1995.
As might be expected, there were differences between the reasons
given by true part-timers and those who are merely labeled as such.
The leading reason pseudo- and other part-timers were in such a position: they could not find a full-time job as a regular employee. A lack
of regular employment options was cited by 37.6 percent of such parttimers in 2001, up from 33.0 percent in 1995. On a more positive note,
25 percent gave interesting work as a reason for choosing their position, while about one-fifth noted that their work hours were convenient.
Pseudo- and other part-timers were slightly more enthusiastic about the
economic benefits of their jobs than their truly part-time colleagues:
12.7 percent noted that the pay and conditions were good. As might be
expected, given that these employees worked over 35 hours a week, the
inability to work full-time was not a major factor; however, 12.2 percent cited shorter hours as a reason for taking such a position.
A separate survey conducted in 2003 provides information on the
motivation of part-time and dispatched employees of both sexes (MHLW
2005). The responses of male part-timers were similar to their female
counterparts, as shown in Table 7.6. The leading reason for taking a
part-time position, mentioned by almost 50 percent, was convenient
hours. About one-fourth gave shorter hours and the need to supplement
family income as reasons for taking their part-time jobs, and about onefifth cited convenient fit with family or personal activities and a shorter
commute. Over one-fourth of the part-time men could not find a position as a regular full-time employee. The main differences between the
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Table 7.6 Reasons for Choosing Nonregular Jobs, 2003 (percentage of
employees choosing each option, multiple responses allowed)
Part-timers
Male
Female
Utilize qualification or skill
More money
Could not find work as a regular
employee
Dislike restrictions by firms
Shorter hours
Convenient hours
To qualify for income-related tax
or social insurance benefits
Easy tasks and less responsibility
Supplement household income
Compatible with family or other
activity
Shorter commute
Health
Earn personal spending money
Other

Dispatched workers
Male
Female

11.9
6.8

9.0
7.0

35.4
20.4

17.8
14.6

26.8
11.5
23.3
45.4

20.5
6.7
29.9
37.6

42.0
16.4
4.9
8.6

39.6
24.6
17.0
16.7

4.3
11.9
23.4

13.9
10.6
46.0

1.6
6.1
5.9

5.7
6.3
17.7

17.9
18.5
2.5
30.7
0.5

27.3
36.0
6.2
27.4
1.9

10.2
12.1
2.1
10.8
6.7

26.6
15.7
2.9
18.1
3.8

Source: MHLW (2005).

responses of male and female part-timers in this survey is that women
were slightly more enthusiastic about work schedules that would allow
them to balance their work and family lives, as well as somewhat less
likely to have been unable to find a job as a regular employee.
The inability to secure a position as a regular employee was one of
the leading reasons both men and women chose to become dispatched
workers, cited by 39.6 percent of women and 42 percent of men. Nearly
one-fifth of female dispatched workers also cited family needs or the
ability to use special qualifications or skills as a reason for taking a nonregular position or reported disliking restrictions at regular jobs. Financially, too, some dispatched workers feel they have an advantage over
employees in “regular” positions: more money was given as a reason by
20.4 percent of men and 14.6 percent of women. While some men also
referred to a dislike for company restrictions on regular workers (16.4
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percent), male dispatched workers were much less likely than women
to have such feelings or to be motivated by shorter, more convenient
hours, shorter commutes, or the notion that a nonregular position was
compatible with family or other activities.
To summarize, convenient hours that mesh well with personal
schedules are one of the main reasons many nonregular employees, particularly women, have taken such positions. Shorter, convenient hours
appear to provide a strong attraction for women in truly part-time positions, and even a fair number of dispatched workers appreciate this
aspect of their work. On the other hand, high proportions of both men
and women working as dispatched employees or pseudo/other part-timers reported that they had tried and failed to find positions as regular
employees. For men, good pay or the ability to use skills often were
reasons for choosing their work.

Institutional Influences
Several institutional characteristics influence the labor market
choices made by Japanese women and the staffing decisions made by
Japanese employers.
Factors Affecting Women’s Choices
Some workers seek shorter hours because they need to combine employment with household responsibilities. Their decision is reinforced
by the expectations placed on employees in the lifetime employment
system and the income tax system.
The benefits of being a regular employee are many in Japan: beyond
a high degree of job security, career-track employees have traditionally
gained through predictable salaries designed to match life-cycle needs.
As regular employees’ skills (and often family responsibilities) grow, so
does their income. On the downside, however, Japanese companies require regular employees to work long hours, socialize with co-workers
and customers in the evenings, attend company sporting events on the
weekends, and relocate whenever and wherever requested. The dedication required can make it difficult for regular employees to contribute

Gleason.indb 221

11/13/2006 9:06:57 AM

222 Ozeki and Wakisaka

to the household in other respects since many will be away from home
from 7 in the morning until 8 or 10 at night, leaving little time to wash
the dishes or help children with homework. Thus, while the relatively
stable economic contribution of a regular employee is valuable, it is
difficult for a family to handle daily tasks if both parents work. Having
one partner who stays at home or has a less time-consuming job makes
sense for families with children or elders who require care.
Japanese personnel systems have traditionally tended to promote
men and track women into lower-paying, dead-end positions with the
often-fulfilled expectation that they will leave when they marry or have
children.10 Generally it is the wife who adjusts her employment and
handles the bulk of family responsibilities. A Japan Institute of Labour
study on occupations and family life found that most wives working
part time handled about 85 percent of household duties. Full-time work
appears to be made possible with assistance from grandparents or other
relatives, who reduce the wife’s share to 65 percent; 16 husbands contributed very little.11 Thus, demands that regular employees work long
hours and relocate when requested, combined with the need for someone to handle household tasks, is one source of institutional pressure
encouraging some women to select a nonregular employment option.
There are also direct financial inducements for married women to
choose less-lucrative employment options. The government does not
assess income taxes on the wages of a household’s second earner if
that person’s annual earnings fall below a certain threshold, currently
set at ¥1.03 million (about $8,650), although due to tax deductions the
actual level at which taxes are paid is generally higher.12 In addition, as
long as earnings remain below ¥1.3 million (roughly $11,000), the second earner does not have to pay national health and pension insurance
premiums, while retaining access to such benefits through the primary
earner.13 For families this means that when the second earner’s income
falls into the range just above ¥1.3 million, there is a drop in real earnings. Many companies also pay family allowances to male employees
with wives whose earnings fall below a specified level, most commonly
¥1.3 million or ¥1.03 million (about $8,650), with the amounts varying
by firm.14 Thus, Japanese wives have several incentives to keep their
earnings at a level equal to approximately $700 to $900 per month. In
fact, the 2001 MHLW General Survey on Part-Time Workers’ Conditions found that 29.1 percent of female part-timers earned between ¥.8
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and ¥.1.0 million, and that 26.7 percent adjusted their hours so that their
earnings would fall below these thresholds, with 19.4 percent of female
part-timers seeking to keep their wages below ¥1.03 million (MHLW
2002).
Incentives for Employers
Companies also have financial incentives and the need for flexible
staffing that make alternative forms of employment attractive, even if
the wages paid regular and nonregular employees are the same. Employers bear one-half of the burden of supporting social insurance plans, but
do not have to make contributions to unemployment insurance, pensions, or health insurance, and do not have to handle payroll taxes for
many part-time or temporary workers. They do not make unemployment insurance contributions for part-time employees who work less
than 20 hours per week, and get a reduction on rates for those who work
between 20 and 30 hours per week. Although they must make contributions to social insurance schemes for those labeled as part-timers
who work full-time hours, they do not pay pension or health insurance
taxes for part-timers who work less than three-quarters of the weekly
hours of regular workers.15 In the case of temporary workers, many of
these costs are paid by the agencies that dispatch them (Houseman and
Osawa 1995). Many firms also do not provide optional benefits, such
as corporate insurance, company retirement allowances, or semiannual
bonuses, to nonregular workers.
Table 7.7 shows the proportion of employers who pay social insurance premiums for all, some, or none of their part-time employees,
as well as the proportion providing retirement allowances, or bonuses.
While most provide these benefits to all regular employees, few provide
them for all part-time workers, and the difference may or may not be
reflected in the wages paid to nonregular employees. The cost savings
can be significant. Most regular Japanese employees receive bonus payments twice annually, in July and in December. Bonuses give Japanese
companies some flexibility in personnel costs; they are adjusted to reflect firm performance and are therefore lower when the company is
not doing well. In 2005, the average semiannual bonus for summer was
¥470,00 ($3,917) (MHLW 2005).
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Table 7.7  Percentage of Employers Providing Benefits for Regular and
Part-Time Employees, 2003
Regular
Part-time
Employer survey
Unemployment insurance
Health insurance
Pension insurance
Corporate insurance
Retirement allowance
Bonus
Employee survey
Unemployment insurance
Health insurance
Pension insurance
Corporate insurance
Retirement allowance
Bonus

100.0
100.0
100.0
23.0
66.1
79.3

53.2
36.0
33.1
3.1
7.3
37.4

99.4
99.6
99.3
34.0
74.7
82.4

56.4
36.3
34.7
4.3
6.0
29.2

Note: Provision of unemployment, health, and pension insurance for regular workers
is compulsory.
Source: MHLW (2005).

Another reason that nonregular employment arrangements appeal
to employers is their need for flexibility. Under the Japanese traditional
lifetime employment system, employees joined the firm when young,
worked hard for many years, and enjoyed gradual improvements in salary and position as they aged. As an organization grew, it was able to
hire ever-larger numbers of young people who were relatively inexpensive and managed by the more experienced workers. Without growth,
there was an oversupply of more expensive middle-aged workers for
the limited number of management posts available.
For much of the period following World War II, the Japanese economy grew rapidly, allowing the lifetime employment model to develop
and flourish. However, in recent years Japanese firms have found that
constant growth is not possible. Furthermore, due to the rapid aging
of Japan’s population, the average age of the Japanese workforce has
increased. The high level of uncertainty that characterized the 1990s
when even leading financial firms failed and many businesses under-
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took restructuring efforts, combined with the population demographic
trends, made more flexible employment arrangements attractive. Consequently, more temporary and part-time workers have been hired,
without the implicit understanding that they will be trained, promoted,
and given life-cycle wages.

Effects of Contingent Employment
on Employees
How does being hired as a noncore worker affect the economic
welfare of these employees? In this section, we look briefly at the differences in compensation, social insurance coverage, career options,
and legal protections. The question of whether employees voluntarily or
involuntarily choose nonregular employment is discussed. Factors that
may affect the future growth of nonregular employment are reviewed.
Compensation
The best data on wage disparities deal with part-time workers. There
is a significant difference between the average hourly wage for full- and
part-time employees. In 2004, the average hourly wage for part-time
female employees was ¥833 (roughly $7.00), less than two-thirds of
the pay received by women in full-time positions (see Figure 7.2). Parttime male employees earned more money, on average, but took home
just over half of the average pay of their full-time counterparts (see
Figure 7.3). Part-time workers of both genders earned, on average, considerably more than the Japanese minimum wage.16
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show how the difference between part- and fulltime wages has changed. In 1990, part-time women earned about 72
percent of the wages full-time women did; this declined to about 65
percent in 2004. Partly because full-time men tend to earn more than
their female counterparts, the decline of about 7 percent has been less
dramatic for part-time males.
Due to the weak economy and continued deflation, wage growth
for all types of workers in Japan has been limited. However, in general,
part-time workers who stay with their employers do see their wages rise.
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figure2 Chart 5

Figure 7.2 Wage Disparity between Part- and Full-Time Workers
(Women)
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Some 29 percent of companies who participated in the MHLW study on
part-time work reported that they had implemented periodic wage increases for their part-time workers; 31 percent offered pay raises based
on seniority and 56 percent offered semiannual bonuses to workers in
this category (MHLW 2005). Several researchers have concluded that
there is little difference in the pay raises offered to regular full-time and
part-time female employees when wage data is adjusted for tenure with
the employer and women who reduced their hours to remain under the
¥1.3 million tax benefit threshold are eliminated from consideration.17
The courts have prevented firms from taking unfair advantage of
workers by simply labeling them nonregular workers. For example, in
1996 an auto parts manufacturer was required to pay compensation to
28 female pseudo-part-time workers who were doing essentially the
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figure3 Chart 1

figure2 Chart 5

Figure 7.3 Wage Disparity between Part- and Full-Time Workers (Men)
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same work as full-time workers but were paid less. The court concluded that the guiding principle should be “same job, same pay” and that
paying part-time workers less than 80 percent of the wages earned by
full-time female employees in the same position with equal seniority is
illegal (Japan Institute of Labour 1996).
Compensation, however, involves more than pay, and there are
concerns that contingent workers may not receive important benefits.
Health insurance coverage, a major issue in the United States, is not a
problem for Japan’s nonregular employees due to the country’s national
health insurance system, which covers everyone. Occupational safety
and health coverage also is universal for all workers. However, the level
of coverage for unemployment insurance, almost universal among regular employees, stands at only 53.2 percent for part-timers (Japan Insti-
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tute of Labour 1997). Similarly, just 33.1 percent of part-time workers
are covered by the government’s mandatory pension scheme, similar to
Social Security in the United States. However, married workers whose
spouses are enrolled in these programs qualify for benefits through their
working spouses (Houseman and Osawa 1995).
Nonregular employees also may suffer from not being allowed to
participate in employer bonus or retirement allowance programs established for regular workers. Table 7.7 shows three-quarters of surveyed
employers said that all of their regular employees were involved in retirement allowance programs and 82.4 percent gave all regular employees bonuses, but only 6 percent reported offering retirement allowances
to part-timers and only 29.2 percent gave bonuses to part-timers. As
discussed earlier, those semiannual bonuses represent a relatively large
amount of money: about $8,000 for 2005.
Retirement allowances are one-time lump sum severance payments
given to workers when they leave an organization. In firms that have
such plans, the amount received is based on company policy, usually
reflecting salary, level, and years of service. Even for young female
workers the amounts can be significant, and for older workers they represent a considerable retirement resource. The average retirement allowance paid to a 60-year-old male college graduate who retires after
spending his entire working career at a single firm in clerical or technical positions and was promoted at an average rate was ¥24.35 million
(approximately $202,000) in 2005.18 Nonregular workers who do not
benefit from bonus and retirement allowance plans may be at a financial
disadvantage compared with regular workers.
To summarize, benefit coverage is not as complete for many nonregular workers as for regular workers, although the lack of medical
insurance is not a problem. Wages, on average, are lower, but those who
remain in their positions see their earnings rise at about the same pace
as regular employees with similar tenure.
Career Paths
Many part-time workers remain with the same firm for many years.
Over 40 percent have tenure of 5 years or more, and 18.1 percent have
been with their employers 10 years or more, with the average being 5.8
years. This compares to an average of 4.8 years in 1995, when only 30
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percent of part-timers had tenure of 5 years or longer. As these figures
show, average tenure is growing as part-time workers remain with the
same organization (MHLW 2002). Those who stay longer may become
quite valuable to their employers. Several researchers have made a distinction between “core” part-timers, who may handle important tasks,
including managing other part-time workers, and “supplementary” parttimers whose work tends to involve more simple, repetitive tasks and
who have little opportunity for advancement or pay increases. There are
no data that provide a good estimate of how many part-time workers fall
into the two categories. However, it is clear that some of these workers
do have opportunities for skill development and advancement, although
they do not have access to the same management-training programs
available to regular career-track employees. In the case of dispatched
workers, the main opportunities lie in improving skills to justify better assignments and pay. In addition to development through work assignments, some dispatching firms offer training programs. While some
dispatched workers are eventually hired by the firms to which they are
sent, there currently is not a strong trend toward using temporary assignments as a way to screen prospective employees, as has become
popular with some firms in the United States. However, the idea that
such a strategy may work appears to lie behind the recent changes in the
Worker Dispatching Law, and many larger companies do report having
systems for switching workers to regular employee status.
Legal Protection
Nonregular workers have the same protections that regular workers do and may not be discriminated against because of their nationality, age, or gender. Since so many nonregular workers are women, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Law passed in 1986 and strengthened
in 1999 is particularly relevant. While the first version of the law encouraged employers to “endeavor” not to discriminate against women,
the current (1999) version flatly forbids unequal treatment of male and
female workers in terms of hiring, pay, promotion, and training, in addition to requiring employers to help prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace. Part-time workers also have some legal protection under
the admittedly weak Part-Time Work Law, which states that employers
should “endeavor” to effectively utilize part-timers’ abilities and main-
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tain balance with regular workers in terms of working conditions, training, improving employee welfare, and improving employment management. The law also says that part-time workers employed continuously
for one year or more should be given advance notice when the employment contract is to be terminated (Kezuka 2000).
Employment security is one major respect in which contingent
workers are often viewed as being at a disadvantage. Japanese nonregular workers can, however, obtain employment security through
continual renewal of contracts and long tenure. In general, Japanese
employers are prohibited from abusing their right to dismiss employees, and without being able to show significant cause, it is more difficult to justify the termination of workers who have worked at a firm
for a long period of time, whether as a regular employee or through
regular renewal of employment agreements.19 However, employers are
more strictly bound in terms of their ability to dismiss regular workers
with indefinite-term contracts than they are nonregular workers with
fixed-term contracts. When economic conditions within a firm necessitate layoffs, employers have been allowed to dismiss part-time and
other such nonregular workers first, depending on the circumstances
(Kezuka 2000). Recently, however, employers seem to be choosing to
add nonregular workers rather than cut them. It is interesting to note
that, despite the economic struggles that have forced many firms to lay
off employees as part of restructuring efforts, the number of nonregular
workers continues to grow. Fewer than one in five employers gave the
ease of conducting employment adjustment as a reason for hiring nonregular employees in the survey summarized in Table 7.4. Employers
apparently are not simply seeking workers they can quickly eliminate.
They are in large part motivated by the other benefits associated with
hiring nonregular workers.
Voluntary or Involuntary Decision?
Have nonregular workers taken such jobs by choice or because they
did not have other employment options? The answers are complex.
Workers in the two major groups of nonregular employees do not have
the same benefits as core workers in terms of compensation or career
options, but it does not appear that all of these workers have low-paying, dead-end jobs. In the surveys reported earlier we noted that many
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enjoyed the shorter hours, flexibility, and in the case of male dispatched
workers, good pay. On the other hand, the less-permanent nature of
such employment agreements is bound to bother some. Indeed, in a
1999 survey 22 percent of temporary and 20 percent of other nonregular employees and dispatched workers wished to change jobs. Some
30 percent of the unhappy part-time and temporary workers cited the
casual nature of their employment as a major reason, as did 26 percent
of other nonregular workers and dispatched workers (Japan Institute of
Labour 1999b).
As several writers have noted, the relatively high job-opening-toapplicant ratio for part-timers seems to indicate that employer desires
are driving the growth in nonregular employment (Osawa and Kingston
1996; Wakisaka 1997). The same could be said of the rapid growth in
dispatched employment, which has occurred during an economic slump
that has made it more difficult for female workers, particularly, to find
positions as regular employees. However, the issue is complex. As we
have shown, there are many reasons why women with families may find
more flexible working conditions and shorter hours attractive, particularly if they are offered some opportunities for advancement and pay
increases. For some workers, nonregular employment may in fact be a
voluntary choice to support their preferred lifestyle. Others, however,
are dissatisfied with these employment arrangements and have taken
nonregular positions only because they were unable to find other work.
While this may be partly due to the poor economy, it is somewhat of
a concern that the majority of the affected workers are women. Not all
women in Japan enjoy the financial support of an employed spouse.
Divorced and widowed women and others who must earn money to
support their families need access to regular employment opportunities
that will provide them with good incomes and opportunities.
Trends That May Affect Nonregular Employment
There are a number of trends in Japan that may have an impact on
the growth in nonregular employment. The first is the rapid aging of
the country’s workforce. Birthrates have been falling for years and are
now at a record low, meaning there will be fewer young, inexpensive
recent graduates for Japanese firms to hire in the future. The fertility
rate in 2004 showed that the average Japanese woman is having just 1.3
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children in her lifetime. Given the decline in fertility, a labor shortage
is a strong possibility in the next 20 years. However, shortages have not
yet occurred due to a decade of economic malaise and Japan’s “second
baby boom generation.” The corporate restructuring and bankruptcies
related to the weak economy, however, have left many former regular
employees seeking jobs in an unwelcoming job market. Opportunities
for older workers, particularly, are limited.
The government has introduced a number of policies in response to
these trends, and some of them have implications for nonregular employment in the future. First, the government has announced the goal
of working toward a “gender-equal” society (Japan Institute of Labour
1999c). Concrete measures include the introduction of a mandatory
child care leave to care for infants up to 18 months old. The law was
recently expanded so that both male and female workers qualify for
leave. While government targets call for 80 percent of mothers and 10
percent of fathers to use the program, current rates are 73.1 percent for
women and a mere 0.44 percent for men. The government has recently
set up a new grant program to encourage small and midsize firms to
develop leave programs by partially subsidizing them. Workers also
receive financial support for leaves. Through the social security system mothers and fathers of new infants on leave receive 30 percent of
their salaries, and upon return to work 10 percent of their salaries are
temporarily subsidized. This leave program makes it possible for new
mothers to keep their jobs as regular employees (Japanese Institute for
Labour Policy and Training 2005b). Inexpensive, high-quality, government-supported day care has long been available to Japanese women
who are working, studying, or caring for invalids, although the centers
are not necessarily open as late as many regular employees are expected
to work.
Officials are also encouraging firms to hire all regular employees
—male and female—under the same system, rather than having both
a “career track” for men and exceptionally promising women and a
“support staff track” for other women, as has been common in the past.
Although heavy work expectations still pose a barrier for those with
families, such measures may open the way for more women to start in
and keep the same sort of regular, career-track positions as their male
colleagues rather than starting out as support staff, quitting, and then
returning as nonregular employees.
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For those who find themselves working in nonregular positions,
laws on part-time employment and worker dispatching have been created to ensure more fair treatment; a special panel convened to study
these issues. These measures are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
The recent amendments to the Worker Dispatching Law, of course, hold
great potential impact. In allowing nearly all types of jobs to be filled
by dispatched workers, and permitting dispatched workers to be used
for longer periods, the government has sought to introduce greater flexibility in the external labor market and create new ways for workers to
find firms that need their skills.20 The downside is the possibility that
these policies could open the way for workers to fall into “permanently
temporary” slots. This is one area that certainly bears close watching.

Conclusions and Directions for
Future Research
Nonregular employment has grown dramatically over the past few
years, with about one-third of Japan’s workforce and over 40 percent
of working women falling into this “contingent” category. Workers in
part-time employment, the largest nonregular sector, are attractive to
employers because of lower costs and flexibility. Many female employees choose part-time work because of shorter hours that fit with their
schedules. Growth also appears poised to take off in the dispatched employee category due to regulatory changes that allow expanded use of
temporary workers and a large pool of potential workers who have had
fewer regular employment options in the sluggish economy, although
this may be changing. However, the future of nonregular employment
also will depend on changes in the way that companies are managed,
social trends concerning women, and changing demographics. The effects of new regulations will need to be carefully researched in order to
make any accurate projections.
There are several important topics to be addressed in future research.
One important area for analysis is worker dispatching by temporary
employment agencies. Researchers need to closely follow the effects of
deregulation to uncover where and how such workers are used, as well
as the characteristics of dispatched workers and the effects of nonregu-
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lar employment on them and their families. Particularly important from
the standpoint of policy development is to determine whether a permanently less-advantaged class of workers is developing. Successful
temporary-to-permanent hiring programs should be identified and any
important lessons shared.
Additionally, it is important to track the effects of government efforts to create a more gender-equal society. Until now, nonregular employment has been very much a gender issue with most affected workers being female. If the new policies are effective, the percentage of
nonregular employees who are women should fall. If it does not, future
research should look at why the government’s approach is not working
and what else can be done.
Another important topic for future research is how the nonregular
workers are being used in industries where growth in this type of employment is most noticeable, including transportation, wholesale/retail
trade, and restaurants. Because of the prevalence of nonregular workers
in the retail industry, this is one area where new ways of treating such
workers has emerged. For example, one large supermarket chain has
announced a policy allowing workers to switch between different employment tracks as their family situations change. Part-timers willing
to switch to regular full-time status and accept transfers to other locations may be able to earn promotions; regular full-timers may choose
to become part-timers assigned to just one area (Japan Institute of Labour 2002). Approaches like this one provide greater flexibility to make
changes in employment status, work hours, and location throughout the
very different stages of a worker’s family life cycle and career, with
strong potential benefits for both workers and employers. Such innovative programs need to be studied so that they can be improved and “best
practices” spread throughout the country.
Nonregular employment holds advantages for both workers and
employers. However, both researchers and policymakers must closely
monitor this growing phenomenon to ensure that nonregular workers
are not permanently enshadowed by clearly inferior conditions without
obtaining some benefits.
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Notes
1. Japan’s so-called lifetime employment system represents an overall approach to
human resource management. However, it does not necessarily mean a guaranteed job for life for all workers. This system involves a strong reliance on internal
labor markets: firms focus their recruitment and hiring efforts on new graduates
who are trained by the organization and promoted as their skills and experience
increase. Students at high schools, technical schools, and universities are recruited for organizational career tracks designed to fit their presumed ability levels
and interests. When faced with financial difficulties, firms try other approaches
to boosting firm performance, including reassigning staff to new areas or related
companies, before laying off regular employees in any career track.
2. Slow economic growth has been a problem for Japan for over a decade, as companies have struggled to deal with the after effects of an investment “bubble”
that developed in the late 1980s and burst as the Bank of Japan moved to raise
interest rates and tighten the money supply at the end of the decade. Recovery
has been complicated by the need to switch to a more service-oriented, advanced
economy. Since the early 1990s, the Japanese economy has struggled with falling stock and real estate prices, which skyrocketed during the bubble period and
have gradually fallen to the levels of a much earlier era. According to the most
recent Japan Statistical Yearbook (Japanese Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications 2003, 2005), by 2002 real estate
values in the country’s urban areas stood at just 65 percent of what they were
at their peak in 1990, and in the country’s six largest cities average land prices
were just 30 percent of 1990 levels, having fallen to where they stood in the early
1980s. A similar pattern can be seen in stock prices. Despite an impressive rise
during 2005, at year’s end the Nikkei average was still less than half where it
stood in 1990.
3. Many writers have pointed out that workers at smaller subcontracting firms also
have “contingent” employment as the work they do for larger companies may be
handled internally during slow periods, leading to bankruptcy or layoffs among
subcontractors. However, since regular employees at even small firms enjoy the
full benefits of employment as long as their firms are operating, we have chosen
to focus on workers in organizations of all sizes whose employment agreements
are more flexible. For a lengthier discussion of how employment at subcontracting firms may be viewed as somewhat contingent, see Clark (1988) and Abegglen and Stalk (1990).
4. Japan’s Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labour (MHWL) performs many of the
same functions as the U.S. Department of Labor. It is responsible for drafting and
enforcing labor regulations, as well as gathering, synthesizing, and providing
information on labor-related topics. The former Ministry of Labour was recently
combined with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, creating a larger organization
with a wider set of responsibilities.
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5. Due to changing demographics in Japan, the workforce is growing older and the
government has been working to gradually raise the age at which workers can
benefit from the national pension system—just as the U.S. has been raising the
age at which people can collect Social Security benefits. See Fujimura (2001)
for a discussion of mandatory retirement as well as pensions. The article also
describes a reemployment program for retirees at Matsushita.
6. See Morishima and Shimanuki (2005) for a discussion of dispatching, and for
legal changes see Mizushima (2004).
7. For further information on the purpose and content of the legislation see Araki
(1999). Also see Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of the changes.
8. A breakdown of these data by age or gender is not available; however, historical
trends in education are reflected here. In the 1960s only 15 percent of the population attended college and 50 percent completed high school, while today these
numbers are 50 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Returns to education have
traditionally been lower for women, and men have historically been more likely
to have a higher level of schooling. Therefore, many of those with low education
levels are older workers, and quite a few of them are women.
9. For a discussion of reasons temporary employment can benefit firms in the U.S.
context see Greenberger, Heneman, and Skoglind (1997), pp. 93–104. Also see
Chapters 2 and 3.
10. For an analysis of reasons companies have treated women differently, see Wakisaka (1997).
11. A lengthier discussion and data are found in Imada (1997).
12. Yen figures have been converted at an exchange rate of ¥120 = US$1, which has
been a common level over the past few years.
13. Women whose earnings fall above the threshold and thus must pay social insurance premiums do not necessarily receive higher benefits, so married women
working part-time are not disadvantaged in terms of health care or pensions.
14. For further discussion of the allowances see Houseman and Osawa (1995).
15. While the United States has had a standard 40-hour work week in all industries
for many years, Japan has phased out a six-day work week more recently, so
three-quarters of the hours of a regular worker was used as a cutoff rather than
30 hours.
16. Minimum wage levels in Japan vary by region and industry. They are revised annually by the government. In October 2005 the highest general hourly minimum
wage in Japan was applied in Tokyo, at ¥714 per hour.
17. For detailed analyses of the effects of financial and tax incentives on women’s
work hours, see Ichino (1985, 1989). Also helpful are Kantani (1994) and Wakisaka (1997). For an excellent discussion on how the ¥1.03 million tax/earnings
threshold and minimum wage rates may affect part-time wages, see Abe (2002)
and Nagase (2002).
18. For more information see the September 2004 survey of companies belonging
to Nippon Keidanren and the Tokyo Employers’ Association, as reported in
Japanese Institute for Labour Policy and Training (2005a).
19. Unlike U.S. companies who regularly initiate layoffs as a way of improving an
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already-strong financial performance, legally Japanese firms must show that they
are seriously suffering financially and have tried all other reasonable means before cutting staff.
20. For a discussion of the background of these changes, see Araki (1999).
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8
Employment Policies and
Labor Union Activities for
Part-Time Workers and
Dispatched Workers in Japan
Kazunari Honda
Kokugakuin University

This chapter discusses part-time workers and workers dispatched
to client companies by temporary employment agencies from the viewpoint of government employment policies and labor union activities in
Japan. Although there are several types of nonregular employment in
Japan, part-time and dispatched workers hired through temporary employment agencies are, respectively, the largest and most rapidly growing groups. Government and unions concentrate their policies, employment services, and activities on these two groups in the labor force.1
This chapter also provides an overview of the governmental institutional framework for the employment policies of the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW, formerly the Ministry of
Labour, MOL) for part-time and dispatched workers. It discusses the
content of the Part-Time Work Law (PWL) designed to protect the economic welfare of part-time employees and employer efforts to implement the law, and reviews the main features and recent reforms of the
Worker Dispatching Law (WDL) that legalized temporary employment
agencies in Japan. In addition, the chapter describes the public employment services provided to these two groups of workers.
Another objective of this chapter is to review labor union activities
focused on part-time and dispatched workers, in particular the role of
unions in the development of the PWL and WDL and union organizing activities targeted at part-time workers. The chapter concludes by
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discussing implications for future government and union activities and
identifying issues for future research.

Employment Policies: The Institutional
Framework
According to Article 4 of the Employment Measures Law of 1966,
the Japanese government is required to develop periodic employment
plans to support the goal of full employment.2 The Ninth Basic Plan for
Employment (covering 1999 through 2009) encourages several actions
to improve employment conditions for part-time workers and workers
dispatched by temporary employment agencies. These recommendations were developed in response to recent changes on both the supply
and demand sides of the labor market. Some of the changes in the current and future supply of labor include the reduced rate of child bearing
by Japanese women, an increasing population of older workers, and
interest in enhancing female labor force participation. The changing industrial and occupational composition of the Japanese labor force in response to the growth of the technology and service sectors has resulted
in a greater interest from Japanese employers in hiring workers who are
not part of the lifetime employment system. These changes in the labor
market have increased the need for part-time and temporary workers.
The Japanese government considers part-time and dispatched workers to be economically vulnerable; they need better job information and
employment assistance to improve their working conditions. Also, they
need protection from employers who have poor management practices;
for example, cancelling a dispatched worker’s contract without notice
prior to its expiration date.
New protections through improvements in Japanese labor laws are
recommended by the Ninth Basic Plan (for further details see Sugeno
and Suwa [1997]). The plan recommends that the Japanese government
help part-time workers find jobs by expanding the public employment
offices and services and seeking appropriate treatment by employers
for part-time workers based on the PWL discussed in the following section. For dispatched workers, the plan recommends streamlining the
labor market adjustment function by having the government monitor
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the dispatching worker business in industries and occupations where
the use of dispatched workers is already popular. Particular concerns
are conditions of employment, training opportunities, and the provision
of social security coverage. The plan also recommends further discussion about dispatched work and the collection of data to document and
analyze the workplace and labor market conditions that these workers
face. The plan thus holds out the promise of a redesign of the range
of the industries and occupations which can be served by temporary
employment agencies and improvements in the working conditions of
dispatched workers.

Employment policies for part-time workers
Japanese employment policies covering part-time workers include
two major components: the PWL of 1993 and a national system of job
placement assistance. However, since the PWL is not legally binding to
employers, relatively few have fully implemented its requirements.
Part-Time Work Law
The PWL and the public policies that preceded it were a response to
the many problems encountered by this group of workers. For example,
although employers were required by the Labour Standards Law to hire
part-time workers based on a written contract, contracts often were not
provided.
The PWL was based on two earlier public policies: a 1984 government memorandum on part-time work and part-time work guidelines developed in 1989.3 The PWL defines part-time workers as those whose
working hours in a week are shorter than full-time regular workers (normally 40 hours a week) in the same business unit. This means that parttime workers who actually work full time are not covered by the PWL.
For example, see the critical discussion of Mizumachi (1997). The law’s
primary purpose is to improve the treatment of these workers through
three objectives: 1) secure appropriate employment conditions, 2) provide
education and training to support improvements in management practices,
and 3) improve the social security system for part-time workers.
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The critical section of the PWL is Article 6, which requires employers to provide both written employment contracts to part-time
workers and advance written notice of the termination of a contract to
a part-time worker who has been continuously employed for more than
one year (Kezuka 2000). The MHLW has advised employers to issue
written employment documents, called employment notices, which describe major working conditions. In addition, subsidies are provided by
the Japanese government to help employers improve their systems for
managing part-time workers, such as providing management training
and hiring personnel who specialize in managing part-time workers.
Unfortunately, the employer responsibilities defined by the PWL are
not legally binding. As a result, many of the problems the PWL sought
to remedy still exist. The current policy debate focuses on whether or
not the law should shift to a compulsory basis to ensure equal treatment
of part-time workers and full-time regular workers. Japanese labor lawyers are divided over the creation of a new law with strict enforcement
mechanisms (Mizumachi 1997).
Employer Implementation of the PWL
Despite publicity about the PWL, many employers are unaware of
it. According to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1998), which surveyed employers in Tokyo to determine their awareness of the law, only
29 percent of the respondents indicated the law was “known” to them.
At the other extreme, 15.2 percent indicated they had “never known”
about the PWL. The largest respondent category was 52 percent of employers who answered “knows the law, but does not know the condition,” that is, they did not know what the law required of them.
However, according to three MHLW reports on part-time workers,
more employers have begun to use written rather than oral employment
contracts with part-time workers (MHLW 2002; MOL 1991a, 1997).
Table 8.1 indicates the methods used to explain the expected employment conditions to part-time workers during the hiring process. Three
primary methods are identified: 1) reliance on oral contracts, 2) issuing
written contracts specifying the conditions of employment, and 3) applying existing work practice rules.
The total indicating the use of “any methods to clarify the working
conditions of part-time workers” did not change appreciably in 1990,
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Table 8.1  Employer’s Clarification of Part-Time Working Conditions in Hiring (%)

Grand
total

Total
1990

All
industries
number of
employees
1,000+
500–999
300–499
100–299
30–99
5–29

Clarifying the working conditions by any methods
Mainly issuing the
Mainly applying
Mainly unwritten
contract stating the
the existing
oral contracts
working conditions
workplace rules

1995

Others

2000

1990

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

1990

100.0 98.1 98.2 98.4
100.0 99.8 100.0 99.9
100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0
100.0 99.1 100.0 100.0
100.0 97.7 99.8 99.7
100.0 98.3 97.7 99.6
100.0 97.5 97.2 96.7

66.5
32.1
24.0
27.1
49.7
64.3
81.7

59.6
18.8
23.3
30.7
42.1
62.3
81.2

45.9
13.5
13.4
23.6
44.3
45.9
66.6

15.8
21.9
40.2
39.5
20.9
21.7
9.2

24.6
31.8
38.9
46.5
37.7
26.3
12.4

40.2
61.0
68.1
62.7
44.3
41.2
23.5

13.9
44.7
27.4
26.2
26.3
9.1
5.5

14.4
47.8
31.8
22.5
18.8
10.9
5.5

12.7
24.9
18.4
13.6
11.2
12.5
8.5

1.9
1.1
8.3
6.3
0.9
3.2
1.1

Not clarifying

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

1.4
1.5
6.1
0.3
1.4
0.5
0.8

1.1
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.4
1.5

1.9
0.2
0.0
0.9
2.3
1.7
2.5

1.8
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.2
2.3
2.8

1.6
0.1
—
—
0.3
0.4
3.3

SOURCE: MHLW 2002; MOL (1991a, 1997).
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1995, and 2001, but some response categories changed. For example,
the use of “unwritten oral contracts” decreased from 66.5 percent to
45.9 percent between 1990 and 2001. Also “mainly applying the existing work practice rules” declined slightly, from 13.0 percent to 12.7
percent. However, during the same period, the use of written contracts
“mainly issuing the contract stating the working conditions” increased
from 15.8 percent of employers to 40.2 percent. Clearly a trend toward
switching from verbal agreements to written contractual agreements
when hiring part-time workers is evident, particularly in large companies with 1,000 or more employees.
Table 8.2 illustrates the same trend toward formalizing employment
arrangements for part-time workers. Respondents replying “no parttime working rules” decreased from 38.8 percent of employers in 1990
to 15.2 percent in 2001. A marked decline occurred for all employers
except those employing 500–999 employees.
Other evidence of the positive effects of the PWL on management
practices is an increase in the percentage of employers who contract
employment for a specified period and clearly indicate the termination
date of the contract. As Table 8.3 shows, employers who have contracts
with part-time workers for work for specified periods of time increased
from 30.4 percent in 1990 to 52.9 percent in 2001. Employers who
inform part-time workers of their end dates of employment 30 days beforehand increased from 15.8 percent in 1990 to 69.0 percent in 2001.
These survey results are consistent with the results in Table 8.1 and
Table 8.2 and for companies of all sizes.
Table 8.2 Companies without Rules for Part-Time Workers (%)
Total
Number of employees
1,000 +
500–999
300–499
100–299
30–99
5–29

1990
38.8

1995
19.9

2001
15.2

11.4
1.8
20.5
24.3
28.8
53.1

5.6
10.9
7.2
19.0
23.6
25.4

2.4
1.8
3.1
5.8
6.5
27.7

SOURCE: MHLW 2002; MOL (1991a, 1997).
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Table 8.3 Situations of Determining Employment Periods and Giving Previous Information Regarding the
Termination of Employment (%)
Determining employment period

Total

Inform
30 days before

Subtotal

Previous information
Do not inform
30 days before

Several cases

Not determined

1990

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

1990

1995

2001

All
industries
number of
employees 100.0

30.4

40.6

52.9

15.8

66.5

69.0

4.5

4.5

5.3

10.2

29.0

25.8

69.6

59.4

47.1

1,000 +

100.0

71.6

80.4

92.2

49.2

79.1

76.4

7.0

5.0

7.4

15.3

15.9

16.2

28.4

17.8

7.8

500–999

100.0

67.2

82.2

85.1

44.4

66.3

86.1

13.8

10.3

1.0

9.0

23.4

12.9

32.8

26.1

14.9

300–499

100.0

70.2

73.9

66.7

40.3

62.9

80.9

9.7

6.9

8.5

20.1

30.3

10.6

29.8

50.3

33.3

100–299

100.0

41.2

49.7

62.6

22.8

63.2

59.9

7.9

2.7

7.4

10.5

34.2

32.7

58.8

62.8

37.4

30–99

100.0

27.3

37.2

47.4

12.3

60.3

63.8

4.2

3.6

6.2

10.8

36.1

30.0

72.7

80.5

52.6

5–29

100.0

16.8

19.5

30.1

6.6

55.4

61.5

2.8

3.0

2.9

7.5

41.6

25.6

83.2

80.5

69.9

SOURCE: MHLW 2002; MOL (1991a, 1997).
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Public Employment Services for Part-Time Workers
The most significant MHLW service for part-time workers is the national system of public employment service offices,4 called “part-timers
banks,” and their associated satellite offices. The satellite offices offer
the same services as the banks, but are smaller offices placed in more
locations to improve access by those workers needing their services.
The first 3 banks were created in 1982 and the first 15 satellites were
created in 1991, followed by the continual increases in the numbers of
both types of offices. As of 1998 there were 80 banks and 85 satellite
offices.
Both the part-timers banks and satellite offices were created specifically to help part-time workers find jobs other than public employment
positions. The MHLW provides a variety of services to accomplish this
objective. These services include the provision of information about
employment opportunities, skills training, individual career counseling,
training in job search methods, and other forms of job placement assistance. However, while workers are looking for part-time employment,
they have to apply to the regular public employment service office to
receive unemployment insurance benefits.
Figure 8.1 shows the number of part-time workers who looked for
and found jobs by using all public employment offices, including the
part-time workers offices. The number of part-time workers using these
services rose from about 178,000 in 1980 to 1,046,000 in 2001. Of
these, the number of those who worked more than one month and less
than four months ranged between 5,000 and 8,000 in each year.
The number of part-time workers who had jobs rose steadily in
most of the years from 1980 through 2001. There were about 485,000
workers with jobs in 2001 as compared to about 76,000 in 1980. The
ratio of those who sought part-time jobs to those who found part-time
jobs was relatively stable in the range of about 35 percent to 47 percent.
The number of the workers who sought and found part-time jobs has
increased since the 1990s primarily because during the last recession
employers shifted to hiring more part-time workers instead of full-time
regular employees to reduce their labor costs.
Figure 8.2 shows the number of part-time workers who looked for
and found jobs by using only the part-time worker banks and their satellite offices. From 1982 (when these specialized offices were created)
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Figure 8.1 Number of Workers Who Sought and Found Part-Time Work
Fig 7.1
by Using All Public Employment Offices
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SOURCE: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour,
and Welfare, Annual Reports on Labour Markets.

through 2001, the percentage of part-time workers who found employment with their assistance ranged from approximately 4 percent to 40
percent.
The trend in Figure 8.2 is quite similar to that in Figure 8.1. The
number of part-time workers using the services of these offices rose
from about 8,500 in 1982 to about 305,000 in 2001. Part-time workers
who found jobs also constantly increased from about 2,900 in 1982 to
about 114,000 in 2001. The percentage of those being hired was between about 34 percent and 43 percent.
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Figure 8.2 Number of Workers Who Sought and Found Part-Time Work
Fig 7.2
by Using Part-Time Worker Banks and Satellite Offices  
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SOURCE: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Annual Reports on Labour Markets.

Employment policies for dispatched workers
Worker dispatching businesses, called temporary employment
agencies in the United States and Europe, supply workers to clients who
employ these workers in their businesses. Although worker dispatching
businesses grew in Japan during the 1970s, their growth was restricted
by the Employment Security Law, which prohibited them except where
employment arrangements were made by written contracts with strict
requirements about the content of the contracts. Since many worker dispatching companies disguised their work as contract work in the 1970s,
most were probably illegal.
Thus, although the Japanese government did not prohibit these businesses due to strong market demands for temporary workers, they were
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strictly regulated. However, as the number of temporary employment
agencies expanded, some regulation became necessary. Consequently,
the Worker Dispatching Law (WDL) was enacted in 1985. It created a
legal private sector mechanism to supplement the public employment
offices in matching workers and employers, with strict regulation of the
methods of operation of temporary employment agencies. In addition, a
variety of public services were provided to dispatched workers.
The WDL has four major components. First, the law restricts by
occupation the kinds of jobs at which dispatched workers can work.5
Second, it creates two types of worker dispatching businesses: those
that handle workers who are already employed, and those that handle
workers seeking jobs. The former is usually called “employment dispatching,” and the latter is referred to as “register dispatching.”6 One
business unit cannot offer both types of service. Workers can be registered by one or more dispatching businesses. Third, the law aims to
improve the working conditions of dispatched workers. For example,
the law requires both the dispatching business and the client company
hiring the workers to issue a written contract to dispatched workers,
thereby regulating the conditions of employment and dismissal.7 Finally, the WDL stipulates penalties for possible infractions of the law by
dispatching companies.
The last revision of the WDL became effective in December 2000.8
This revision included four significant changes. First, it changed the
regulation from listing only the 26 occupations that could be filled by
dispatched workers (the “negative list” system) to listing only the narrow set of jobs for which dispatched workers cannot be hired (the “positive list” system). Second, it sets a limit on the employment period of
one year for dispatched workers for the same jobs as those filled by fulltime employees to encourage employers to move dispatched workers to
full-time regular employment.
Third, the law establishes client employers’ responsibilities for covering the damages of dispatched workers who were discharged before
the end of their contracts. This change is designed to address identified
abuses of treatment. For example, a Tokyo Metropolitan Government
(1999) survey showed that 13.9 percent of register dispatched workers
were asked to leave their jobs or were discharged during the contract
period; 57.1 percent of dispatching agents had their contracts broken by
the client employer.
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Finally, the Japanese government was concerned about protecting
the privacy of dispatched workers. The revision of the law outlines the
responsibilities of the dispatching company for managing individual
information.
Public services for dispatched workers are administrated by the
MHLW. The main services are the deployment of advisors to provide
assistance to employers on managing their dispatched workers and on
procedures for handling grievances. The advisors provide training for
the management specialists at both the dispatching and receiving client
companies. Also, subsidies are provided to help cover the employers’
costs for appropriate employment management services for dispatched
workers.
Assistance with the handling of grievances is important because
there is a high rate of grievances from dispatched workers against both
the dispatching and receiving companies. For example, according to the
Tokyo Metropolitan Government survey (1999), 30.6 percent of register dispatched workers filed grievances. Grievances cover such matters as contract concerns, wage levels, and shop floor human relations
issues. The MHLW also directly receives grievances from dispatched
workers through telephone calls. However, since the system covers just
a small portion of those who have grievances, it is unclear how effective
the advice and consultation provided by telephone is in the settlement
of grievances.

Union activities: The Context
Approximately 20 percent of the Japanese labor force was unionized in 2002 (MHLW 2002). Unions are particularly important in large
enterprises with more than 1,000 employees; about 55 percent of workers in these large companies are unionized. What makes the Japanese
union structure distinctive is the dominance of unions organized at the
enterprise level. These enterprise unions account for more than 90 percent of all union membership.9
Until relatively recently, Japanese unions did not actively seek parttime workers and dispatched workers as members. However, as the employment of low-wage part-time and dispatched workers has grown,
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unions have realized a potential danger: if a gap exists between the
wage levels of full-time regular workers and part-time and dispatched
workers, employers will seek to replace more expensive full-time regular workers with nonregular workers.
In response to this threat, unions have used two strategies to maintain their bargaining power. First, unions have supported public policies that seek to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, the differences in the
employment conditions between full-time regular workers, part-time
workers, and dispatched workers. Second, some unions have begun to
organize part-time workers as union members to enhance union bargaining power.

Union activities Focused on Part-time Workers
Union Involvement in the Development of the Part-Time
Work Law
Labor unions have been heavily involved in the development of
Japanese government employment policies, including those aimed at
part-time and dispatched workers.10 The Japanese Private Sector Trade
Union Confederation (Private Rengo) strongly supported the PWL and
urged the MOL to enact this legislation in 1984.11 Instead, the Japanese
government produced a memorandum on part-time work, which failed
to present a clear direction for the growth of part-time work. Subsequently, in 1988 Private Rengo developed its own policies for part-time
workers to encourage government commitment to union guidelines.
In response the MOL took two actions in 1989. First, it replaced
the 1984 working memorandum with guidelines for employers on parttime work. These guidelines clearly identified part-time workers as
a key workforce in industry. They offered guidance to employers on
providing appropriate working conditions. Second, the MOL extended
the coverage of the Employment Insurance Law, which provides unemployment insurance to qualified part-time workers. However, Rengo
criticized the government guidelines because they only offered advice
to employers and did not provide a legal enforcement mechanism. Ren-
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go continued to advocate the enactment of the PWL from 1990 until its
passage in 1993.
The passage of the PWL still did not satisfy Rengo, however. It argued that the PWL did not provide the level of protection for part-time
workers that was needed, particularly due to the absence of legal penalties for the employers who did not follow the law. Consequently, Rengo
pursued two strategies simultaneously. It continued to develop draft
proposals for revisions of the PWL, which were submitted to the MOL.
In addition, Rengo again developed new policies on part-time work. It
urged discussion of revisions of the PWL in 1996 in the government
councils discussing part-time work. In response to pressure from Rengo, the MOL set up the Part-Time Work Special Committee composed
of the government, union, and employer representatives. However, no
further essential changes have been made in the PWL since its passage
in 1993.
Organizing Part-Time Workers
Like other industrialized nations, Japan has experienced a decline in
labor union membership rates. However, one growth area is part-time
workers. Although the number of unionized part-time workers remains
small, the membership rate for part-time workers has increased slightly
from 1.5 percent in 1990 to 3.3 percent in 2005 as shown in Table 8.4.
However, labor unions are not enthusiastic about organizing parttime workers, even though increasing part-time worker membership
is predicted to strengthen unions. Table 8.5 shows that in 1990 only
10.7 percent of Japanese unions had organized part-time workers and
planned to continue to organize them, while 12.6 percent of unions had
not organized part-time workers but planned to organize them in the
future. In contrast, 56.0 percent of the unions did not and were not planning to organize part-time workers. The wholesale, retailing, and restaurant sectors were more interested in unionizing part-time workers
than the service and manufacturing sectors.
The unions that had organized or were planning to organize parttime workers preferred to target only those workers who meet some
specific requirements. As Table 8.6 shows, 39.2 percent of the unions
targeted all part-time workers, while 56.4 percent of these unions identified potential members by some criteria such as minimum length of
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  Table 8.4  The Trends Reflecting Union Membership Rates of Part-Time        
Workers
(1)
(2)
(3) = (1) ⁄(2) × 100
Number of part-time
Union membership
union members
Number of employees
rate (%)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

97,150
113,380
131,880
155,810
168,120
184,240
196,090
218,030
239,600
244,000
260,000
280,000
293,000
331,000
363,000
389,000

6,290,000
6,940,000
7,540,000
7,980,000
8,370,000
8,640,000
8,890,000
9,230,000
9,570,000
9,930,000
10,170,000
10,420,000
10,970,000
10,980,000
11,070,000
11,720,000

1.5
1.6
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.7
3.0
3.3
3.3

SOURCE: Number of union members from Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare, Basic Survey on Labour Unions. Number of employees from Japanese
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications,
Monthly Surveys on Labour Force.

service, hours of work, and annual earnings as a cutoff. For the latter
group, the most important characteristics were length of service (45.3
percent) and hours of work (37.6 percent).
Table 8.7 shows the two major reasons unions have not sought to
organize part-time workers. Unions reported that these workers do not
join enthusiastically in the union activities (29.6 percent). Also, 44.7
percent of the unions perceived the differences between the interests of
full-time and part-time union members or part-time workers to be too
large for accommodation in the same union.
In contrast to the negative attitude of many unions toward organizing part-time workers, some part-time workers view union membership
positively. Based on his analysis of a survey of members of Rengo,
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Table 8.5 Union Interests in Organizing Part-Time Workers, by Industry in 1990 (%)
Total of unions
where part-time
workers are
employed

Organized parttime workers or
will organize in
the future

100.0
100.0
100.0

10.7
6.2
27.4

12.6
9.5
19.0

100.0

13.1

14.3

All industries
Manufacturing
Wholesale, retailing,
and restaurants
Service
SOURCE: MOL (1991b).

Organized partDid not organize time workers but
but will organize will not organize
in the future
in the future

Did not
organize and
will not
organize

Others

No
response

1.0
1.6
0.3

56.0
60.3
39.1

15.5
18.3
12.7

4.1
4.2
1.6

1.0

53.1

13.6

5.0
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Table 8.6 Part-Time Workers Targeted by Union Organizing Activities in 1990 (%)
Subtotal of unions
that do and will All partorganize parttime
time workers
workers
All industries
Manufacturing
Wholesale,
retailing and
restaurants
Service

Characteristics used to identify potential members
Total

Length of Working Kinds Annual
service
hours
of jobs earnings

Other

No
response

No
response

100.0
100.0
100.0

39.2
33.4
23.9

56.4 (100.0)
62.8 (100.0)
75.4 (100.0)

(45.3)
(47.4)
(49.4)

(37.6)
(36.9)
(35.7)

(8.0)
(3.6)
(4.1)

(0.3)
(0.0)
(0.2)

(6.7)
(7.0)
(10.4)

(1.9)
(5.0)
(0.3)

(4.4)
(3.8)
(0.7)

100.0

61.4

27.5 (100.0)

(28.5)

(40.0)

(29.2)

(2.3)

(0.0)

(0.0)

(11.1)

SOURCE: MOL (1991b).
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Boyles (1993) concluded that the attitudes of female part-time workers
toward the unions were more positive than those of male and female
full-time regular employees. Of the female part-time workers who were
already organized in enterprise unions, 30.3 percent preferred the enterprise unions consisting of only part-time members, and 26.0 percent
preferred the traditional full-time workers’ unions. This contrasted with
the 4 percent who preferred other types of union organization, such as
regional unions rather than enterprise unions. Thus, more than half of
the organized female part-time workers preferred enterprise unions to
outside unions.12 This perspective reflects the popularity of enterprise
unions with Japanese workers. These views of part-time workers are
consistent with this general attitude toward unions in Japan.
The findings from Furugori (1997) help explain why part-time
workers are interested in union membership. She finds that the wage
levels of part-time workers in unionized companies are higher than
in nonunionized companies. Consequently, joining unions should be
advantageous for part-time workers. Boyles (1993) also finds that the
union effects on the wage level and job content were relatively higher
than expected.
Consequently, it can be concluded that there is a mismatch between
the negative attitudes of many unions toward organizing part-time
workers and the positive attitudes of part-time workers toward union
membership. However, it appears unlikely that the needs and interests
of part-time workers will be served by unions in the near future due to
the lack of aggressive union organizing activities.

Union activities Focused on dispatched workers
Union Involvement in the Development of the Worker
Dispatching Law
Unions and employers disagreed on the need for the WDL even
before it was enacted in 1985. Unions argued that strong employment
protections were needed for dispatched workers because of abuses by
client employers. One example was the sudden termination of employment before the expiration of the contract period. Employers who ter-
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Table 8.7 Reasons for Not Organizing Part-Time Workers in 1990 (%)

Total
Total of three industries
Manufacturing
Wholesale, retailing,
and restaurants
Services

Interests between
Part-time workers do not part-time workers and
full-time regular
join enthusiastically in
Did not identify reasons
the union activities
workers do not match

Other reasons

100.0
100.0

7.5
6.1

29.6
30.5

44.7
48.9

18.2
14.5

100.0
100.0

3.5
9.5

31.5
29.2

44.3
39.7

20.7
21.5

SOURCE: MOL (1991b).
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minated workers in this manner did not face any penalties. Employers,
on the other hand, proposed complete deregulation for worker dispatching businesses. Rengo proposed changes during the reviews of WDL,
which were conducted every three years.
The perspectives of unions and employers remained the same in the
1996 and 1999 WDL reviews. For example, Rengo’s official position
for the revision in 1996 included limiting the type of jobs in which dispatched workers could be hired and promoting stronger protections for
the working conditions of dispatched workers. The proposal submitted
by Rengo contained five major points. The confederation
1) 	 opposed an increase in the number of jobs eligible for dispatched work, the expansion of eligible occupations, and an
increase in the permissible length of the employment contract;
2) 	 clarified the differences between similar types of employment,
such as subcontracted workers, temporary transferred workers, and transferred shop assistants, and secured legal worker
dispatching businesses;
3) 	 promoted the protection of the working conditions of dispatched workers and the enhancement of their working conditions at the dispatching companies;
4) 	 promoted the protection of the working conditions of dispatched workers and enhancement of their working conditions
at receiving client companies; and
5) 	 supported the strengthening of the inspection system for dispatched working through MHLW.
In contrast to the advice provided by Rengo, the revision of the
WDL in 1996 added 12 new occupations for which dispatched workers
could be hired, thereby bringing the total to 26 occupations. However,
throughout the discussions preceding the 1999 revisions, Rengo continued to argue for expanded use of formal employment contracts in hiring
dispatched workers and setting limits on the number of occupations
open to dispatched workers. It also continued to document the problems
faced by dispatched workers with both dispatching companies and receiving client companies.
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The debates preceding the 1999 revisions were intense due to employer efforts to open more occupations to dispatched workers. Rengo
expressed three major concerns. First, Rengo argued that the new concept of temporary dispatched worker proposed by employers would
result in undesirable expansion of shorter contracted employment at
the cost of employment of full-time regular workers. Second, Rengo
requested that legal penalties be added to the law so it could be enforced and worker protection from abuses by dispatching companies
improved. Finally, Rengo stressed that the law needed a statement of
the rights of dispatched workers in the complex triple employment relationship in which they work. However, Rengo’s recommendations were
not included in the revised law. The 1999 revision expanded both the
industries and occupations that could be staffed by temporary workers
so significantly that only a few exclusions were retained.
Supporting Dispatched Workers
In contrast to efforts made to organize some of the part-time workforce, Japanese labor unions have not focused on dispatched workers
as potential members. Instead of organizing these workers, Rengo has
developed telephone services for receiving and handling grievances
and troubleshooting for dispatched workers, and providing advice or
consultation on issues related to employment and working conditions.
These services are similar to the public services that the MHLW provides to dispatched workers.

Conclusions and Directions for
Future Research
Part-time and dispatched workers represent two segments of the
nonregular labor force that have grown over the past 20 years in Japan.
This chapter reviews the government employment policies and public
services provided for part-time workers and dispatched workers in Japan. It also discusses the perspectives of Japanese labor unions on these
two groups of workers and union efforts to improve their economic
well-being. However, both the Japanese government and labor unions
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can do more to protect these workers who are relatively vulnerable to
abusive management practices and changing economic conditions.
Several government actions are needed. The MHLW should work
with employers to increase their awareness of both the Part-Time Work
Law and the Worker Dispatching Law, as well as to enforce the already
existing provisions of these laws. In addition, public services to assist
part-time and dispatched workers should be expanded and improved.
Furthermore, future revisions of these laws should strengthen the protections provided to these two groups of workers. However, improving
employment protections for dispatched workers is more complicated
since it involves both the dispatching and receiving client companies.
Japanese labor unions have sought actively to counterbalance the
influence of employers in the development of public policy toward parttime and dispatched workers. However, unions have placed relatively
little emphasis on organizing part-time workers as a means of providing protections for them, and have avoided any organizing activities
targeted at dispatched workers. These modest organizing efforts will
limit the potential for union growth in the future if these two types of
nonstandard employment continue to increase.
There are several issues that should be studied to provide the basis
for the development of appropriate changes in public policy for parttime and dispatched workers in Japan. Three topics for future research
are identified for each employee group.
Research on part-time workers should examine wage equity, work
sharing, and union organizing activities. It is well documented that a
gap exists between the hourly wage paid to full-time regular and parttime workers in Japan. Discussions have occurred about the need for
equitable pay to eliminate the wage gap between these two groups of
workers since this may be the ultimate protection for part-time workers.
Researchers should identify policy options for the Japanese government
and labor union actions that can eliminate the wage gap.
A second research topic is work sharing. There was heated discussion of work sharing as a panacea to increase employment throughout
the recession in the 1990s in Japan. For instance, some companies have
started to use “part-time regular workers” whose working hours are
shorter than the full-time regular workers’. Since these part-time employees are regular workers, they should have better conditions of employment than traditional part-time workers and they should be paid the
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same hourly pay as full-time regular workers. Research can determine
how pervasive the use of part-time regular workers is, the availability of
people who want to be part-time regular workers, and how their treatment compares with that of full-time regular and traditional part-time
workers. Also, the appropriate responses from the government and labor unions should be determined.
Finally, researchers can assist labor unions in a reexamination of their
attitudes toward organizing part-time workers. In 2001, Rengo developed a plan to organize part-time workers through its regional branches
rather than through the traditional approach of enterprise unions. This
plan raises questions about whether the organizing functions of the national center and enterprise unions can be complementary.
Research on dispatched workers should focus on pay levels, the
impact of deregulation, and union activities. During recessions companies experience pressure to reduce labor costs, including the cost of
dispatched workers. Dispatched workers therefore are at risk for lower
rates of pay and unfavorable longer working hours. Research can measure the extent to which dispatched workers are economically disadvantaged during a recession and determine how the government and labor
unions can address these problems.
In addition, research can explore the impact of the further deregulation of temporary employment, in particular the effects of revising
the WDL to open more occupations to dispatched workers by including manufacturing and assembly workers and changing the permissible
contract period. If the WDL is revised, the costs and benefits of the
changes should be studied.
Finally, as discussed previously, enterprise unions have opposed the
substitution of dispatched workers for full-time regular workers due to
the impact on the employment opportunities of their members. However, since the latest WDL revision, increased numbers of dispatched
workers have been converted to the status of full-time regular workers
in the same company. This change from temporary to permanent status
has occurred after the employee has served a trial period as a dispatched
worker. The prevalence of this practice, and the implications for organizing efforts of enterprise unions, should be analyzed.
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Notes
1. 	As discussed in Chapter 7, “regular” or “lifetime” employees are grouped separately from “nonregular” employees who are in nonstandard employment arrangements. This chapter uses the term “nonregular” for consistency with the
discussion in the earlier chapter. See Chapter 7 for further discussion of these
two groups of nonstandard employees. Also see Wakisaka (1997). In addition to
part-time and dispatched workers, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare (MHLW) regulates employment policies for older nonregular workers,
employees who are family members working in a family business, home helpers,
and other groups of workers. However, this chapter does not discuss these policies or any tax or social security policies.
2. 	Employment policies since 1998 have focused on three types of actions to maintain employment: 1) expanding traditional policy approaches such as subsidies
for training or to help cover the costs of transferring employees to a related firm,
2) using the traditional public works approach to absorb unemployed workers,
and 3) developing new policies, including subsidies designed to support job creation by covering costs in small and medium-sized firms associated with additional human resource needs or wage subsidies for targeted groups such as older
workers. For more details see Ohtake (2000).
3. 	Since the 1984 revision of the Employment Insurance Law which provides unemployment insurance, part-time workers have been able to receive unemployment benefits. Since 1994 part-time workers who work less than 20 hours a week
are no longer eligible for unemployment benefits, while those working more than
20 hours but less than 30 hours can participate on a short-term basis. However,
they receive smaller benefits than the full-time workers.
4. In addition to the public employment service offices, the MHLW also designates
the 21st Century Vocational Foundation, a nongovernmental public agency, as
an assistance center for part-time workers. Its main duties are subsidizing the
improvement of the management of part-time workers at companies, developing management specialists for part-time workers, and providing consultants to
assist employers with the management of part-time workers. According to the
MHLW, approximately 18,000 part-time workers have received vocational training every year since 1995 through this organization.
5.  The 1994 amendment of the Older Persons Employment Stabilization Law permitted dispatched workers to be over 60 years of age and allowed them to work
in any job except those considered “port transport services, construction, guard
services, and production services.” The 1996 amendment to the Child Care and
Family Leave Act revision permitted dispatched workers to fill vacancies occurring due to child or family care leave. See Araki (1997); Morito (1999).
6.  Employment dispatching businesses provide continuous employment for dispatched workers. They place workers for indefinite periods of time or more than
one year. These businesses only have to register with the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare. In contrast, the register dispatching businesses register work-
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ers and find employment for them. The worker is placed for a specified period of
time. Since their services are similar to those of the public employment agencies,
these businesses have to be approved by the MHLW to ensure they have the
resources to operate properly. See Araki (1994).
7. The contract with the dispatching company describes the content of the work to
be performed, the location of the work site, the direct supervisor, the length of
the workday, including starting and ending times, when overtime may be paid,
the length of the employment contract, health and safety concerns, and the staff
responsible for the worker at both the dispatching and client companies. The
conditions specified in these contracts are negotiated between the dispatching
company and the client company. For more details see Araki (1994).
8. 	Prior to this revision, dispatched workers were permitted to remain in a job for
three years (for more details see Araki [1999]). In 2000 the permissible period of
employment was reduced to one year. Employers were encouraged to employ in
full-time jobs the dispatched workers who worked for them for one year. Debates
about the effects of this revision are increasing, but little is actually known about
what is being done by employers. For example, see Yashiro (1999).
9. In an enterprise union in Japan the wages and conditions of work are negotiated
by the union and the employer with little involvement from higher-level union
organizations. Decisions are influenced heavily by a sense of being part of a
community whose members will share in the future of the business (Shinoda
1997). This approach to labor-management relations has supported the “lifetime
employment” practices followed by these enterprises (Nitta 1997) and has maintained stability through close ties between employees and management. However, enterprise unions have evolved somewhat differing features in response to the
characteristics of the industry and company in which they operate (Price [1997].
Also see Fujimura [1997]). “The three jewels of the employment system—enterprise unions, lifetime employment and seniority based wages—are not about to
suddenly fade into oblivion . . .” (Osawa and Kingston 1996, p. 5).
10.   For a discussion of the evolution of the role of Rengo in the development of
government employment policies and the consultation processes employed, see
Shinoda (1997).
11. Shinoda (1997) provides an overview of the history of the growth of nationallevel unions in Japan following World War II. The Private Rengo was established
by 1987 as the new national center for unions in the private sector. In 1989 Private Rengo and the public sector unions combined to create the Japanese Trade
Union Confederation (Rengo).
12. There are several ways to organize part-time workers. For instance, Honda analyzed the way a union organized part-time workers in retailing. He reported organizing methods that did not require these workers to join the existing full-time
regular workers’ union. For example, there is a part-time council whose members are only part-timers. The council is legally independent from the existing
union of full-time regular workers, but it receives some advice and assistance for
its activities from the union. For more details see Honda (1993, 2005).
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Temporary Agency Work in Europe
François Michon
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

European countries have been experiencing the growth of employment in nonstandard or flexible work arrangements. The basic causal
factors have been similar to those experienced in the United States and
Japan: global economic forces have required employers to adapt and
change more quickly. In response to these economic forces, temporary
agency work (TAW), one of a variety of flexible employment arrangements, has expanded over the past 30 years.1 Although it existed earlier
in some European countries, in others TAW has been authorized for
only a few years. In some countries TAW is still restricted to a limited
number of professions.
A variety of approaches exist to regulate and monitor temporary
work agencies (TWAs) and the services they provide. These variations
reflect distinctive national approaches to the regulation of labor markets and their institutions. Because of the diversity of these approaches,
TAW is one area where the efforts for harmonization of national labor
markets within the European Union (EU) have failed in the last few
years. As a result, no common standard for the regulation of TAW has
been developed in the EU.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of TAW within the EU and explain the challenges confronted as the EU continues
its efforts to harmonize policies regulating TAW across its member nations. The regulations of EU members and the social debates on TAW
are reviewed. Much of the discussion is based on data collected in a
1999 survey of the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO)
(2000). A 2002 study of the Dublin European Foundation, which focused on the economic analysis of TAW in EU members, and a 2005
study of the European Industrial Relations Observatory, which actualized the 1999 survey in the context of the EU enlargement, were used
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to provide updates on some major changes in national regulations that
occurred after 1999 (Storrie 2002; Arrowsmith 2006).
The chapter first provides an overview of the growth of flexible
work in Europe, including a brief discussion of the problems associated
with trying to estimate the prevalence of TAW. Variations in the national definitions and regulations of TAW are then reviewed. The perspectives on TAW of employers’ organizations and unions are presented,
followed by a discussion of the differences in national approaches to the
regulation of TAW through the use of laws and collective bargaining.
The rules which the firms that use TAW must follow in each country to
secure the social protection of employees also are described. Throughout this discussion the extreme heterogeneity of the regulatory frameworks of the EU nations is emphasized. Finally, concluding comments
on the very brief history of “Social Europe” and the future of its labor
market institutions are provided. Several future directions for research
are identified.

Flexible Work and Temporary Agency Work
in Europe
The need for greater labor market flexibility has been discussed for
almost 20 years in Europe. When compared to the United States, labor
market flexibility in European countries often is viewed as inadequate
except in a few countries such as the United Kingdom. Labor market
rigidities such as those created by government regulations encouraging
standard employment arrangements are often discussed as the main reason for the slower economic growth and the high levels of unemployment in Europe. These discussions of the limited labor market flexibility
in the EU focus primarily on adjustments of the number of employees.
One of several forms of atypical employment that permit numerical
adjustments to be made easily by employers is temporary agency work.
However, due to poor data, it is difficult to accurately measure the actual prevalence of TAW in the EU as discussed in more detail below.
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Employment Trends and Flexible Labor
Markets in Europe
Since the beginning of the 1990s the rate of economic growth in
Europe has been lower than that of the United States. The key trends
in Europe during the 1990s were an increase in the importance of both
unemployment and atypical work.2 These trends resulted in greater attention to how labor market flexibility is linked to the regulation of
employment contracts such as TAW.
For a short period of time in the late 1990s it appeared that the rate
of increase in unemployment had slowed due to the positive response
of standard employment to the economic recovery and the creation of
jobs. The strong job creation that occurred during the late nineties (European Commission 2002) appeared to have been linked
. . . to jobs of better quality . . . Recovery is now favoring more
stable employment. The proportion of workers on fixed-term contracts (temporary work) in all new jobs created was only slightly
over a third in 1999, compared with 50 percent in previous years.
. . . For the first time since 1990, full-time jobs created—some 63
percent in 1999—exceeded the number of part-time jobs created.
(European Commission 2000)

However, the economic climate began to deteriorate in 2001 and
worsened in the following year due to the uncertainty of the international political situation. Since then the EU has had great difficulty recovering a fast and solid economic growth, especially in the old core
of its member nations: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In these countries, the downturn had a significant negative impact on job creation for both standard and atypical employment.
Since the late 1990s the EU has tried to promote a European employment strategy (the so-called Lisbon strategy) which focuses on an
increase in employment rates and in the quality of jobs. However, as the
European Commission (2005) stated,
[t]he weak labour market performance in Europe over recent years
is an important element in explaining the slow progress towards
the Lisbon and Stockholm objectives. The overall employment
rate remains 7 percentage points below the employment rate target
for 2010.
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The evidence of limits, or even failures, of the Lisbon strategy has
been presented in many reports, comments, and proposals to increase
the efficiency of this strategy (see, for example, Kok [2004]). The main
point repeated in these commentaries is that welfare and social justice
remain largely a member country issue. Furthermore, many members
are opposed to removing any national regulations in favor of the EU
institutions. Consequently, in the present environment, the European institutions can only propose objectives, observe the situation of country
members relative to these objectives, and give their opinions.
Labor market flexibility, or the lack thereof, is often explained
in the context of the regulations defining—and thus potentially constraining—employment contracts, with particular attention given to the
amount of flexibility gained from atypical employment arrangements.
It therefore is commonly associated with fixed-term contracts and TAW,
and in some EU members (especially in France, Spain, and Italy) with
part-time contracts. However, within Europe part-time employment and
fixed-term contracts are better known than TAW because there are more
of them. Part-time contracts are different from the standard full-time
contracts because they imply in most of European countries a specific
employment status. Part-time employees are not necessarily easier to
fire, but it is easier to increase or decrease their daily, weekly, or even
monthly work times. The increase in part-time employment and fixedterm contracts from 1990 through 2004 is shown for 10 EU countries
in Figures 9.1 and 9.2, respectively. For these two types of employment
arrangements the European Labor Force Surveys provide good quantitative data for intra-European comparisons.
The use of these employment arrangements varies by country. Figure 9.1 indicates that in 2004 in the Netherlands, part-time employment
was over 45 percent of total employment but just under 10 percent in
Belgium and Spain. The other seven nations range from about 15 percent to 45 percent. Fixed-term contracts in Figure 9.2 show a different
pattern of prevalence. In 2004 in Spain fixed-term contracts represent
over 30 percent of total employment, but the other nine countries are in
the range of 5 percent to 15 percent.
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Figure 9.1 Part-Time Employment in Selected EU Countries (% Total Employment)
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Figure 9.2 Fixed-Term Contracts in Selected EU Countries (% Total Employment)
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Prevalence of Temporary Agency Work
TAW was one of the most rapidly growing forms of atypical employment in the 1990s (Storrie 2002). However, this growth is difficult
to measure and compare across the EU nations. Unlike the measures of
the prevalence of part-time employment and fixed-term contracts, there
are no equivalent employment data for TWA. Due to the differences in
national regulations, the terms temporary agency work or temporary
work agency refer to very different and noncomparable employment
arrangements between the three partners in the relationship: the employee, the TWA, and the client firm. This explains why the available
data that compare TAW cross-nationally within the EU nations are unreliable, and there are no data at all for some countries. Due to the lack
of common definitions, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) does not try to quantitatively measure the prevalence
of TAW.3 It therefore is difficult to provide a precise and comprehensive
picture of the prevalence of TAW in Europe, and estimates of the rate
of growth of TWA are even more difficult.4 Consequently, the estimates
provided below of the prevalence of TAW must be used with caution.
In an effort to provide some data, the European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions undertook a study of
TAW.5 The resulting estimates range widely from no TAW in Greece to 4
percent of total employment in the Netherlands, as shown in Table 9.1.
For the 13 nations that reported the use of TAW by sector in the
1999 EIRO survey, 6 reported that TAW was concentrated in the industrial sector, and 7, the tertiary sector (services, public services, and
retail). The industrial TAW was dominant in Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain; the tertiary TAW was dominant in Denmark,
Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. The industrial sector consisted primarily of manual labor and a
male workforce, while the tertiary sector was primarily a female and
white-collar workforce. According to the European Trade Union Confederation (2005),
. . . in the UK, some 80 percent of temporary agency work is in
the service and public sectors, while three-quarters is in construction and manufacturing industry in France. In most of the EU-15,
the majority of workers are male, but in all three Nordic countries
there are more women, and proportions are roughly equal in the
Netherlands and the UK.
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Table 9.1 Temporary Agency Work in the European Union, 1999
Number of
Agency work as %
Country
agency workers
of total employment
Austria
24,277
0.7
Belgium
62,661
1.6
Denmark
18,639
0.7
Finland
15,000
0.6
France
623,000
2.7
Germany
243,000
0.7
Greece
0
0.0
Ireland
9,000
0.6
Italy
31,000
0.2
Luxembourg
6,065
3.5
Netherlands
305,000
4.0
Portugal
45,000
1.0
Spain
109,000
0.8
Sweden
32,000
0.8
United Kingdom
557,000
2.1
EU total
2,080,642
1.4
Source: EIRO (2000).

A second estimate of the prevalence of TAW was developed by the
French employer organization for TWA, Syndicat des Entreprises de
Travail Temporaire (SETT). This organization published estimates for
2004 derived from national sources for only eight EU countries. A comparison of Tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggests a relatively large increase from
1999 to 2004 in TAW in the United Kingdom, but no clear trend in the
other countries.
Both tables reflect national historical differences in the treatment
and regulation of TAW in the context of all forms of temporary work.
Actual changes suggest that there are two reasons why limitations imposed by regulation based on the types of jobs and industrial sector are
being reduced. First, there has been an increased acceptance over time
of TAW in countries that for a long time were reluctant to expand TAW.
This will result in a relaxation of these regulations. Second, temporary
work agencies are developing their businesses to provide their services
wherever temporary help is needed, and even when temporary help for
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long periods of time is required (European Trade Union Confederation
2005). Regulations are likely to be relaxed as employers become more
dependent on these services.
Finally, what Tables 9.1 and 9.2 do not show is the importance of
TAW in labor flows into and out of unemployment, and out of and into
employment. The 1999 EIRO report provided this information for a few
countries. For example, TAW in Spain accounts for 12.5 percent of new
employment contracts. This is not surprising since temporary work arrangements of various types are often entry-level jobs for persons entering the labor force and for those with relatively low levels of skills.

Defining Temporary Agency Work and
Temporary Employees
In an effort to standardize the social protections provided to employees hired through atypical employment contracts, the EU authorities in the second half of the 1990s organized negotiations between
the EU-level social partners (employers and unions) on “flexibility in
working time and security for workers.”6 The European negotiations
focused on three types of atypical employment: part-time work, fixedterm contracts, and TAW. It was expected that some European standardTable 9.2 Temporary Agency Work in Europe, 2004
Number of
Agency work as %
Country
agency workers
of total employment
Belgium
75,100
1.8
France
569,300
2.1
Germany
350,000
0.9
Italy
154,400
0.6
Netherlands
180,000
3.0
Portugal
48,000
0.9
Spain
120,000
0.7
Sweden
39,000
1.0
UK
1,052,000
3.5
Source: Syndicat des Entreprises de Travail Temporaire (2005).
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ization of the definitions and regulations in all three areas would result.
EU-level negotiations were concluded successfully on part-time work
in 1997 and on fixed-term contract work in 1999. They produced two
official directives from the European authorities. The negotiations on
TAW were the last to be organized, but in May 2001 they failed despite
repeated efforts to resolve differences.
The EU-level collective negotiations on TAW failed because the
social partners were unable to negotiate an acceptable compromise.
Unions blamed employers for the failure. They perceived employers
as trying to completely deregulate TAW. However, the employer representatives were divided among themselves along two lines: there was
conflict between the interests of the client firms and temporary work
agencies, and the objectives of employers varied from one country to
another. The only result of the negotiations was a common “declaration” that mainly stressed the general principle of equal treatment between temporary agency workers and permanent employees.
Even this declaration was ambiguous on some points and was hardly discussed by the national members of the employers’ organization.
It did not clarify what aspects of permanent employment should be the
reference points for equal treatment, nor whether the permanent employment was in the TWA or the client firm. Making such determinations was not an easy task in the European context. Some countries
legally restrict the role of a TWA to offering temporary workers who are
temporary employees of the TWA to client firms, while in other countries a TWA can in addition select, train, and hire permanent employees
for their future employers. Consequently, the TWAs under these two
different regulations are not the same businesses.
Further EU Actions to Standardize TAW Regulations
After the failure of the TWA negotiations, the European authorities decided to seek an agreement between EU member governments
instead of employers and unions. The basis for this step was the prior
declaration by the EU social partners of the principle of equality of
treatment of temporary agency workers and permanent employees. In
March 2002 the European Commission issued a “draft directive” on
temporary work. It was studied and extensively amended by the European Parliament in November 2002. Although the general principle of
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equal treatment was accepted, there was much discussion of the definitions of the comparable workers and the acceptance of the possibility of
EU members being exempted or allowed to deviate from the principle
(European Industrial Relations Observatory 2002).
The formal objective of the directive proposed in November 2002
by the Commission of European Communities is to ensure better working conditions for temporary workers. This directive defines TWA and
TAW and the workers that will be covered. The Employment, Social
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council examined the directive in
March and June 2003, but an agreement was not reached (European Industrial Relations Observatory 2003). According to the European Trade
Union Confederation (2005), adoption of such an “essential piece of
social legislation” is blocked by a minority of EU member states, namely: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Since then,
nothing more has been done.
Differences in National Definitions of TAW
The major difficulty confronted in the EU discussions is that the
national laws are very dissimilar and do not provide even a minimum
basis for a common perspective on which an EU-level agreement can
be developed. On TAW issues the situation is characterized by such
significant heterogeneity between countries that regulations do not even
use the same vocabulary. Recent changes in national regulations do not
modify this general picture. There is no agreement on what is called
“temporary agency work” and how is it specified relative to other forms
of temporary work or even to standard employment contracts. Furthermore, there is no agreement on what is called a “temporary work agency” or how is it specified relative to other forms of services provided
to firms or to the other forms of three-way relationships between an
employee, an employer who has signed an employment contract with
an employee, and another employer for whom the employee is working
(e.g., service subcontracts or some workforce lending or leasing). Due
to this lack of a common approach, the EU authorities’ proposals have
been written in relatively vague language to avoid conflicts with the
specific regulations of the member nations.
In some countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands,
TAW is fully recognized as a specific employment relationship. In oth-
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ers, the definitions and regulations are vague, and there are no clearly
defined categories. Consequently, the available information on atypical
employment and TAW is extremely diverse and of variable quality. The
public debate at both the national and European levels over appropriate regulatory and collective bargaining approaches to TAW reflects the
lack of accurate, high-quality data and standardized definitions of the
activities being measured.
The 1999 EIRO survey indicated that there are three approaches to
the definition of TAW in Europe: 1) TAW is not clearly distinguished
from other forms of flexible work and therefore can be measured poorly
at best; 2) TAW is determined solely by identifying the companies given
the status known as a TWA; the temporary employment businesses thus
are formally recognized, but their temporary employees are not; and 3)
a defined legal status is given to both the temporary employment agencies and to the employees working for them, so TWA employment can
be relatively easily measured.7 These approaches are discussed below
for the countries using each approach.
No Distinction between TAW and Other Flexible Work
Temporary agency work is not clearly distinguished from other
forms of flexible work in a few countries such as Finland, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom. The lack of reliable quantitative data on TWA in
these countries makes it difficult to determine whether this situation
reflects a very small amount of this type of work in these countries or
the lack of a precise definition that distinguishes TAW from other forms
of employment, particularly other forms of temporary work. This data
measurement problem can be illustrated by using the United Kingdom
as an example. According to Morris (2002), the British Department
of Trade and Industry reported 600,000 temporary agency workers in
2002 in the United Kingdom, contrasting markedly with two other reports. In spring 2002 the British Labour Force Survey reported 275,000
workers (Office for National Statistics 2002), while the Recruitment
and Employment Confederation (REC) reported 1,336,699 workers
(REC 2002).
There is no precise definition of TAW in any of the three countries.
In Finland the contract binding a temporary employment agency to its
employees is almost identical to the contract required by regulations
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for temporary work. Irish regulations hardly intervene in the relationship between temporary work agency and the worker since the Irish
worker has been considered an employee of the client company for a
long time.
In the United Kingdom no unique status is granted to TAW. It depends on the same regulations as any temporary work regardless of
whether workers are employed directly by the client firm or by the employment agency, or even are independent. This treatment of TAW reflects two factors. First, it is frequently the same company that acts both
as an employment agency and as a temporary employment agency as the
term is used in this chapter. No statutory regulation now distinguishes
one activity from the other. As for the formal employment relationship
itself, the courts must determine the employer to whom the employee
is contractually bound: the employment agency or the client company.
Second, temporary workers increasingly can be self-employed. This
means that the agency is only a structure that manages administrative
procedures associated with the employment of the temporary workers.
However, in the beginning of the 1990s the situation of TAW
changed in these countries. For example, in 1994 Finland abolished the
existing regulations on hiring, which distinguished between permanent
and temporary employees. To provide some protection for workers, the
responsibilities of a temporary employment agency and its client company were clarified instead. In 1993 Ireland acknowledged that temporary contracts could be renewed repeatedly, but left it to the courts in
case of conflict to determine whether employer abuses were being perpetrated. Furthermore, the principle was established that a temporary
agency worker was not employed by the client company. In 1994 the
United Kingdom abolished the necessity of TWAs receiving a permit
to do business, and later contemplated new regulations to acknowledge
that an employment relationship exists between the employee and the
“employment agency.” The Employment Relations Act of 1999 removed the prohibition against regulations which restricted employment
agencies from paying temporary workers directly.
Defining Only Temporary Work Agencies
In some countries the presence of TAW is determined by a company
status known as the “temporary work agency.” The prevalence of TAW
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is determined solely by identifying the companies given this status.
These temporary employment businesses are formally recognized, but
their temporary employees are not. This pattern is quite frequent.
The TWA “status” is conferred by very different regulations in these
countries, however, and usually is determined in one of two ways. The
first is to issue a permit for the TWA. A company given the status of a
TWA then becomes the basis for specifying the temporary nature of the
employment relationship between the agency and the employees the
agency sends for assignment to the client firms. The second gives a permanent contract to all employees of a TWA who are sent to an assignment. This permanent contract can be a specific one, or a standard one
used for ordinary open-ended contracts. In this situation it is no longer
the employment contract that separates TAW and other forms of employment but only the status of the employer. The principle of authorizing TWAs as employment agencies now seems established. However,
the principle of a specific open-ended contract, or even a standard openended contract, being used for temporary agency employees seems to
be losing ground, and is now less frequently used than before.
The different national approaches are illustrated by five countries:
Spain, Germany, Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands. For example,
in Spain TWAs have been legally recognized since 1994 and must be
licensed by the state. The employee’s contract can be either permanent
or temporary.
Private TWAs in Germany are subject to the approval of the Federal Employment Department. Until 1997 TWAs were bound to their
employees by a permanent contract, basically similar to any standard
employment contract but the periods of work were for a strictly limited
period. However, a succession of deregulatory measures in 1997, 1998,
and 2003 abolished these limitations. Temporary employment contracts
such as those lasting only the length of a particular assignment were
introduced. For these contracts there was the possibility of reemploying
temps three months after a first assignment, subject to the limitations of
the common regulation of fixed-term contracts.
In Norway temporary agency work is only allowed for unskilled
office or commercial work. Its regulation has established the principle
of the permanent contract, but acknowledges exceptions for which employment contracts can be temporary. The number of these exceptions
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has risen since 1996. Today a temporary contract is more often used by
TWA than a permanent one.
The content of the contract of a temporary agency employee in Austria is prescribed by regulation. It is not required to be a temporary
contract, but it must stipulate the level of pay, the duration of work assignment, the amount of notice required for job termination, the nature
of the work, and the place of work. Thus, while no principle requiring
temporary contracts applies, the content of the contract defines the work
as temporary.
From the perspective of both the status of temporary employment
agencies and the content of the employee’s contract, recent Dutch developments are atypical. The “Flexicurity” and “WAADI” Acts passed
in January 1999 in the Netherlands abolished permits for temporary
work agencies and determined that the temporary worker is progressively bound as employment continues to the employment agency by a
standard contract. This means that time thresholds determine in stages
the increases in employee rights and wages. After 18 months at a single
client firm or 36 months at various firms, the employment contract becomes a standard open-ended contract with the TWA. Storrie (2002)
judges the new Dutch legislation as “rather innovative.”
Defining Both TWAs and Temporary Employees
Finally, in France, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium, a clearly defined legal status is given to the temporary employment agencies. In addition, a
special status differentiates their temporary employees from other temporary workers with ordinary fixed-term contracts and their permanent
employees such as the staff of the agencies.
France has been one of the leaders in the development of TAW and
its regulations since it was first regulated in 1972. Consequently, information on TAW is relatively plentiful when compared to many other
countries. In France, the TWA is not an ordinary firm. Until the beginning of 2005, the provision of temporary employees hired and paid
by the TWA had to be the only profit-making activity of the agency.
However, a new regulation in 2005 allowed a TWA to perform as ordinary employment agency in addition to its specific TWA business. The
TWA also is subject to two special obligations. First, the company must
file statements to document a specified level of financial resources and
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regularly provide the government with a full account of its activities.
Second, a temporary employee of this type of company has a unique
legal contract known as an “assignment contract” with prescribed content, accompanied by a set of extensive rules protecting the employee.
Some other countries have chosen similar approaches. In Portugal,
TWAs must be licensed. Employment contracts are subject to specific
legislation that stipulates the regulations of the three-way relationship.
In Italy, TAW was forbidden until 1997. A law passed in that year authorized TAW for the first time and established the conditions for its
use. The specific character of temporary work agencies was acknowledged. This legislation established a contract for temporary work that
is drawn up between the TWA and the client company. In addition,
special provisions were included that relate to the situation of temporary employees.
The legislation in Belgium defines the various forms of temporary
work but appears to formally avoid defining a status for temporary employment agencies. However, the content required in a TAW contract is
specified and known as “temporary for work on the premises of a third
party.” However, TAW has been affected by the general trends in Belgium toward regulating all nonstandard forms of employment. These
efforts toward formal regulations include extending the required length
of an employment assignment; less monitoring of employers to verify
that they are observing the required length of employment, particularly
by union representatives; and improving social security coverage and
ongoing training for temporary agency employees.8
This section has discussed how regulations have been used to clarify
the three-way relationship specific to TAW. Even those countries pursuing labor market deregulation to extend the use of more flexible types
of employment have developed regulations to provide a clearer legal
framework and better social protection for temporary workers. Thus,
nontraditional forms of employment may be regulated with the ultimate
goal of deregulating more traditional forms of employment. But the
result is the creation of a paradoxical situation: far from deregulated
flexibility, more regulation is being introduced to increase the flexibility
of the labor markets.
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Employer and Union Organizations and
Strategies Toward TAW
As discussed above, the temporary agency business in many European countries is a relatively new and poorly regulated institution.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the relationships between TWA
employer organizations and unions also remain relatively underdeveloped, and that collective bargaining in this sector is still evolving.9
In most EU countries TWAs are organized to varying degrees to
create their own national employer organizations. Today in France,
Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal, there is one national employer organization. A single organization in France was created when two earlier organizations merged in 1998. In Spain and the Netherlands there
are two employer groups. Employers are not organized in a separate
association in only a few countries, such as in Sweden.
In contrast to employers’ organizations, the organization of temporary agency workers in specialized unions is rare, as reported in the
1999 EIRO survey. The report on Italy is the only one that indicates that
unions are exploring concerns related to separate unions for temporary
workers. However, although union attitudes toward TAW are generally
changing as the importance of labor market flexibility is acknowledged,
unions remain largely hostile to TAW. It is this hostility that explains
why unions favor bargaining with the client firm rather than the TWA,
despite the fact that regulations identify the employer for the purposes
of collective bargaining as the TWA instead of the client firm.
As a result of the relative lack of employer and employee organizations, the organization of industrial relations in the TAW businesses
remains relatively weak. A number of TWAs are not covered by the
agreement between sectoral organizations of the social partners. These
TWAs conclude work agreements with their own work councils. Germany is one notable exception, however. An employer organization
for the TWA businesses, the Unternehmensverband für Zeitarbeit e.V
(UZA), was founded in 1969. The first collective bargaining agreement
for TAW was signed in 1970.
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Employer and Union Attitudes toward TAW
The relations between TAW employers and unions are fraught with
tensions and conflicts that arise from the relatively recent growth in most
countries of temporary agency work. All employers who are potential
users of TAW understand the benefits of temporary employment. They
now advocate flexibility in employment arrangements and appreciate
the options provided by TAW for adjusting their labor force with fewer
restricting regulations. In contrast, unions in all of the EU countries perceive the negative impact of TAW since it threatens the employmentrelated rights of the permanent employees. Temporary agency workers
are paid less than the permanent workers, do not have equivalent social
protection, and continue to be subject to employer “abuses.” It is easier
for employers to hire and fire temporary agency workers than permanent employees, to hire temporary workers to replace strikers, and to
fire temporary workers for minor causes without an appeal process.
However, the strategic objectives of employers and unions are not
always antagonistic. Since TAW in Europe is often considered by workers as the worst type of flexible employment arrangement, employers in
some countries have declared their willingness to limit abuses related to
TAW and tried to improve the image of this work. For example, Manpower France declared its willingness to limit TAW abuses, which led
to negotiations with unions before the first TWA regulation in France
in 1972. Also, the public relations activities of French temporary work
agencies seek to convince workers that TAW can be highly skilled and
better paid employment, which can introduce a worker to a real career
for life. They try to convince potential client firms that they can provide
to them highly skilled and better selected people at a lower cost. Spanish employers also agreed to limit abuses, although they disagree with
the unions over what should be done. Swedish employers complain
about the poor quality of temporary agency workers. They consider
better training a more pressing need than any change in the regulations.
German employers also have focused on finding ways to improve the
relatively negative image of TAW.
However, some progress has been made, as unions generally are no
longer overtly hostile to TAW. This reflects either a strategic fallback
position in the face of a fait accompli, or the recognition that it is better
to work toward the improvement of social protections that fit the spe-
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cial situation of TAWs. In some countries the unions now acknowledge
the valid role of TAW. However, they retain the objective of providing
a framework for this type of work, even if it is only to ensure that the
uses of TAW remain within established limits. This is the case in the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy.
Strategies for Compromise
The process of identifying common ground between employers and
unions is not easy. However, appropriate strategies can create the conditions for compromise through collective bargaining between temporary
employment agencies and unions, or client companies and unions.
France and Belgium are countries where some common ground has
been found. French employers in the temporary agency industry called
for standards to be adopted for TAW. Although historically the unions
have long demanded a ban on TAW, they participated in the discussions.
The 1990 cross-sector collective bargaining agreement, extended in the
form of a law in the same year and still in effect today, deals with most
aspects of the relationship between the temporary agency employer and
its employees. A number of agreements in the client industry sectors
relating to areas such as vocational training, safety and hygiene, and
union rights have complemented this agreement. In Belgium, employers have declared themselves in favor of controlled growth for TAW.
The unions within several client companies demanded long and renewable periods of temporary agency employment. However, they signed
an agreement in 1997 supporting the principle that TAW is the best
means for employment flexibility. This represents a major change in the
attitude of the unions toward TAW.
In Italy, a cross-sector collective bargaining agreement quickly followed the enactment of the 1997 law authorizing TAW, even though
differences of opinion between employers and unions delayed the passage of this law. The agreement seems to have been based on the notion
that regulation by collective bargaining agreement is the only way to
avoid inflexible labor markets, and that legislators should not be writing
these regulations.
Even in the United Kingdom, the idea has begun to take root that
some action must be taken due to the increasingly widespread use of
the services of temporary work agencies. The concern is that the lack of
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regulation may create conflict between the dual functions of TWAs of
selecting and hiring permanent workers for their clients, and providing
their own workers for temporary use by the client. This turnabout in the
United Kingdom attitude is particularly interesting since it is the most
hostile country in Europe to any employment regulation other than the
protections against discrimination. However, no major reform has been
undertaken yet.
In addition to negotiations between temporary agency employers
and unions, collective bargaining in client companies also can focus
on TAW at either the firm level or the cross-industry level. In Austria,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands, negotiations have become more
prevalent in both the client company sectors and temporary employment industry, and in Italy and France, even at the cross-sector level. In
a few countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and
Luxembourg, negotiations take place almost exclusively, and sometimes
totally, at the level of the temporary employment agency industry. Organization in Belgium is exemplary. Since 1987 there has been a jointly
run employers and unions committee in the temporary employment industry, which is similar to the organizations used for other industries in
Belgium. In Finland and Sweden, however, there is no negotiation at
the temporary agency industry level; negotiations occur only at client
company level.

The Regulatory Framework: Law and
Collective Bargaining
Temporary agency work is a form of employment that has appeared
in Europe because it initially provided employers with a way to avoid
the constraining regulations governing standard employment. Legislated and negotiated regulations on TAW were developed in response
to limit the maneuvers of employers to cases in which exceptions to
the standard of employment can be justified. As employer ingenuity
found ways to increase the margin for maneuvering despite, or in parallel with, the law or collective agreements with which they are supposed
to comply, regulations have been updated in an effort to reduce the margin for maneuvering, reduce the scope of abuses, and impose standards.
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Temporary agency work and its regulation have continued to evolve
over the past 10 to 15 years, but are not reproducing the traditional industrial relations models previously used in Europe.
A typology of three regulatory frameworks is commonly used in
Europe. The first model is the Latin countries (the South), where the
state imposes a large number of regulations which are not always properly obeyed. The second is the German-Scandinavian model (the continental North), in which regulation has historically imposed obligatory
minimum standards. Finally there is the British model, largely influenced by the dominant free market theories of the 1980s and 1990s. In
this model there is an almost total absence of regulation for TAW.
The following analysis of the national reports from the EIRO centers
illustrates the limitations of these traditional industrial relations models
when applied to the case of TAW because new employment trends are
reducing the differences between the three models and thereby the relevance of such a typology. Negotiation no longer augments the legally
enforced standards as was the usual historical function of collective
bargaining in many countries. Instead, negotiation may, under some
conditions, remove or challenge the advantages granted to employees
under the law. The interesting question is what the regulatory model of
the future will be.
The Latin Model
According to the Latin model, the state imposes many regulations,
but they are not always followed properly. However, there have been
no regulations for TAW for a long time, and the need for a framework
has surfaced only in the last few years. This change occurred in a period
when the Latin model had already been altered to some extent through
negotiated regulation achieved through collective bargaining. Although
almost unknown in the past, negotiated regulation has become to varying degrees an accepted practice in recent years. Italy and Spain are
examples of this model, while Greece and Portugal are exceptions. The
early and protective regulation of TAW in France is unique.
Italy is an excellent example of the change operating within the
Latin Model. According to the 1999 EIRO survey, the late recognition
of TAW in this country in 1997 is attributable to the deep-seated differences in the positions taken by employers and unions toward TAW. Two
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collective bargaining agreements (one national across industries and the
other national for the TWA business sector) were signed in 1998 immediately after this recognition. Compared to the provisions of the 1997
law, the negotiated agreements were more restrictive on certain points,
such as the introduction of a maximum length for TAW assignments.
However, the agreements were more flexible on other points, such as
identifying new situations in which TAW can be used by a company and
stipulating the rights of temporary employees. Thus, negotiation rapidly
imposed its mark.
Spain has followed a pattern similar to that of Italy. Temporary
agency work has been recognized in Spain by law since 1994 (with
amendments in 1995 and 1997). Some unions refused any recognition
of TAW. Others tried to limit the use of TAW to the strictly temporary
needs of client companies or to give some special permanent contracts
to temporary workers, and to provide better protections to workers. Employers recognized that abuses occurred. Finally, the collective bargaining agreements of 1997 and 1998 attempted to improve the regulation
of TAW. These agreements were negotiated cross-sector and within the
TWA sector, including one known as the state agreement, which was
later changed into a law. The 1999 EIRO survey stressed that TAW
remains a central theme of collective bargaining negotiations in Spain,
but it is the subject of incessant dispute between employers and unions
about the desired model of TAW.
Greece and Portugal are the exceptions to the Latin model. In
Greece, as already noted, there is still no official acknowledgment of
TAW either in legislation or negotiated agreements. The 1999 EIRO
survey stressed that in Portugal TAW is regulated by a 1989 law. This
legislation supersedes a collective bargaining agreement that has never
been enforced. However, union participation is occurring now as part
of the general public debate over the changes that should be made to
the 1989 law.
France is a special case within the group of Latin countries due to
its early and very protective regulation of TAW. Moreover, contrary
to the reputation of the French government that regulates everything,
regulations negotiated through collective bargaining have been part and
parcel of the French legislative decisions for many years. Although the
regulation of TAW in France is principally carried out by enacting legislation, on several occasions the law has only reviewed and modified
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a number of the issues previously negotiated by employers and unions.
For example, the first French law on TAW in 1972 was based largely on
the previous provisions adopted by Manpower France. Again, in 1990,
the government used the option known as “extension” in the French
industrial relations system to confer legal status on the provisions of the
cross-sector collective bargaining agreement for the temporary work
business.
The German-Scandinavian Model
The principles of the German-Scandinavian model include minimum standards imposed by legislation with almost all additional regulations imposed by collective bargaining. This model is not any better
suited to the field of TAW than the Latin model. Although Austria is
still a good example of this model as applied to TAW, it does not fit the
other countries well (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and
Germany) due to one of two considerations. In some countries the law
prescribes some limits and/or principles that significantly restrict the
opportunities for collective bargaining negotiations on TAW. In other
countries the current trend toward deregulation and increased flexibility
in employment are changing profoundly the fundamental characteristics of the relationship between legislation and negotiation to the detriment of the former.
Austrian law carefully frames the work of temporary employment
agencies. These agencies must have permits to operate and observe the
obligatory content of the contract binding the TWA and the employee.
A TWA sector-level collective bargaining agreement complements the
law on pay issues. Moreover, the collective agreements of many client
companies deal specifically with the issue of TAW. The primary concern is the requirement that temporary work agency employees must be
recruited on permanent contracts.
In contrast, TAW in Norway is an excellent illustration of how the
legal framework significantly restricts the opportunities for collective
bargaining negotiations on TAW, thereby deviating from the GermanScandinavian model. The 1999 EIRO survey emphasizes that a wide
margin has developed in Norway between the laws which establish legal principles and bans on activities so that TAW is strictly regulated,
relative to the actual practices of the client firms. Probably for this rea-

Gleason.indb 291

11/13/2006 9:07:03 AM

292 Michon

son, TAW is as widespread in Norway as in many other EU countries,
and now accounts for 2 percent of the labor force. The EIRO survey
observes that collective bargaining seems to have neglected TAW since
this sector is not yet covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
However, TAW does not seem to be the subject of any significant dispute. With no information available on disputes, the report can only
theorize that issues related to TAW are discussed in the in-house negotiations with the client companies.
The case of TAW in Denmark illustrates a change in the relationship between legislation and negotiation. Prior to 1990, the regulation
of TAW was carried out by legislation. The law only allowed TAW in
a few industries (retail and office work) and only licensed temporary
employment agencies were allowed to handle it. In 1990 both sets of
restrictions were lifted. Subsequently collective bargaining has grown
rapidly in the newly opened industries.
Curiously, the regulation of TAW in Germany appears to be a bad
example of the German-Scandinavian model. Regulations in this country have undergone a rather stormy passage. The first and only collective bargaining agreement ever reached on TAW dates back to the
1970s. The principle of a permanent contract binding a temporary employee to the TWA was laid out in the first piece of legislation in 1972.
In 1989 the collective bargaining agreement was not renewed. In 1997
statutory constraints were greatly relaxed. At present temporary employees still are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and
remain outside the participation system which regulates all the German
industrial relations.10
In the Netherlands the model of a complementary relationship between laws and negotiation is apparent. A law passed in January 1999
altered the legal framework by removing any specific definition of
TAW, requirements to license temporary employment agencies, and
the need to acknowledge the temporary nature of the employment contract. However, TAW has been the focus of a high degree of negotiation
between temporary work agencies and unions, client companies and
unions, and employers’ associations of temporary work agencies and
associations acting on behalf of client companies.
A similar scenario to that of the Netherlands occurred in 1991 in
Sweden, when the sector called “workforce rent” was deregulated.
Since the deregulation collective bargaining in Sweden has devoted
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more attention to TAW. For example, the local union must approve the
hiring of any temporary staff, including temporary agency workers. The
union also must participate in a discussion of pay between two assignments for temporary agency workers. However, this is not as radical as
in the contemporary Netherlands. Despite deregulation the Swedish law
still guarantees temporary agency workers some minimal protection.
Examples include the possibility of being hired on a permanent contract
by the client company, and prohibiting a client firm from asking its employees whose fixed-term contracts have just expired to return to work
as temporary employment agency workers. The current debate primarily is focused on the possible introduction of a system of licensing by an
independent authority for temporary employment agencies.
The British Model
The British model is still in effect in the United Kingdom, even
though the current administration is said to be thinking of regulating
the employment contract by binding the employee and the “employment agency.” Since there are only a few regulations of employment
relationships in the United Kingdom, and above all of TAW, firms do
not have to use any innovative practices to avoid the prescriptions of
the legislator.

Rules Governing the Use of TAW and the
Protection of Employees
The discussion in the previous section focuses on the differences in
the policy approaches used to control the use of TAW. They typically
involve the joint use of legislation and collective bargaining agreements
in various combinations determined by the national industrial relations
systems of each EU country. In this section the discussion is focused on
the key aspects of TAW that legislation or bargaining seek to regulate.
In addition to the rules that control the business of TWAs such
as the requirement to have a permit to operate, the regulations control the use of TAW by client firms and provide some social protection
to the temporary employee. There are four main types of regulations:
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those that 1) control the length of TAW contract; 2) define the employment situations in which user firms can ask for workers from agencies;
3) require parity in the conditions of employment and pay between temporary agency workers and permanent workers doing the same work
in a client company; and 4) grant union and representation rights to
temporary agency workers in the client company and/or in the temporary employment agency, and regulate union and representation rights
to ordinary employees and union representatives in the client company
when temporary agency workers are present.
Table 9.3 presents a brief overview of the key regulated aspects of
TAW. It can be observed that a deep gulf divides the countries that have
deregulated TAW to varying degrees (in some cases, almost completely as in the United Kingdom) and those that are maintaining or even
strengthening the legislative or negotiated framework.
Permitted Use of TAW, Contract Length, and Parity
Many European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Norway, Portugal, and Spain) always control TAW in the first three key
aspects simultaneously. Therefore, regulations determine the maximum
length of assignment for which a worker is hired, the circumstances
in which temporary agency workers can be used, and the principle of
parity in conditions of work and pay between TAW and permanent employees.
As discussed above, when TAW was legally introduced in Italy, it
was with strict control of TWA businesses. The Italian law did not set
any limitation on the length of assignments. However, two 1998 collective bargaining agreements limited both the use of TAW and the length
of contracts. One contract that covered the TWA businesses determined
that TAW could be used only in case of an absence of an employee, to
provide skills that are not present within the client firm, or for any other
reason negotiated through collective bargaining. The other contract was
the April 1998 national multi-industry agreement. It identified which
reasons are acceptable to use temporary agency workers: to provide
coverage in periods of additional workload, skills not present on the labor market, and employees who could perform specific tasks that could
not be performed by an employee of the firm. Contract length, includ-
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ing four renewals, was limited to 24 months. Other regulations required
parity with permanent employees.
Since TAW was first regulated in 1972, in France the regulations
have been relaxed or strengthened in response to the interest of the political majority and new choices of collective bargaining. For example,
a 1990 change reintroduced a list of authorized uses for temporary
agency workers which had been suppressed a few years earlier. The
list limited the use to the replacement of an absent employee, the replacement of a departing employee when the job must be filled only
temporarily, filling a position until a new permanent employee arrives,
handling a temporary additional workload, and completing tasks defined as temporary “by nature.” Temporary agency workers thus cannot
be used to do the standard work of the firm, to fill core permanent jobs,
or to replace strikers. The standard length of assignments is limited to
18 months, including renewals. The length of the contract must be indicated in a written contract between the employee and the employer.
In some very specific situations, such as those that arise when the end
of the work assignment cannot be determined at the time the contract is
written, the contract can be left open-ended. However, in these cases,
the written contract must indicate a minimum length for the assignment.
Parity with permanent workers is formally required. In this context,
the recent 2005 change is often considered a “revolution.” Some new
uses are authorized, which are not defined in terms of user firm needs,
but in terms of worker profile: to contribute to employment policies, it
is authorized to use temporary agency work for people with very low
employability.
If controls are present generally in all the three areas simultaneously, there are countries where they may be very strict in some area or
concerning some specific situation and weak in another. For example, in
Belgium the maximum period of time for which temporary agency staff
can be employed varies greatly. Temporary agency work contracts are
limited to 15 days if the employee is covering for a permanent member
of staff, or 12 months with possible extension for a further six months if
there is an increase in company workload. Compared to Belgium, Italy
with its maximum of a 24-month period and four renewals (see above)
is the complete opposite.
For continental Europeans, it is not surprising to observe that the
United Kingdom has no regulations stipulating a maximum length of
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Country
Austria
Belgium

Denmark

Regulation of maximum
length of TAW contract
None
15 days–12 months
(including renewal)
depending on
circumstances
None

Finland
France

None
Usually 18 months
(including renewal),
but 9 of 24 months in
some circumstances

Germany

None

Greece
Ireland

None
None

Restrictions on use of TAW
Parity with
(permitted uses)
permanent workers
Very few
Yes
Significant (replacement
Yes
of employee, temporary
increase in workload and
special work)
None
No (only by CB in
some sectors)
None
No
Significant (replacement
Yes
of employees, temporary
increase in workload and
inherently temporary work),
specific workforce groups
(very low employability)
Very few
Introduced in the
2003 legislation,
can be suppressed
by CB
None
No
None
No

Exercise of union/
representation rights
for TAW workers
No special provisions
Mainly in agency

No special provisions
No special provisions
Mainly in agency

Divided but mainly in
agency

No special provisions
No special provisions
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24 months (including 4
renewals) by CB

Luxembourg

12 months, including 2
renewals

Netherlands
Norway

None
None

Portugal

6–12 months

Spain

No maximum in some
cases, 6 months in
others (up to 18 months
by CB)

Sweden
UK

None
None

Significant (replacement,
special skills, or—by CB—
for workload peaks, specific
tasks/skills)
Significant (specific, nonpermanent jobs, not part of
enterprise’s normal activity)
Very few
Significant (replacement,
seasonal work and
unpredictable, short-term
changes in activity—
exceptions by CB)
Significant (replacement,
temporary increases in
workload, and short-lived
seasonal tasks)
As for other temporary
work (replacement,
specific work, market
circumstances, temporary
increases in workload)
None
Very few

11/13/2006 9:07:04 AM

NOTE: CB = collective bargaining
Source: 1999 Eiro Survey (reproduced from EIRO [2000]).

Yes

Divided but mainly in
agency

Yes

Divided but mainly in
agency

Yes
No

No special provisions
In agency

Yes

In agency (user
company after 2 years)

Yes

Mainly in the user
company

No
No

In agency
No special provisions

Temporary Agency Work in Europe 297

Italy

298 Michon

contract, rules on parity, nor constraints restricting the activities of “employment agencies” to specific employment situations in which they
can be used. Existing regulations only impose the principles of racial
and sexual equality, and equal opportunities for the disabled and union
members, for every type of employment contract.
It is more surprising to observe the same absence of regulations in
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the same exception for parity. In Denmark, for example, collective bargaining agreements in industries using
agency workers include rules on wage parity. In Sweden, wage parity is
not one of the basic principles enshrined in law, but temporary agency
workers have the right to the same safety and hygiene conditions as
permanent staff.
Two countries have recently relaxed their regulations: Germany and
the Netherlands. Prior to 1997, Germany required open-ended contracts
between an agency and temporary agency workers, and restricted TAW
to a list of formally defined uses. In 1997 fixed-term contracts were
introduced. These contracts must have exactly the same length as the
assignment in the client firm, and maximum length of the assignment
was increased from 9 to 12 months. Furthermore, the use restrictions
were eliminated.
The Netherlands abolished maximum length limits on contracts in
1999. At the same time the employment contract for TAW was transformed into an open-ended contract after an employee worked for 26
weeks for the same client company. Also, the regulation determining
the content of every standard employment contract, whether fixed-term
or open-ended, was changed. The dismissal procedure for the openended contracts was relaxed. Furthermore, the existing regulations on
parity were maintained.
It is difficult to evaluate these changes in Germany and the Netherlands. It is not clear whether they represent deregulation or a change in
the regulation of TAW (see Storrie 2002, p. 17).
Unions’ Effects on Key Aspects of TAW
The regulation of TAW within a country depends on the political and social power relations and the features of the national labor
markets. Predicting the union and representation rights for temporary
agency workers within a country is difficult due to several consider-
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ations. First, weak, nonexplicit, and poorly formalized regulation of the
conditions of TWA does not mean that unions are without any power
against possible abuses by employers. It can be the opposite: union
control balances the weakness of formal regulations. In Sweden, for
example, where the constraints on the use of temporary agency workers
are minimal, the request for temporary agency workers must be approved by employee representatives in the client company. Belgium,
which otherwise imposes much more constraint, is the only other country where the agreement of employee representatives is required. In a
small number of other countries, such as Germany, Italy, Norway, and
Portugal, union agreement is not required, but employee representatives must be informed. In the other countries, whatever the regulations
of the use of TAW—whether very detailed and strict, minimal, or no
control—employers have no obligation to inform unions or employee
representatives of the use of temporary agency workers.
Second, powerful unions and strictly controlled TAW do not necessary imply either specific unionization or representation rights equivalent to those of every ordinary employee. Union rights of temporary
agency workers are not always recognized. And where they are recognized, this may be within the temporary employment agency, as in
France, Luxembourg, and Norway, or within the client company, as in
Sweden and Italy. In Germany, temporary agency workers cannot vote
or stand for election to representative authorities, but may take part in
meetings and consult employee representatives in their company. In
Italy, the right to engage in union activity does not prevent temporary
agency workers from being excluded from calculations to work out the
number of seats granted to employee representatives within the user
firm or the appropriate unit of the user firm.
Finally, there is little correlation between the existence of regulations on the maximum length of employment, the circumstances of
the valid use of temporary agency staff, and the principles of parity on
the one hand, and the recognition of temporary agency workers’ union
rights and the role played by the employees’ representatives on the other. It can be hypothesized that the more powerful unions are, and/or the
tighter the labor market conditions, the more regulation of temporary
agency work can be expected. However, this hypothesis has not been
empirically tested.
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Conclusions and Directions for
Future Research
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of TAW
in the EU. However, it also has shown how large the differences in
TAW are between the EU members and how difficult it is to make comparisons within the EU. Additional comparative research therefore will
help us to better understand TAW and its contributions to improving
labor market flexibility.
The history of temporary work agencies is highly variable within
EU: some are relatively old businesses as in France, while others are
very recent businesses as in Italy where TAW was authorized only a few
years ago. In some countries TAW is highly regulated and strictly controlled by national legislation and collective bargaining, while in others,
such as the United Kingdom, it is relatively unregulated. Even if the
present dynamics suggest some convergence to more deregulated TAW,
no really common definitions of TAW are used throughout the EU.
The widely varying status and regulation of TAW in the EU member
states are closely linked to and dependent on those of standard employment relationships, which remain as different from one EU member to
the other as those of the TAW relationships. Due to these significant
cross-national differences, it is not surprising that any solid agreement
at the EU level about TAW issues, even the principle of parity between
temporary agency workers and permanent employees, remains illusive.
Today European labor markets are trapped between two contradictory dynamics. One set of increased pressures is working for a deregulated labor market at EU member states level. This is being countered
by the increased necessity to provide some regulation at the EU level
to avoid social dumping from unregulated countries, especially the new
EU members from Eastern Europe.
Only one trend has emerged that allows us to predict the directions
in which TAW will evolve in the future: new employment relationships
are being tested by EU members as ways of making European labor
markets more flexible and adaptable to the changing economic forces
of the global economy. Temporary agency work is one of these new
relationships; it presently represents something like a social laboratory
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in Europe. It can be expected to be an important issue at the heart of
collective bargaining in Europe in the foreseeable future.
Several topics will provide useful insights to guide future developments in EU-level employment and industrial relations policies. First,
in-depth national case studies will provide useful insights into the forces resulting in changes in labor market institutions. The cases should
discuss the recent trends in the development of temporary agency work
and the contribution of TAW to greater labor market flexibility. Second,
more information is needed about the best way to regulate TAW. Conducting and comparing in-depth case studies in countries with different
approaches to TAW will provide useful insights into the optimal policies for national regulation. Third, because at present only part-time and
fixed-term contracts are measured by European surveys, while TAW is
not, case studies will provide the knowledge needed to design statistical surveys to collect better comparative data on TWA and the other
nonstandard employment arrangements that provide employers with
options for better numerical flexibility. Fourth, national comparative
case studies of the strategies of employers’ organizations and unions
will provide better information on issues related to the future of TAW.
Specifically, it is necessary to understand why the national employer
organizations did not succeed in harmonizing their positions at the European level and the implications for future harmonization efforts.
Finally, at present TAW remains primarily low-skilled jobs. However, two changes have been observed that may affect the future directions of the development of TAW. First, it has been observed in many
countries that temporary work agencies are beginning to prospect labor
markets with better qualified workers, but we do not know whether this
is a new strategy in all European countries. Second, TAW is primarily present in the industrial sector in some European countries and in
the service sector in other countries. It is not clear whether there is
any convergence occurring between the European countries that will
reduce these differentiations between European countries or whether
such changes should be anticipated. Comparative case studies and comparative statistical surveys can be used to answer these questions.
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Notes
1. The defining characteristic of TAW is the three-way relationship between the employee (the temporary agency worker), the company called the “temporary work
agency” (the employer in most of the national legislation), and the client firm
(the user of the employees of the temporary work agency). See Gonos (1997, p.
105) for further discussion of this relationship.
2. From 1990 through 2004, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rates in the
EU-15 (the members prior to May 1, 2004, when new members were accepted)
ranged from a low of 7.4 percent in 2001 to high of 10.5 percent in 1994. During
the same period in the United States, the unemployment rate ranged from a low
of 4.0 percent in 2000 to a high of 7.5 percent in 1992 (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2005a,b).
3. The Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) is the official
institute for processing and publishing comparable data at the EU level. The
statistical agencies of the EU member countries collect the data, but EUROSTAT
works with them to define common data collection methods. EUROSTAT then
consolidates the data and adjusts the data as needed so that they are comparable.
4. National estimates that are not based on a standardized definition of TAW cannot
be used for any serious international comparison.
5. A summary of the study is available at the following Web site: http://www
.eurofound.eu.int/working/tempagency_new.htm, updated December 2002. The
summary presents the main findings and conclusions from Storrie (2002). The
report is based on 15 national reports commissioned by the European Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
6. Specifically, an industrial relations system for the EU is only beginning to
emerge, and is in the very early stages of development. Many difficulties arise
due to the fact that the national industrial relations systems are organized very
differently, with varying rules for unions and different levels and competencies
in collective bargaining.
			 The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE)
on one side and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on the other
are the main representatives of the national organizations and confederations
for Europe-wide collective negotiations. Note that only confederations rather
than the unions or associations themselves are represented in this organization of
EU-level collective bargaining. Also, all of the national confederations of trade
unions are not represented in ETUC. For example, one of the largest unions in
France, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), was not a member of
ETUC until a few years ago. Furthermore, newly created national unions and
confederations rarely are represented.
7. The one notable exception to these three categories is Greece. In this country
even regular work is not formally defined, so there is almost no information
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about the different forms of employment. However, TAW is known to exist in
Greece.
8. In Europe, depending on the country, social security refers to benefits such as
illness coverage and pension contributions as well as employment security and
unemployment benefits.
9. There are three possible levels for collective bargaining on TWA: 1) the level of
the actual TWA business when it exists in a specific sector depending on the rules
of each country, 2) the level of client firms (each client sector or level of users of
any sector), and 3) the cross-industry level including the TWA business and the
client business.
10. The German participation system allows unions to be part of the decision system
of the firm.
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Where Do We Go from Here?
Sandra E. Gleason
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The nonstandard workforce has grown in the mature industrialized
nations of the United States, Japan, and Europe. On the demand side of
the labor market this growth has been a response to a common set of
forces for change. These forces include the globalization of economies,
deregulation of labor markets, rapid advances in technology that have
created the information age, and other factors that require employers
to adjust more agilely to continuous change. On the supply side of the
labor market the growth has reflected the desire of many workers for
more flexible employment options to accommodate life stage and lifestyle preferences. Due to these demand and supply forces, nonstandard
employment is expected to continue to grow in the future.
The structural changes that mature industrialized nations are undergoing and the resulting (sometimes negative) impact on the nonstandard
labor force highlighted the inadequacies of the present labor market infrastructures. For example, in the United States, policies, laws, and institutions developed in the New Deal in the 1930s structure the current
employment relationship. However, the research presented in this volume shows that this system no longer meets the needs of many workers,
employers, or the U.S. economy, because the premises on which the
New Deal system was based have changed. Specifically, workers, who
primarily were male, were expected to have a long-term, full-time employment relationship with only one employer during their careers. The
system required reciprocity: employers provided employees with job
security; in return, employees were a loyal and committed workforce
for the employer. This set of bilateral expectations—often referred to as
a “psychological contract”—defined the operational concept of a “good
job” (Stone 2004). In contrast, the workforce of today—particularly the
more educated workers in their twenties and thirties—expects to have
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multiple employers during a career, is more diverse, desires greater
flexibility, and has less concern for security (Kochan 1998). This expectation of a “boundaryless career” is part of the new psychological
contract of the future (Stone 2004).
Some authors have noted that the current definition of a “good job”
is actually relatively new because it was developed in the twentieth
century. The growth of contingent and short-term employment contracts thus represents a return to the historical past when contingent
employment was the norm for most workers. Nevertheless, despite the
recency of our definition of “good jobs,” this is the definition used to
frame much of the research on employment, and continues to provide
the benchmark against which alternative employment arrangements are
compared (Kelloway, Gallagher, and Barling 2004).
The attention focused on nonstandard employment over the past
several decades has changed the way we think about jobs, even though
nonstandard employment has not—and will not—become the dominant
model of employment in the countries discussed in this book. What has
changed is the perception that a career-long tenure with one employer
will no longer be the norm in the future. There is now an awareness that
employees will bear more risks in the labor market than in the past as
they move between different types of working-time employment arrangements, such as from full-time to part-time status.1 The risks include job loss and fluctuations in pay. However, “these are changes of
degree, not of kind. They . . . constitute . . . a reallocation within a stable
institutional structure dominated by standard employment arrangements” (Jacoby 1999).
Kochan (1998) argues that the situation in the United States today
is analogous to the period from the turn of the century to the 1930s
prior to the New Deal. It took about 30 years to develop the intellectual
foundations of the New Deal. Similarly, researchers have been studying for about 30 years the changes in nonstandard employment and the
myriad forces determining them. However, they still are grappling with
the realization that the fundamental premises on which the current employment relations system was built no longer apply to many workers,
and trying to determine what this implies for the future. Consequently,
we have not yet developed the intellectual foundation that will define
the characteristics of a new system and a new social contract. Japan
and the countries of the European Union (EU) also are facing a similar

Gleason.indb 308

11/13/2006 9:07:05 AM

Where Do We Go from Here? 309

challenge (see Jouen and Caremier 2000). The labor market institutions
that worked well after World War II no longer fit the needs of their
national economies. Kochan concludes that for the future “Identifying
the specific features of these institutions and policies remains the key
intellectual challenge and responsibility of this, and, perhaps, if history is any guide, the next generation of researchers and professionals”
(Kochan 1998, p. 245).

The Challenges for Future Research
The challenges in the development of appropriate labor market policies for a new social contract are to clearly identify the problems that
need to be addressed, measure empirically their dimensions, determine
which problems are the most important and therefore worthy of policy
attention, and then select the “best” policy options in light of identified
trade-offs. High-quality research is fundamental to this process. It must
be based on a balanced analysis of the issues, rather than perspectives
expressed in the media, which tend to be skewed to either promanagement or prolabor viewpoints.
When thinking about the identification and measurement of labor
market problems, it is important to consider the challenges created by
the heterogeneity of nonstandard workers and ongoing evolution of the
theoretical models used to analyze the demand and supply forces. The
heterogeneity of this segment of the workforce requires researchers to
use data that permit the analysis of the subgroups of contingent workers that are negatively affected by their employment arrangements. For
example, a variety of U.S. government databases are available for this
purpose, but must be combined and better organized to facilitate research (U.S. Department of Labor 1994). However, it is not always possible to find data that define precisely the groups of workers of interest,
so the severity of the negative effects of contingent employment may be
overstated or understated (Lester 1998).
Furthermore, the theoretical models on which empirical analysis
can be based are continuing to evolve. For example, there is no general
agreement on the correct theoretical model to use to frame the analysis
of the labor market effects on those workers disadvantaged by contin-
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gent employment. Lester (1998) argues that we need an improved understanding of the “root harm” experienced by disadvantaged groups,
which considers both workers’ abilities and preferences. This harm
fundamentally is underemployment resulting from a mismatch between
the jobs held by workers and their skills, interests, and human capital.
While the New Keynesian models of involuntary unemployment seem
to offer the best analytical approach for the analysis of “root harm,”
they have not been tested empirically. Thus, their ability to provide insights into appropriate legal reforms is unknown (Lester 1998).
Similarly, as Michon notes in Chapter 9, cross-national research is
complicated by the lack of data to compare groups of workers defined
in the same way across nations and an absence of well-developed theoretical models. The reasons for variations and the extent of the diversity
observed across nations in the use of different nonstandard employment arrangements have received little attention; this has hindered our
understanding of how the established institutions and cultural contexts
explain particular national adaptations and the variations in the rate of
adaptation. However, since the 1990s the “new institutionalism” has
been developing; this approach seeks to explain how rules embodied
in various institutions shape economic, social, and political activities
(Godard 2004, pp. 232–235). This approach requires the researcher to
understand national institutions and values as a precursor to explaining
national changes in response to global forces (Godard 2004, p. 246;
Martin and Bamber 2004, p. 293).

Conceptualizing Policy Effects
The infrastructures of the United States, Japan, and the European
Union were designed to meet the needs of an earlier era. The growth of
the global economy has restructured many sectors of these economies.
What is needed now are new ways to improve labor market flexibility
through policy changes to, or redesign of, the infrastructure of tax, labor, and employment laws and institutions.
Two major policy approaches have been identified to provide coverage for a greater number of employees by extending coverage to contingent workers: 1) to revise the laws to expand the eligibility standards
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determining coverage, and 2) to eliminate the gray areas of legal interpretations. Table 10.1 is used to illustrate how the two approaches
would affect selected employment laws in the United States.
Table 10.1 (which is based on the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6)
presents the employer’s perspective on the coverage of workers under
five categories of employment laws for six types of employment arrangements. At one extreme are the full-time, permanent core employees in “good jobs,” while at the other end of the spectrum are independent contractors. The legal standing of these two groups of workers
generally is clearly defined. However, these usually are not the workers
of concern to those advocating improvements in public policies affecting nonstandard employment. The workers of concern are those in the
middle—the part-time, temporary, and leased employees, differentiated
by the firm that hires them. In Table 10.1, “Yes” indicates coverage
Table 10.1 Employer Perspective: Coverage by Selected Employment
Laws of Employment Relationships in the United States
Employment
relationship
Full-time, permanent,
core worker
Part-time worker
hired by employer
Temporary worker
hired by employer
Temporary worker
provided by agency
Leased worker
provided by agency
Independent contractor

FICA &
FUTAa
Yes

Qualified
FLSA
retirement (minimum Workers’
plan
wage) compensation

EEO
laws

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Uncertainb Noc

Yes

Yes

Yes

Uncertainb Uncertainc Yes

Yes

Yes

Uncertain Uncertain Yesd

Uncertain

Uncertain

Uncertain Uncertain Yesd

Uncertain

Uncertain

No

No

No

No

No

a

These federal statutes provide unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare
coverage.
b
Workers will quality for coverage only if the eligibility criteria are satisfied (see Chapter 5).
c
An employee must work at least 1,000 hours, the equivalent of one year of service in
a 12-month period, to qualify.
d
The contentious issue is not the payment of the minimum wage, but rather the requirement that an employee must be paid overtime pay at time and one-half after 40 hours
of work. However, independent contractors are exempt from this requirement.
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by the employment laws of workers for each type of employment arrangement; “No” indicates noncoverage; and “Uncertain” indicates that
coverage is uncertain and varies with the eligibility requirements, legal
interpretations, and compliance. The heterogeneity of treatment resulting from varying legal definitions and interpretations used to determine
when a worker is an “employee” has created what Befort (2003) describes as “a veritable regulation-free zone in portions of the contingent
work landscape,” a “Black Hole of Workplace Regulation.”
The first policy approach is to revise the laws to expand the workbased eligibility requirements for employment-based benefits to expand
eligibility, thereby covering more nonstandard workers. For example,
prorated benefits could be provided for pension coverage for workers
who work less than the current requirement of one year of service in
a 12-month period. A variation is to include under the coverage of the
statutes any industries or firms that are currently exempted from the
legislation to expand the number of workers covered. This approach
requires changing each law in Table 10.1, thereby affecting the workers
by column.
The second policy approach is to eliminate the gray areas of legal
interpretations that exclude some workers from employment protections, thereby expanding coverage to more employees. This approach
can be partially successful without changing the content of the laws per
se by using a two-pronged approach: clarifying terminology and improving compliance within the existing laws. The Dunlop Commission
addressed the issues of confusing terminology resulting from multiple
definitions of “employee” by recommending the adoption of one definition of “employer” and one definition of “employee” for all workplace
laws “based on the economic realities of the employment relationship”
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994). If this recommendation was followed,
such as through the development of model laws and practices based on
the consistent use of definitions, the laws would have to be revised. In
terms of Table 10.1, most if not all of the uncertain outcomes would be
eliminated if consistent definitions were used for all laws. Improved
compliance would affect both the columns and the rows.
Improvements in compliance within existing laws can be achieved
through several tactics. It will be helpful to employers to have clearer
guidance about their legal responsibilities, such as more user-friendly
guidelines for following the laws. Employer compliance is mandated
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when low-wage workers are unionized because union contracts clearly
define these workers as “employees.” In addition, some nonprofit organizations, such as the Center for a Changing Workforce (CFCW) and the
National Employment Law Project (NLEP), work to enforce compliance
by ensuring that employees are correctly classified by employers.
The CFCW focuses on “permatemps”2 and provides “advice and
consultations for individuals and organizations on employment issues,
litigation, and public policy” while also analyzing policy and legislation related to permatemps and tracking litigation. An illustrative project is its investigation in response to a request from AFSCME Council
28 to determine whether the University of Washington Medical Center
was misclassifying employees. The 2002 report presented to AFSCME
stated that “there has been widespread misuse of hourly ‘temporary’
employees at UWMC” (Center for a Changing Workforce 2002; Hanbey 2003). Similarly, the NLEP Nonstandard Worker Project “seeks to
ensure that all workers regardless of what their employer calls them—
temp, independent contractor, part-timer—receive the full benefits of
labor and employment laws” (National Employment Law Project).
A two-dimensional table similar to Table 10.1 also can be developed
for Japan and the countries of Europe to help researchers understand the
potential impact of various policy changes. However, in the case of
Europe, the analysis is compounded by the presence of EU regulations.
This will require a three-dimensional diagram to more fully illustrate
the potential of cross-national EU policy effects.
Well-designed research can help predict and evaluate the effects of
policy changes. This information then can be used to design the appropriate changes in policy based on the identified trade-offs and evaluation
of economic efficiency, equity, security, and liberty of the policy (see
Chapter 6 for a review of these concepts). This process of evaluations
reminds us that we have choices in shaping how the forces for change in
the global economy are managed. There are no “. . . overwhelming and
uncontrollable market forces [that] have made the trend toward contingency as we know it inevitable” (Gonos 1997, p. 104). Furthermore,
pursuing the policy changes guided by research will “open up employment policy and practice to a period of experimentation and opportunities for further learning” (U.S. Department of Labor 1994, p. 13).
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Directions for Future Research
Throughout this book a number of topics for future research related to the intellectual challenge posed by Kochan (1998) have been
discussed. These are reviewed from four perspectives. First, research
can explain more fully how employers make strategic decisions regarding the best mix of permanent and nonstandard employees, as well as
the best mixes of alternative employment arrangements. To guide policy choices, we need a better understanding of decision making under
varying circumstances and the impact of these choices on management
practices. Also, research can guide the expansion of the coverage of
employment and benefits protections for contingent workers. In addition, more comparative research on the impact of variations in regulation will help to guide policy development as nations learn from each
other. Finally, research can help us evaluate the effectiveness of strategies used by unions and nonprofit organizations to improve the conditions of work and economic welfare of contingent workers.
Employers’ Strategic Decision Making and Management Practices
The limited empirical evidence has identified demand-side factors
as dominant when explaining the growth of nonstandard employment
(Kahn 2000). Progress has been made in our understanding of the complexity of employers’ strategies to mix permanent workers and varieties
of nonstandard employees. However, future research focused on employers’ decision making can further clarify three issues. First, we need
a better understanding of the factors influencing strategic decisions that
result in the hiring of nonstandard workers. Second, we need better information about the conditions under which employers choose to implement standards that treat contingent employees more equitably. Finally,
we need to know whether different management strategies are required
for a workforce that blends permanent and contingent workers.
Research can help determine the most important factors driving the
demand for nonstandard employment arrangements, and the management strategies that are the most effective in differing circumstances.
As an illustration, the cost-minimizing strategy of hiring temporary
workers to cover short-run needs such as the replacement of absent
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full-time workers is different from the strategy that focuses on longrun productivity enhancement through labor input flexibility. The latter
strategy may require investing in permanent employees who are trained
to be flexible in adapting to changing work assignments instead of using
contingent workers. Also, we need to understand better how these strategies mesh with hiring nonstandard workers in response to business
cycle changes and structural changes in the economy. For example,
improved understanding of these aspects of employer decision making will help us analyze the forces affecting U.S. firms hiring part-time
and temporary employees, as well as worker dispatching by temporary
employment agencies and the use of part-time workers in Japan and the
growth of temporary employment agencies in Europe.
Also, although standards for the equitable treatment of contingent
workers are available, we have little understanding of why and when
employers implement these models when the choice is voluntary. For
example, the International Labor Organization (ILO) published recommendations for the equal treatment of part-time workers relative to fulltime workers. The ILO recommends that part-time workers should be
paid a comparable wage and have the same statutory coverage of Social
Security programs on a pro-rated basis. Also, these workers should have
the right to organize and bargain collectively, be protected by occupational safety and health laws and against employment discrimination,
and be entitled to equivalent protections for maternity and sick leave,
job termination, paid annual leave and public holidays, and transferring
between part-time and full-time employment (for further discussion
see Zeytinoğlu [1999]). Similarly, in 2002 the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) published “Standards of Good Practice in the Employment of Part-Time/Adjunct Faculty” (2002), which outlines appropriate standards of treatment. These standards include equitable pay and
a seniority system, as well as standards to ensure adjuncts are treated
with professional courtesies.3 Research can help explain the conditions
under which these guidelines will be implemented by employers.
We know that hiring many contingent employees changes the organizational culture. We need to develop strategies that effectively
manage the tensions and conflicts that arise in a blended workforce of
permanent and contingent workers. The management of the attitudes
and performance of contingent employees may require different methods than for permanent employees; the methods also may depend on
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whether the workers are voluntarily or involuntarily in contingent jobs.
Case studies of how various employers manage their blended workforces should provide useful insights.
Extending Coverage of Employment Protections and Benefits
We know that employees with less education and fewer skills—notably women, minorities, younger workers, and those employed involuntarily in contingent work such as part-time jobs—have experienced
the negative effects of nonstandard employment. These include lower
wages and the receipt of few, if any, employment-related benefits from
either the employer or the social welfare system. While some of the
individuals in contingent employment can make education and lifestyle
choices to move into full-time standard employment and improve their
opportunities, many will be left with few options for change and therefore will remain relatively disadvantaged. Consequently, the challenge
is to design a more flexible social welfare system to provide employment protections and benefits to contingent employees that mirror the
protections provided to full-time permanent employees. Another way of
stating this goal is to recognize that “[w]hile we cannot change the level
of risk in today’s economy, we can change the rules that govern how risk
is shared among the participants to the economic game” (Jacoby 1999,
p. 145).
Two research projects would help move us toward this goal. First,
in the United States we need to measure the extent of noncoverage of
the various social welfare programs at the national level. This research
would provide the information for the design of methods and policy to
cover those presently excluded from coverage, as well as the evaluation
of unintended consequences. Researchers can evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of different designs for prorated benefits, portable
pension plans, unemployment insurance, and other programs.
Because of the dominance of women in some of the most economically vulnerable forms of contingent work such as part-time employment, tracking and evaluating government efforts to support gender
equality will help nations monitor their progress. In the United States
attention must be given to finding ways to improve the safety net for
these female workers. Japan also is seeking ways to address the needs
of a changing female labor force in which fewer women are marry-
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ing and marriages are occurring later in life.4 In the EU “. . . the social
contract has failed to incorporate the high-risk groups and ought to be
reviewed. Above all, it must take account of the gender divide, which
has been largely disregarded until now . . .” (Jouen and Caremier 2000,
p. 29).
Comparative Research on Regulation
Comparative research provides insights into how a balance between
supporting flexibility and extending social protections to relatively vulnerable contingent workers can be structured using different models of
regulation (Vosko 1998, pp. 26–27). This in turn requires understanding national preferences for “relative equality of compensation” and
“relative equality in the form of labor market participation” since “not
all forms of equality can be optimized simultaneously” (DiPrete et al.
2004). These trade-offs can be explored in studies of temporary employment agencies and efforts to “harmonize” regulations within the
EU for part-time employment.
We have seen that one of the fastest-growing forms of contingent
employment in the mature economies of the United States, Japan, and
Europe is temporary employment arranged by temporary employment
agencies (Kelloway, Gallagher, and Barling 2004, p. 111). Unlike the
United States, in both Japan and Europe this growth has resulted from
deliberate national policy choices. However, we do not have much empirical analysis documenting how temporary agency workers actually
fare in the labor market.5 Empirical evidence from four countries with
different regulatory environments—Britain (Booth, Francesconi, and
Frank 2002); France (Blanchard and Landier 2002); Sweden (Holmlund and Storrie 2002); and Spain (Dolado, García-Serrano, and Jimeno
2002)—suggests that overall an expansion of temporary jobs to increase
labor market flexibility has measurable negative consequences for temporary workers relative to permanent employment (Booth, Dolodo, and
Frank 2002). Further comparative research is needed to explore this
finding in other countries, as well as to differentiate the impact of institutions and culture on male and female part-time workers (Pfau-Effinger 1998).
A major goal of the EU is to create a single labor market in which
workers can move freely by coordinating and harmonizing the ap-
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proaches to nonstandard employment used by its member nations. This
requires creating consistent standards to determine the employment
conditions of part-time workers and providing the same basic minimum
social protections for temporary employees in all of the member nations
(Vosko 1998).6 The achievement of the EU goals will require the use
of voluntary coordination of policies (referred to as the “open method of coordination”) across nations and EU directives, i.e., “soft law”
supplemented by “hard law” measures such as the Part-Time Workers’
Directives (Ashiagbor 2004; Sciarra 2004). Researchers can study and
monitor the impact of the implementation of this European Employment Strategy over time.
Finally, research can consider how the lessons learned by the mature economies can provide insights for developing countries such as
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India to help them proactively design their legal structure and social safety nets to support labor
market flexibility. The importance of these two nations in the global
economy is growing rapidly, and their populations are moving rapidly
from employment in agriculture to manufacturing and service sectors.
However, in the PRC industrial restructuring reduced employment from
1993 to 2002, creating the same problems for laid-off workers as those
experienced in the United States and Japan (Lu et al. 2002; Banister
2005b). In the PRC movement into contingent employment—often
through migration to other parts of the country—can result in not only
the loss of earnings and social welfare benefits such as pensions and
unemployment pay, but also the loss of subsidies for transportation,
housing, food allowances, and other benefits provided by employers
(Banister 2005a).
Unions and Nonprofit Organizations as Change Agents
Labor unions and nonprofit organizations in the United States have
directed their attention in recent years to improving the economic welfare of the working poor—low-wage contingent workers. Some unions
see the opportunity to serve as an advocate for contingent workers as
an extension of their traditional leadership roles in the protection of
workers’ welfare, while nonprofit organizations serve as advocates for
economic justice for the working poor. Both use multiple strategies:
conducting campaigns to publicize the economic realities faced by the
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working poor, maintaining Web sites on which information is provided
to assist contingent workers and those working on their behalf, sponsoring research on the factors that determine the opportunities of the working poor, organizing community efforts, and pursuing legislative and
political initiatives. In addition, unions are working to organize these
workers. However, we know relatively little about how widespread
such efforts are and what their actual impact may be. Case studies of
the effectiveness of these change agents should yield insights into the
impact of a variety of strategies on employment and wages.
Stone (2004) argues that this expansion of union activities into the
community and political action to represent a broader segment of the
workforce, including contingent workers, is a predictable response to
the transformations in the nature of work. As the attachment of employees to employers is reduced, unions must change from bargaining with
one employer to bargaining with groups of employers to improve workers’ compensation and conditions of work. She distinguishes two new
models of union activity. The first is the “new craft unionism” based
on occupations and bargaining industrywide with employer groups to
facilitate worker mobility between employers. The focus is the creation
of minimum standards and the provision of training.
The second model of “citizen unionism” also focuses on facilitating
contingent worker mobility, setting minimum standards, and providing
training, but only works within a locality or region and is not necessarily limited to a particular occupational group. In addition, efforts are
made to improve the local social infrastructure through improved child
care and legal assistance, and the encouragement of corporate support.
Also, as discussed below, citizen unionism often is based on a collaboration between nonprofit organizations, local unions, and other local
community groups working together to achieve a living wage in a specific geographic location (Stone 2004, Chapter 10).
The efforts by the AFT, the leading organizer of part-time faculty
(AFT 2003), to improve the welfare of part-time teachers is an example
of the new craft unionism based on occupation. It provides protections
for part-time faculty while enabling them to move between employers. A two-pronged approach is used: legislative and political action,
and collective bargaining. This dual strategy was used by the Washington Federation of Teachers (WFT), an AFT affiliate. In 1999 the WFT
successfully pursued a public campaign for pay equity and lobbied to
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convince the governor and the legislature in the State of Washington to
include additional funds in the state budget to increase the pay for parttime faculty. Also, the criterion for participation in the retirement plan
was modified, so more part-time faculty became eligible to participate.7
Subsequently in 2000 a prorata sick leave policy was approved for parttime faculty (AFT 2001). In addition, the AFT used collective bargaining to improve the pay, benefits, and conditions of work for part-time
faculty.8
Another example is the media-intensive multiunion campaign begun in 2004 that focused on retail workers employed by Wal-Mart. It
was led by the AFL-CIO to pressure Wal-Mart to become a better corporate citizen by increasing its wages and health benefits. Because of
the size of the company, no single union can handle the challenge alone.
The campaign was not designed as a unionization effort, but rather as
a means of publicizing the relatively low wages that Wal-Mart pays
throughout the United States, as well as the impact of the introduction of
its supercenters into specific locations (Greenhouse 2004; Quisumbing
2005).
Case studies of these and other union activities can help us understand the conditions that determine whether a union will try to organize
low-wage contingent workers, the factors determining which strategies
are selected by the unions and why, and which organizing strategies are
the most effective for different groups of contingent workers. Comparative research on the strategies used by unions in other countries also
may provide insights into strategies for unions in the United States, and
perhaps vice versa.
Examples of citizen unionism are the California Partnership for
Working Families (CPWF) and Working Today. As part of their broader commitment to economic justice, these nonprofit organizations are
working for both decent standards of living for low-wage contingent
workers and employer compliance in properly classifying employees
(see Chapter 5). Their approach is aimed at improving social welfare
through the payment of a living wage higher than the legally mandated
minimum wage to all eligible workers. This objective is consistent with
the employer responsibilities identified by the United Nations Subcommission on the Promotion and Protections of Human Rights (2003)9:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall
provide workers remuneration that ensures an adequate standard
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of living for them and their families. Such remunerations shall take
due account of their needs for adequate living conditions with a
view towards progressive improvement.

CPWF is a nonprofit, statewide consortium that links organizations
in four major population areas: the East Bay area of San Francisco,
Los Angeles, San Jose, and San Diego. It is committed to an emerging
model of economic development that includes as the primary goal “the
creation of economic opportunity and the reduction of poverty and social inequality” so that development works for the benefit of communities rather than just providing profits to developers and sales tax income
(California Partnerships for Working Families; Center on Policy Initiatives 2004; Karjanen and Baxamusa 2003). Ordinances and agreements
already have been passed which require the payment of a “living wage”
in the East Bay, Los Angeles, and San Jose. One of the CPWF partners,
the Center for Policy Initiatives (CPI) in San Diego, is presently spearheading the San Diego Living Wage Campaign.10 More than 20 unions
support this initiative in San Diego.
Another example is Working Today, which was created in 1995 to
place on the national agenda the issues of part-time workers and others
in temporary and short-term jobs. This national network includes a variety of organizations ranging from labor unions to community groups.
One of its first projects was the Portable Benefits Fund created to provide access to affordable health insurance (Horowitz 2000; Working
Today).
Case studies of organizations such as CPWF and Working Today
can help explain the strategies selected, the factors determining which
strategies are most effective, and the actual impact on the welfare of
contingent workers.11 While these groups have often used city-by-city
campaigns, we do not know whether this is the most effective way to
generate change. Also, although there are more than 120 living wage
laws across the United States, we do not know much about the extent
of their actual impact on working families. For example, the Berkeley
Living Wage Ordinance of 1999 requires city contractors and developers who receive project subsidies of more than $100,000 to pay the living wage rate of $11.37 an hour (California Partnerships for Working
Families). However, this means that many low-wage workers are not
covered. We do not know whether employers have found ways to avoid
complying with the law or what the unintended consequences, either
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positive or negative, for covered and noncovered workers are. We do
not know what factors will explain the success or failure of approaches
such as the Portable Benefits Fund.

Conclusion
All labor market participants, whether employers, employees, or
unions, operate within the legal framework of their nations and the expectations of their societies. What they can and cannot do is regulated
by government, which can play a supportive role or create barriers to
change. Each nation therefore has to choose how it will address the
challenges of designing its future employment relations system to explicitly include workers in nonstandard employment arrangements. The
challenge for the future is to develop public policies to protect the truly
contingent workers at least as well as we protect workers in standard
employment arrangements.
Research will provide guidance for the selection of the components
chosen by employers, unions, and governments for this future system. It
also will help identify better approaches to balancing the employer and
the employee interests.12 The need is for flexibility and efficiency while
treating all employees equitably in a world of rapid and continuous economic change. What is sought is “a more humane model of flexibility”
(Jouen and Caremier 2000, p. 135).

Notes
1. For a detailed discussion of the factors determining the dynamics of transitional labor markets see O’Reilly, Cebrián, and Lallement (2000).
2. The CFCW was created in 1999 in Seattle, Washington. Permatemps are
defined as contingent employees who have been misclassified by employers and therefore ineligible for job security, equal pay, and benefits.
3. Many adjunct faculty, along with graduate students, perceive themselves
to be exploited by the low pay and poor working conditions at colleges
and universities in the United States. They are seeking unionization as
a means of addressing their employment concerns. Unions as diverse

Gleason.indb 322

11/13/2006 9:07:06 AM

Where Do We Go from Here? 323

4.

5.

6.

7.
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as the California Part-Time Faculty Association, the National Education
Association, and the AFT have been organizing these contingent faculty.
See Smallwood (2002).
This situation is a source of concern to the Japanese national government. Since the latter half of the 1970s the birth rate has followed a
steady downward trend. The country experienced in 2004 the lowest rate
of population growth since 1899 when data collection began, and international migration adds to the population only marginally. At the same
time the population is aging rapidly, and much faster than in Western
Europe and the United States. For example, it is projected that in 2030
the percentage of the population aged 65 and over in the United States
will be about 19 percent, while in Japan it will be about 30 percent. See
Ujimoto (2000) and Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2006).
It is important to remember that temporary employment firms are not
necessarily inherently bad actors in the labor market. However, the way
in which they conduct their business has disadvantaged the workers they
hire by not providing many of the job protections available to full-time
core workers. While temporary employment arrangements provide employers with an option for flexibility, they also relieve employers to varying degrees depending on the country from some of the costs associated
with permanent employees.
The “European Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work” was signed
in June 1997. The agreement states the principle of nondiscrimination
that “part-time workers shall not be treated in a less favorable manner
than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part-time
unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds” (p. 242). It
also requires the member states to identify and eliminate obstacles that
will limit part-time employment opportunities. Employers are expected
to facilitate the movement of employees between part-time and full-time
work and vice versa. However, this is not a comprehensive agreement.
There is no reference to social security issues since these matters are left
to each country. The wording in the nondiscrimination statement also
permits employers to treat part-time and full-time workers differently
under some circumstances. See European Union (1997). For a detailed
discussion of the tension within the EU as it works to increase labor
market flexibility see Teague (1999).
A recommendation also was made by the state agency overseeing community colleges to increase the number of full-time jobs and to use fewer
part-time faculty.
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8. Collective bargaining also was used to restore full-time faculty positions
and negotiate provisions which permit full-time nontenured faculty to
move to tenure-track positions. See Chapter 4 for additional examples of
the use of collective bargaining to improve pay, benefits, and conditions
of work.
9. Similar standards also have been set by other groups such as Social Accountability International (SAI), a nonprofit organization based in the
United States. SAI provides codes of conduct for business community
organizations such as the Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now (ACORN) that also are pursuing policy changes to create living wage ordinances. However, while such goals are expressed as
ethical goals, it is not easy to reach agreement on a specific standard, although minimal standards can be set. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, along with other business groups, has actively opposed
the creation of living wage standards (Lafer 2005). For a more detailed
discussion of codes of social accountability which support the concept of
the living wage, see Wheeler (2005).
10. The CPI provides information and serves as an advocacy group for workers in “retail and service jobs—jobs that are often just or above the minimum wage with no health care benefits.” In 1994 the first living wage
was adopted in Baltimore. See Center on Policy Initiatives (2006).
11. For additional examples of innovative ways to improve the welfare of
nonstandard employees see Carré and Joshi (2000).
12. For an expanded discussion of the importance of balancing employer
and employee interests see Budd, Gomez, and Meltz (2004).
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